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I want you to know 
one thing. 
 
You know how this is: 
if I look 
at the crystal moon, at the red branch 
of the slow autumn at my window, 
if I touch 
near the fire 
the impalpable ash 
or the wrinkled body of the log, 
everything carries me to you, 
as if everything that exists, 
aromas, light, metals, 
were little boats 
that sail 
toward those isles of yours that wait for me. 
 
Well, now, 
if little by little you stop loving me 
I shall stop loving you little by little. 
 
If suddenly 
you forget me 
do not look for me, 
for I shall already have forgotten you. 
 
If you think it long and mad, 
the wind of banners 
that passes through my life, 
and you decide 
to leave me at the shore 
of the heart where I have roots, 
remember 
that on that day, 
at that hour, 
I shall lift my arms 
and my roots will set off 
to seek another land. 
 
But 
if each day, 
each hour, 
you feel that you are destined for me 
with implacable sweetness, 
if each day a flower 
climbs up to your lips to seek me, 
ah my love, ah my own, 
in me all that fire is repeated, 
in me nothing is extinguished or forgotten, 
my love feeds on your love, beloved, 
and as long as you live it will be in your arms 
without leaving mine. 
 
Pablo Neruda, “Si tú me olvidas” (1952). 
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Despite abundant research on emotions, the more complex features of emotional 
experience, such as mixed emotions, have only been recently investigated. The present 
research project presents evidence from five studies dedicated to better understanding the 
origin and consequences of mixed emotions (i.e., the co-occurrence of oppositely valenced 
emotions, such as feeling happy and sad). Firstly, a meta-analytic review of the literature 
(k=63) determined mixed emotions as a robust and a non-artifactual experience. Study 1 
(N=35) showed that goal conflict significantly predicted greater levels of mixed emotions 
compared to when no conflict was present. In Study 2 (N=57) actual goal conflict experiences 
predicted greater levels of mixed emotions compared to another intergoal dynamic (i.e., 
facilitating goals). Findings of Study 3 (N=429) supported the relationship between goal 
conflict and mixed emotions using a cross-sectional design, and confirmed a positive 
correlation between mixed emotions and different measures of eudaimonic well-being. 
Results of Study 4 (N=52) demonstrated that eliciting mixed emotions in a sample of students 
about to graduate produced greater levels of eudaimonic well-being. Finally, Study 5 (N=73) 
used an experience-sampling design to clarify the association between mixed emotions and 
eudaimonic well-being such that: (1) individual differences in mixed emotions interacted 
with goal conflict to predict greater levels of life-purpose; (2) fluctuations in mixed emotions 
mediated the relationship between goal conflict and efforts to resist temptations, (3) mixed 
emotions also interacted with efforts to resist temptations, which was associated with 
enhanced vitality. The findings of these five studies are integrated and discussed in terms of 
their implications for goal theory, well-being related outcomes and emotional complexity 
theory. Overall, this research project’s main contributions are: that goal conflict is a 
prominent predictor of mixed emotions, and that mixed emotions can help people to 
overcome the negative consequences of goal conflict, enhancing eudaimonic well-being.  
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1. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
“I certainly found being there an astonishing experience. Although I was witnessing the death of one 
who was my friend, I had no feeling of pity, for the man appeared happy both in manner and words as 
he died nobly and without fear, […] I had a strange feeling, an unaccustomed mixture of pleasure and 
pain at the same time as I reflected that he was just about to die […]” 
Plato (Phaedo; e.59).  
 
espite notable progress in the study of emotion, it is possible to observe certain 
paucity in the investigation of more complex features of emotional life, beyond the 
classic distinction between positive affect (i.e., emotional experiences characterised as 
positively valenced, including both activated and deactivated affect, such as happiness and 
relaxation) and negative affect (i.e., emotional experiences characterised as negatively 
valenced, including both activated and deactivated affects, such as sadness and anger). 
Questions such as how the covariation of different emotions can: (a) explain certain effects, 
(b) give rise to new emotional experiences and/or (c) result in the regulation of the activated 
emotion itself, are not well understood. Only in recent years have scholars been equipped 
with better methods, which have enabled their scientific exploration. 
Defining the concept of emotion has been the subject of extensive debate in the 
history of Psychology (Gendron, 2010). However, at the present, it is mostly accepted that the 
concept of emotion is a description of its dominant uses, which implies a certain fuzziness 
and over inclusivity (Dixon, 2012). According to Mulligan and Scherer (2012), the minimum 
conditions that define an emotion are that: (a) emotions are directed towards an object; (b) 
emotions involve bodily changes that are felt; (c) emotions contain a subjective experience; 
(d) emotions are triggered by a certain evaluation of an external event, usually referred as an 




Based on a survey administered to 35 distinguished scientists in the field, Izard (2010) 
defined emotions as “neural circuits (that are at least partially dedicated), response systems, 
and a feeling state/process that motivates and organised cognition and action” (p. 367). 
Emotions have been also characterised as producing consistent patterns of feelings 
over time that distinguish one individual from another (Gohm & Clore, 2000). Emotions can 
be studied as individual differences in the tendency to experience certain emotions, the 
intensity of emotional experiences, and the expressiveness of emotions (Gohm & Clore, 
2000). Contrasting with typical definitions of emotion, individual differences in emotions 
have been thought of as states of feelings or moods that do not require an object (Clore, 
Schwarz, & Conway, 1994). Moods are global and diffuse affective states, which also entail 
functional properties in the sense that moods may signal discrepancies between necessary and 
perceived resources available to the self; whereas emotions are specific and object-directed, 
and result from discrepancies between perceptions and any goal-related aspect of a situation 
(Morris, 1992). 
Considering the functional implications of emotions and moods (usually covered 
under the general concept of affect; Batson, Shaw, & Oleson, 1992) for individuals’ lives, the 
effect of affect on well-being has been one of the most studied (Izard, 2010). For example, 
multiple studies have consistently shown that positive affect improves life satisfaction and 
promotes better health (e.g., Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000; Tugade, Fredrickson, & 
Barrett, 2004), implying that negative affect reduces well-being. This tradition has reinforced 
the idea that the structure of affect is better represented as positive emotions and negative 
emotions lying at opposite extremes on the dimension of valence (e.g., Russell & Carroll, 
1999; Yik, 2007). Thus, for example, happiness and sadness should be represented such that 
an increase in one necessarily implies a proportional decrease in the other. 
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However, distinguishing positive affect and negative affect may not be enough to 
understand the full range of emotional experiences, their antecedents or consequences. For 
example, in the field of the emotional determinants of well-being, recent studies indicate that 
greater fluctuations in positive emotions (i.e., high variations of positive emotions, such as 
feeling excited and minutes later feeling fully relaxed) predict lower well-being and life 
satisfaction, and greater depression and anxiety (Gruber, Kogan, Quoidbach, & Mauss, 
2013). Similarly, new findings suggest that experiencing more flexible, wide-ranging 
emotional experiences offers additional benefits (beyond positive and negative emotions) for 
mental and physical health, such as decreased depression and fewer GP visits (Quoidbach et 
al., 2014). This evidence emphasises that emotional life is often more complex than 
traditional distinctions between positive and negative affect would imply. 
One striking phenomenon that exemplifies the complexity of emotional life is mixed 
emotions, which are the focus of the current research. As noted by Plato, mixed emotions are 
defined as affective experiences characterised by the co-activation of both positive and 
negative emotions, such as feeling happy and sad concurrently (Larsen & McGraw, 2011; 
Larsen, McGraw, & Cacioppo, 2001). For example, participants in a study reported greater 
feelings of concurrent happiness and sadness after, compared to before, watching the film 
Life is Beautiful (a bittersweet film based on the fictional story of a boy and his father who 
tries to protect him from the horrors of a concentration camp during the second world war) 
(Larsen, et al., 2001, Study 1). Similarly, a study using a sample of first year undergraduate 
students, found that students who had just moved to their dormitories felt significantly sadder 
but also more excited than on a typical day before arriving at university (Larsen, et al., 2001, 
Study 2). 
Take the following situation illustrated by Kristjánsson (2010) as an example of how 
mixed emotions may be felt in everyday life. Two very close friends - call them John and 
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June - are competing for the same job, both are very competent and the two of them have 
been short-listed for an interview. In the end June gets the job. How might John be feeling 
about the situation? Presumably John feels something like happiness and disappointment. He 
might feel happy because June got the job, she is his friend and they have shared many good 
things together; but he also might feel disappointed because he did not get the job. Thus, it 
seems that happiness and disappointment are linked to the same fact: June got the job. The 
rest of this chapter is dedicated to providing a broad overview of the concept of mixed 
emotions, and reviewing existing research in this area. This chapter also presents the aims of 
the current research project and a model, which summarises the main hypotheses that will be 
tested.  
1.1. Understanding mixed emotions  
Acknowledgment of the presence of mixed emotions can be traced as far back as 
Plato’s Phaedo, where he suggested that pleasure and pain may be experienced together, as 
the epigraph cited at the top of this chapter reveals. Aristotle’s Rhetoric (trans. 2006) also 
mentioned that the same emotion might involve pleasure and pain un-paradoxically. 
Although these two philosophers lived hundreds of years apart, and mostly offered dissimilar 
conceptions about human spirit, it seems that they agreed on the existence of mixed emotions. 
Likewise, Hume (1739/1985) indicated that two different passions can be joined in the mind, 
particularly when those feelings are elicited by different objects or events. Hume argued that 
under some circumstances feelings such as hope and fear can be experienced together.  
Although some classic philosophers agree about the importance of mixed emotions in 
human experience, the investigation of mixed emotions has aroused controversy since the 
beginning of the scientific Psychology era. Kellogg (1915) was one of the first to 
scientifically investigate and appropriately document the experience of mixed emotions. In 
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his study he presented rapidly alternating pictures of pleasant (e.g., a cat) and unpleasant 
(e.g., a surgical intervention) stimuli. Kellogg’s findings indicated that rapidly alternating 
these pairs of pictures produced mixed feelings, but not in all participants and only when 
adequate levels of attention were present. He concluded that two opposite streams of feelings 
can operate continuously, unless one of these feelings has a much greater intensity, in which 
case, the stronger prevails. However, shortly after, Young (1918) argued that such mixed 
feelings represent a ‘meaning error’; that is, people confuse emotions felt with emotion 
intellectualisation, which refers to a rationalisation of an event using emotion words without 
the corresponding feeling. These conclusions were based on the fact that only a small portion 
of the reports in his study corresponded to clear descriptions of mixed feelings. 
Over time, and particularly in the last fifteen years, research interest in mixed 
emotions has grown (see Figure 1) but controversies in the field survive. Critics have mostly 
argued that mixed emotions are merely a reactive phenomenon related to expectancies of 
participants and/or researchers and arise from confusion in reports of emotion (Barrett & 
Bliss-Moreau, 2009; Brehm & Miron, 2006; Greenspan, 2003; Russell, 2003). As a result, a 
substantial amount of research on mixed emotions has been dedicated to demonstrating that 
mixed emotions are not a product of: demand effects, lay theories of mixed emotions, 
vacillation, or measurement problems (Larsen & McGraw, 2011; Larsen et al., 2001; Rafaeli 
& Revelle, 2006; Schimmack, 2001, 2005). 
It is worth mentioning that mixed emotions should not be confused with three 
apparently related concepts: attitudinal ambivalence, meta-emotions, and emotional conflict. 
Attitudinal ambivalence refers to affective perceptions (opinions or ideas) about something 
(Kaplan, 1972), like for example, having both positive and negative attitudes towards gay 
marriage or political aspirants. Conversely, mixed emotions refer to one’s own affective 
experience, not affective perceptions (opinions or ideas) about something. Meta-emotions 
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refer to recurrent emotional reactions about one’s own emotions (Mitmansgruber, Beck, & 
Schüßler, 2008). Meta-emotion implies that one’s current emotion serves as an object for a 
secondary emotion (Mitmansgruber, Beck, Höfer, & Schüßler, 2009). For example, feel 
angry for being sad. Thus, experiencing a meta-emotion requires that one emotion (e.g., 
anger) triggers a secondary emotion (e.g., sadness); one emotion is the cause of a subsequent 
emotion. This is not the case when experiencing mixed emotions. The concept of mixed 
emotions implies that the subjective experience is fused into one feeling containing two 
different affects. Finally, the concept of emotional conflict refers to feelings of ambivalence 
about expressing (or experiencing) certain emotions, like feeling conflicted about 
demonstrating affection towards other people (King & Emmons, 1990). Some authors have 
equated emotional conflict to mixed emotions (Carver, Sutton, & Scheier, 2000); therefore, 
emotional conflict demands closer examination to determine the nature of the relationship 









Figure 1. Number of citations extracted from Scholar-Google including mixed emotions or related 


























1.2. Can two opposite emotions truly be experienced as occurring at the 
same time? 
Growing interest in mixed emotions has also led researchers to examine whether 
mixed emotions can have specific physiological patterns (Henderson & Norris, 2013; 
Kreibig, Samson, & Gross, 2013), with evidence showing that mixed emotions involve 
particular physiological responses that are not simply reducible to their constituent emotions. 
Yet, extant emotion research has, by and large, focused on the experience of singular rather 
than mixed affects (Lench, Flores, & Bench, 2011). In part, this has occurred because of 
assertions that positive affect and negative affect cannot coexist because they represent 
opposite ends of a bipolar dimension of valence (Russell, 2003; Russell & Carroll, 1999). 
According to the circumplex model of affect (Russell, 1980), valence is a psychological 
primitive (Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009) that cannot be divided to combine positive and 
negative feelings. 
To suggest that two opposite emotions, such as happiness and sadness, can be 
experienced concurrently is particularly contentious because the circumplex model of affect 
has been among the most popular and widely used theories of affect (Remmington, Fabrigar, 
& Visser, 2000). According to some authors, mixed emotions do not reflect the co-activation 
of two opposite emotions, rather they are simply two distinctive, consecutive emotional 
responses regarding two unrelated events (Greenspan, 2003; Russell, 2003), and that reports 
of mixed emotions are merely an illusion (Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009), a perceptual error, 
as suggested by Young (1918). Thus, for example, when people report having experienced 
mixed emotions after watching the bittersweet film Life is Beautiful, they summarised a 
roller-coaster of emotions experienced throughout the film that they, mistakenly, attributed 
as feeling two opposite emotions concurrently. 
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  As a consequence of the aforementioned criticisms, new methods were developed to 
more accurately probe the simultaneous experience of mixed emotions. For example, Carrera 
and Oceja (2007) implemented a moment-to-moment measure of mixed emotions (an 
Analogical Emotional Scale, AES). Following an emotion elicitation procedure (a film clip), 
participants were instructed to draw two separate curves representing the intensity of two 
opposite emotions (e.g., happy and sad) over a space designated by an axis marking the 
intensity of emotions (vertical axis), and another axis marking time - since the beginning until 
the end of the emotional event (horizontal axis). This measure allows simultaneous and 
consecutive emotional reactions over time to be distinguished. 
However, the AES relies on a retrospective evaluation of an emotional event, making 
viable the criticisms that two emotions may not be activated at the same time. As a result, a 
more refined simultaneous measure of mixed emotions was developed by Larsen and 
colleagues (2011). In this method, participants report on each emotion (e.g., happiness or 
sadness) by pressing separate buttons while being exposed to an emotional event (e.g., a 
film), having the possibility to press one, two or no buttons during the duration of the 
experiment. In this manner, mixed emotions reports are taken online, and confusion cannot be 
held as responsible for participants’ responses because the two opposite emotions can be 
reported separately. Research using this measure has demonstrated that, for example, 
participants who watched a clip from the film Life is Beautiful pressed the two buttons 
simultaneously more than participants who did not watch this clip (Larsen & McGraw, 2011, 
Study 4). 
Even this contemporary simultaneous measure of affect may be subject to criticisms, 
however. People’s monitoring of their emotional experiences can lead to reactive responses. 
That is, requesting people to monitor their emotional states may produce distorted emotional 
responses (Russell & Carroll, 1999). To remedy this problem, Larsen and Green (2013, Study 
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2) used the simultaneous measure of affect in an experiment where participants monitored 
their emotions only once, when asked participants to do so by the researcher. Again, results 
confirmed that participants experienced more mixed emotions while watching the film Life is 
Beautiful compared to those watching an emotionally neutral film. Likewise, evidence 
derived from diary studies (e.g., Diener & Iran-Nejad, 1986; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1996), 
has shown that people sometimes report two opposite emotions together in everyday life, 
suggesting that this complex emotional experience may also take place in naturally occurring 
settings. However, it could be argued that mixed emotions do not reflect real co-activation 
but rather very rapid oscillations between two opposite affects (Brehm & Miron, 2006).  
In part because of the novelty of the research on mixed emotions and the alternative 
approaches suggesting that mixed emotions cannot be experienced, many questions 
concerning mixed emotions have not been empirically assessed. For example, it is unknown 
whether the diversity of studies and measures used to investigate mixed emotions have 
produced consistent evidence to support mixed emotions. Similarly, little is known about how 
mixed emotions emerge or what effects experiencing mixed emotions has. 
Precisely, this research seeks to better understand the influence of goal conflict as the 
main predictor of mixed emotions (chapter 3) and the effects of experiencing mixed emotions 
(chapters 4 and 5). Although the focus of this project is not to provide definite answers to 
current criticisms, it heeds the controversy in the field (further examination is provided in 
chapter 2). The approach of the present contribution understands the controversy as an 
opportunity to enlarge the horizons of a growing field of study in emotion science. According 
to Dascal (1998) the existence of controversy is what facilitates the expansion of existing 
conceptual limits of science, leading to radical scientific innovations. 
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Although the present contribution is much more modest than radical scientific 
innovation, it shares the enthusiasm for using controversies as a platform for gaining a greater 
understanding of a phenomenon, specifically, more clarity about the predictor and effects of 
mixed emotions. Ultimately, one way to provide support for the existence of psychological 
phenomena is to establish their antecedents and consequences on well-known phenomena. 
1.3. Research domains where mixed emotions have been studied 
Before continuing with the description of the model proposed to examine the 
influence of conflicting goals on the elicitation of mixed emotions and effects of mixed 
emotions, it should be noted that the concept of mixed emotions has been explored in several 
research domains, most of the time using different terminology, but preserving the basic 
understanding that mixed emotions refer to the co-activation of opposite emotions.  
The following paragraphs describe the research domains where mixed emotions have 
been studied, including research on mixed emotions in applied psychology (i.e., mixed 
emotions in consumer research); mixed emotions as an individual difference (i.e., 
synchrony); mixed emotions as a cultural hallmark (i.e., dialecticism); and the investigation 
of mixed emotions as a limited time experience (i.e., poignancy). Each of these aspects is 
briefly detailed below.  
1.3.1. Consumer research and mixed emotions 
Investigation on consumer research is mainly interested in understanding buying-
related attitudes and behaviours; within this context, mixed emotions have been seen as an 
emotional determinant of consumer behaviours (Williams & Aaker, 2002). One phenomenon 
that has interested researchers is people’s attraction to watching horror films; they have 
wondered whether mixed emotions play a role in this type of preference (Andrade & Cohen, 
2007; Bee & Madrigal, 2013; Madrigal & Bee, 2005). For example, Andrade and Cohen 
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(2007, Study 3a) demonstrated that preferences for gory horror films are accounted for by the 
experience of mixed emotions of fear and happiness. 
One interesting contribution of the investigation of mixed emotions in consumer 
research has been the acknowledgement of mixed emotions as a complex emotional 
experience (Aaker, Drolet, & Griffin, 2008). Previous findings have shown that people have 
more difficulties trying to recall past experiences involving mixed emotions, implying that 
greater resources are needed to process and to store these emotions in memory (Aaker, 
Drolet, & Griffin, 2008). Evidence has shown that the decline in memory for mixed emotions 
experiences are different from the patterns observed for memories of negative emotions. 
Compared to negative emotions, the memory of mixed emotions experiences had completely 
different slopes and intercepts in the regression models, implying that it is the complexity 
rather than the negativity that account for the difficulties recalling mixed emotional 
experiences (Aaker et al., 2008). 
A final note worth mentioning about the studies of mixed emotions in consumer 
research is the link that some researchers have made between self-regulatory dynamics and 
mixed emotions; in particular, evidence suggests that the simultaneous experience of positive 
and negative emotions may be a result of indulgence consumption (Mukhopadhyay & Johar, 
2007; Ramanathan & Williams, 2007). That is, people may experience mixed emotions as a 
result of having yielded to a temptation, such as buying an unwanted item that is against 
efforts people make to avoid compulsive purchases. 
1.3.2. Mixed emotions as an individual difference 
Rafaeli, Rogers and Revelle (2007) investigated whether the experience of mixed 
emotions can be understood as an individual difference. This individual difference, which 
they called affective synchrony, was inferred from within person correlations between 
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energetic arousal and tense arousal, over and above other personality dimensions of affect 
(i.e., positive or negative mood). Across five intensive longitudinal studies, they found that 
the average within person correlation between positive and negative affect is close to zero, 
nonetheless, this average was qualified by large and stable individual differences identified 
via the random-effect coefficients in the studies. Synchrony’s stability was tested in another 
study where 82 women completed records of affective experiences every 3-waking hours, 
during two non-consecutive weeks. This design allowed researchers to estimate separate 
synchrony indices for each week and then correlate both coefficients. Results revealed that 
the association between the two indices was large in magnitude and significant, which 
indicated that synchrony was stable over time; similar findings were observed in Study 4 and 
Study 5 of the present research project. 
An independent research investigation (Wilt, Funkhouser, & Revelle, 2011), reporting 
two new experiencing-sampling studies, replicated these findings and also observed 
synchrony for pleasant and unpleasant affect. Furthermore, these studies determined that 
affective synchrony, for both energetic-tense and pleasant-unpleasant pairs, was predicted by 
a tendency to flexibly perceive threatening and pleasant situations as occurring together. The 
authors speculated that these findings suggested that people who, on average, felt emotions 
more synchronously may have noticed the potential benefits of negative situations (Wilt, 
Funkhouser, & Revelle, 2011). The concept of affective synchrony emphasises that mixed 
emotions can be characterised as an individual difference, which may lead some people to 
feel greater mixed emotions in everyday life, and in turn, could offer some benefits when 





1.3.3. Cultural differences in the experience of mixed emotions 
The concept of dialecticism (Bagozzi, Wong, & Yi, 1999) considers that individuals 
are able to integrate both positive and negative aspects during complex situations, using both 
aspects to figure out alternative interpretations of external events (Bagozzi et al., 1999). This 
concept is based on elemental Chinese philosophical principles according to which people can 
accept contradiction by recognising the coexistence of opposites as a natural process during 
change, and by looking for the connections in the opposites as a way of development (Peng & 
Nisbett, 1999). The study of dialecticism has been situated in the field of cultural differences. 
Evidence indicates that Eastern cultures are more likely to experience dialectic emotions 
(Bagozzi et al., 1999; Scollon, Diener, Oishi, & Biswas-Diener, 2005). Dialectic emotions are 
characterised by combining positive and negative emotions without apparent contradiction. For 
example, Bagozzi and colleagues (1999) found that among Chinese population samples the 
correlation between positive and negative affect tended to be positive; whereas the opposite 
pattern was observed with US-American samples. Similar results have been obtained in other 
studies (Kitayama, Markus, & Kurokawa, 2000). Evidence has shown that the critical cultural 
feature that predicts emotional dialecticism is a dialectic philosophy within the country, and 
not merely a distinction between collectivistic and individualistic societies (Schimmack, Oishi, 
& Diener, 2002). 
Dialecticism sheds some light on the subjective experience associated with mixed 
emotions. Given that emotional dialecticism is imbued by the dialectic philosophy, the 
subjective experience is characterised by feelings of integration and acceptance of opposite 
emotions as co-occurring (Bagozzi et al., 1999). However, the exploration of the subjective 
experience of mixed emotions has produced mixed results. In a study, a group of students were 
asked to report the extent to which they felt bittersweet on the day that they just moved-out to 
their dormitories and on a typical day (Larsen et. al., 2001, Study 2). Results failed to confirm 
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that participants on the move-out day felt subjectively more bittersweet. Other studies using 
different subjective measures have shown more auspicious results (Fong, 2006). 
1.3.4. Poignancy and the study of mixed emotions in the elderly 
Poignancy refers to a mixed emotions experience that occurs in the face of 
meaningful endings, such as graduation day (Ersner-Hershfield, Mikels, Sullivan, & 
Carstensen, 2008). For example, in one study, participants were guided to imagine the 
experience of being at their favourite place. The experimental group was guided to imagine 
themselves in their favourite location but as though this would be the last time that they 
would be able to visit it, whereas the control group continued imagining themselves in their 
favourite place normally. Results showed that participants in the meaningful ending condition 
reported more mixed emotions compared to the control group (Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2008, 
Study 1). This evidence emphasises that mixed emotions can be elicited by certain person-
situation transactions characterised by contexts containing a pleasant component (i.e., a 
favourite location) and a threatening one (i.e., the last opportunity to visit a favourite 
location). 
In a replication study, Zhang, Ersner-Hershfield, and Fung (2010) found that 
differences in poignancy can be accounted for by age; older people tend to experience greater 
poignancy compared to their younger counterparts. Similarly, other findings have revealed 
that the intra-individual correlation between positive and negative affect tends to turn positive 
with age (Carstensen, Pasupathi, Mayr, & Nesselroade, 2000; Ong & Bergeman, 2004), 
contrasting with typical findings from the circumplex model of affect (Russell & Carroll, 




Interestingly, evidence has also shown that, among older adults (over 60-years old), 
the co-activation of positive and negative emotions is associated with greater resilience (Ong 
& Bergman, 2004). Individuals who scored higher on neuroticism and perceived stress (two 
variables usually related to experiencing less well-being) were more likely to experience 
emotions in a bipolar fashion, as either good or bad (Ong & Bergman, 2004). 
In summary, six conclusions can be extracted from the brief review of the research 
domains where mixed emotions have been employed, although the last three mentioned here 
are of particular interest for the present research. First, evidence derived from consumer 
research has revealed the importance of understanding mixed emotions as a complex 
emotional experience, and not merely as the summation of isolated emotions. This is 
important because it suggests that these experiences can be distinguished from simple 
distinctions between positive and negative affect. 
Second, studies on dialecticisms highlight the importance of understanding the 
subjective experience of mixed emotions, which is difficult to infer from self-reports using 
only emotional adjectives. For example, asking people to report their emotions using 
adjectives, such as happy or sad, do not inform researchers about people’s inner feelings and 
the mental representations of these emotions. Understanding whether mixed emotions are 
represented as feeling contrasting emotions at the same time, may help to clarify the 
subjective experience of mixed emotions. 
Third, one marked characteristic of this body of research is its diversity. For example, 
the majority of the research investigating mixed emotions substantially varies in terms of the 
measures used to evaluate the presence of mixed emotions (e.g., correlations between 
positive and negative emotions, simultaneous measure), and types of mixed emotions studied 
(e.g., happy-sad, fear-happy, energetic-tense). Although further details and implications of 
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this diversity are properly addressed in the following chapter (chapter 2), suffice to say that 
this evidence has not been systematised in order to estimate how robust the experience of 
mixed emotions is across a variety of methods.  
Fourth, current evidence emphasises the importance of understanding the conditions 
that promote the emergence of mixed emotions. Since the first documented study on mixed 
emotions, the importance of contextual variables has been acknowledged (Kellogg, 1915). 
This also has been stressed by current research showing that situations containing pleasant 
and threatening components are favourable for eliciting mixed emotions (Ersner-Hershfield et 
al., 2008; Mukhopadhyay & Johar, 2007; Ramanathan & Williams, 2007; Wilt et al., 2011). 
However, researchers have not yet agreed what could be the origins of mixed emotions. 
Fifth, it is interesting to note the link that some researchers have established between 
mixed emotions and self-control dilemmas (e.g., Mukhopadhyay & Johar, 2007; Ramanathan 
& Williams, 2007). For these researchers, mixed emotions may be the result of yielding to 
temptations. However, an unexplored path is to examine whether mixed emotions may also 
be involved during a self-control dilemma and not solely when evaluating outcomes once a 
decision has been made (e.g., after being purchased an unwanted item).  
Finally, diverse sources of evidence suggest that mixed emotions may have beneficial 
effects for individuals. Studies on individual differences of mixed emotions have mentioned 
that synchrony may provide a buffer for coping with negative situations (Wilt et al., 2011). 
Similar evidence may be implied from research studying limited time experiences, with 
studies showing that poignancy may be associated with greater resilience among older adults 
(Ong & Bergman, 2004). Nevertheless, the effects of mixed emotions on individual well-




1.4. Aims of the current research 
In light of this research background, the aims of this research are threefold: (a) to 
evaluate the robustness of mixed emotions; (b) to determine the psychological factors that 
elicit the experience of mixed emotions; and (c) to examine the effects of mixed emotions on 
psychological well-being and self-control. 
1.4.1. Evaluating the robustness of mixed emotions as a phenomenon 
As mentioned, it is helpful to evaluate the accrued evidence concerning mixed 
emotions in order to establish the robustness of mixed emotions as a phenomenon. 
Robustness in the philosophy of science refers to the quality of a scientific phenomenon, 
according to which it is sufficiently invariant under a number of conditions to reach identical 
conclusions about the process under scrutiny (Wimsatt, 1981/2012). 
Wimsatt (1981/2012) argued that in life and social sciences it is usual to find multiple 
models and techniques to investigate singular phenomena. Thus, finding consistency across a 
diverse set of evidence and approaches serves as a criterion of reality of entities (Wimsatt, 
1981/2012). However, it is important to note that robustness does not confirm a theory, but it 
only helps to identify robust theories or principles (Weisberg, 2006); that is, theories that are 
consistent regardless of the approach used in the experimentation stage. 
Hence, the first aim of this research project is to establish whether mixed emotions 
can be considered a robust phenomenon. As previously shown, research on mixed emotions 
has substantially varied in terms of the different approaches in which the co-activation of two 
opposite affects has been studied. This diversity is more complex when the different 
measures and underlying models are taken into account. In this scenario, there will always be 
room to question whether one experiment produced evidence supporting the experience of 
mixed emotions because it is simply an artifact derived from incorrect assumptions or an 
30 
 
imperfect measurement model. In contrast, it is unlikely that two or more utterly different 
models or techniques may be flawed and yet find consistent evidence between them (Trizio, 
2012). Therefore, a systematisation of the accumulated evidence is necessary. A quantitative 
review of the literature will establish whether the evidence concerning mixed emotions 
produced similar results. The confirmation of the robustness of mixed emotions will establish 
that, regardless of the methods or models used to investigate mixed emotions, the 
phenomenon remains stable. 
1.4.2. Determining the predictor of mixed emotions 
The second aim is to determine the effect of conflicting goals in the activation of 
mixed emotions. Several views in emotion theory have argued that emotional experience is 
yoked to features of external situations. Arnold (1960), for example, proposed that emotions 
can be represented as affective perceptions in tone with relevant external situations. Similar 
notions have been incorporated in communicational models of affect (Parkinson, 1997), 
appraisal theories of emotions (Moors, 2013), and even by conceptualisations that dispense of 
any high evaluative process in the experience of emotions (Zajonc, 1984). Therefore, 
understanding affective experiences requires specifications about the conditions that promote 
the emergence of certain affective experiences, and this extends to mixed emotions. 
Studies investigating poignancy emphasise the importance of the contextual factors 
that promote the emergence of mixed emotions (e.g., Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2008). 
Similarly, findings studying cultural differences in mixed emotions have explicitly concluded 
that situations involving loss, self-others comparison, and life transitions are related to 
experiencing mixed emotions (Miyamoto, Uchida, & Ellsworth, 2010). However, despite the 
importance of this evidence, it is still unclear what the psychological predictors of mixed 
emotions actually are. 
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1.4.3. Examining the effects of mixed emotions on well-being and self-
control 
The third and final aim is to examine the effects that mixed emotions might have on 
psychological well-being and self-control. Previous research investigating poignancy have 
speculated that mixed emotions may be important during stressful situations because these 
complex emotional experiences help individuals to get the best from negative life events 
(Ong & Bergman, 2004). Similar conclusions have been derived from studies on individual 
differences in mixed emotions (Wilt et al., 2011). However, so far, evidence demonstrating 
the beneficial effects of experiencing mixed emotions is notably scarce (see Hershfield, 
Scheibe, Sims, & Carstensen, 2013, for an exception). 
On the other hand, some studies in the field of consumer research have indicated that 
mixed emotions may be a consequence of experiencing self-control dilemmas, such as 
wanting some chocolate and being on a diet (Mukhopadhyay & Johar, 2007; Ramanathan & 
Williams, 2007). However, as previous research has only investigated mixed emotions as a 
consequence of decision outcomes (examining mixed emotions as a result of purchasing 
unwanted items), it is legitimate to question whether mixed emotions may play a role during 
the self-control dilemma itself. 
To address and better justify this aim, this section is separated into two brief sub-
sections. Firstly, a general background to understand the concept of well-being, and some 
selected approaches to study it are provided. This background sets the definition and 
preferred approach that is then used in further chapters. Second, a brief background to self-




Understanding well-being. Well-being mainly refers to people’s optimal experience 
and functioning; the concept of well-being gathers many of the aspects of what people 
usually call a “good life” (Ryan & Deci, 2001). As such, well-being is a complex construct, 
although the dominant approach understands well-being as the subjective beliefs, affective 
experiences and physiological correlates that make people happy and fulfilled (Diener, 1984; 
Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999; Kahneman, Diener, & Schwarz, 1999). This approach 
implies that people are driven by pleasure, and therefore, the presence of pleasant affect (e.g., 
happiness), the absence of negative affect (e.g., sadness), and greater levels of life satisfaction 
(i.e., a cognitive component of well-being) should be considered the hallmarks of a good life 
(Diener, 1984; Diener et al., 1999; Kahneman et al., 1999).  
Evidence has supported the hedonic assumptions (e.g., Fredrickson & Joiner, 2002; 
Myers & Diener, 1995; Pressman, Gallagher, & Lopez, 2013); nevertheless, other approaches 
have been suggested. For example, Ryff’s model of psychological well-being (Ryff, 1989, 
1995; Ryff & Keyes, 1995; Ryff & Singer, 1998) suggests that hedonic conceptualisations of 
psychological well-being heavily rely on two assumptions: the distinction between positive 
affect and negative affect, and the relevance of life satisfaction as a determinant of a good 
life. However, she argued that the hedonic approach does not fully capture the key elements 
of human wellness (Ryff, 1995; Ryff & Keyes, 1995). She further proposed a 
multidimensional model of psychological well-being composed of six dimensions (autonomy, 
environmental mastery, personal growth, positive relations with others, purpose in life, and 
self-acceptance), and demonstrated this construct of psychological well-being fitted the data 
better than a model including a single-factor (e.g., life satisfaction scale only) or two-factor 
models (e.g., life satisfaction scale and positive-negative affect scale) (Ryff, 1989, 1995; Ryff 
& Keyes, 1995). 
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More recently, the eudaimonic well-being approach has emerged as an alternative to 
characterise human wellness. Eudaimonic well-being refers to trying to achieve congruency 
between values, ideals and individual actions (Ryan & Deci, 2001; Ryan, Huta, & Deci, 
2008; Ryff & Singer, 2008); another way to understand eudaimonic well-being is the efforts 
that people invest trying to achieve significant goals in order to reach a meaningful life, even 
though sometimes this may involve postponing immediate gratifications (Ryan et al., 2008). 
Eudaimonic well-being is anchored in Aristotle’s notions of virtue, according to which 
individuals’ lives are driven by principles and not mere consummations of immediate desires 
(Ryan & Deci, 2001). The place of emotions in eudaimonic well-being is notably different 
compared to the hedonic well-being approach. The eudaimonic model of well-being suggests 
that positive emotions are not good per se, but rather it is the ability to experience emotions in 
accordance with the conditions that provoked them. For example, when facing a break-up 
with a significant partner it would be more functional to experience the natural negative 
emotions that follow this painful life-event (Ryan & Deci, 2001). One final important feature 
of the eudaimonic model of well-being is that emotions can be studied independently of well-
being (Ryan & Deci, 2001). As emotions are not a component of the definition of eudaimonic 
well-being, these can be incorporated either as a predictor of eudaimonic well-being or an 
outcome. 
The model of psychological well-being and the eudaimonic approach are connected. 
Ryff and Singer (2008) have suggested that the concept of psychological well-being relates to 
Aristotle’s notions of virtue, according to which, wellness lies in the balance between 
different aspects of individuals’ lives. In particular, Ryff (2014) suggested that autonomy, 
positive relationships, environmental mastery, personal growth, purpose in life, and self-
acceptance are fundamental to bring balance, and constitute relevant components of 
eudaimonic well-being. Thus, henceforth the term well-being is taken to mean eudaimonic 
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well-being; in other words, the meaning-making process that creates balance between 
different spheres of individual life (including psychological well-being).  
Understanding self-control. In the classic delay of gratification paradigm, children 
were measured in their willpower to resist eating one immediately available marshmallow in 
order to get two marshmallows later (Mischel, Ebbesen, & Raskoff-Zeiss, 1972; Mischel, 
Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989). The ability to resist immediate temptations, gaining control over 
oneself to favour more relevant, distant, goals has been the common definition for self-
control (Carver  & Scheier, 2011). Since these classic studies on willpower, researchers have 
defined self-control dilemmas as conflicts between two motives or goals (Mischel, 1974; 
Mischel et al., 1989). More importantly, in recent years, multiple theories have asserted that 
the identification of conflicting goals is a fundamental step for exerting self-control (Fishbach 
& Converse, 2011; Fujita, 2011; Hofmann, Baumeister, Förster, & Vohs, 2012; Hofmann & 
Van Dillen, 2012; Myrseth & Fishbach, 2009).  
For example, the two-stage model of self-control argues that the first stage involved in 
successfully regulating behaviour is the identification of conflict (Myrseth & Fishbach, 
2009). Conflict identification further depends on whether individuals see the temptations as a 
single opportunity or one among many others (Myrseth & Fishbach, 2009). Perceiving a 
desire, such as wanting some chocolate, is not tempting in isolation, and as a consequence, 
the probability of satisfying this desire increases; whereas perceiving a desire as impeding 
future courses of action facilitates conflict identification and the temptation emerges, which 
in turn, increases the probabilities of displaying self-control strategies and pursuing goals 
(Fishbach & Converse, 2011).  
Likewise, Hofmann and colleagues (Hofmann et al., 2012; Hofmann & Van Dillen, 
2012) have demonstrated that the perception of goal conflict is a signal that recruits self-
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control resources (i.e., resistance), which in turn, helps individuals to prevent self-indulgence 
in the presence of temptations. Thus, a temptation is the name given to a desire that conflicts 
with a current important goal (Hofmann et al., 2012); when someone sees an appetitive 
stimulus but its satisfaction lessens the probability of achieving a relevant goal, individuals 
experience a self-control dilemma. 
One common consequence of resisting temptations is exhaustion. According to the 
strength model of self-control (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007; Muraven & Baumeister, 
2000), self-control resembles a muscle whose energy is limited and, ultimately, is depleted 
after previous efforts to resist temptations (i.e., ego-depletion; Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 
2007; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Thus, after several attempts to resist temptations, 
individuals will be less able to resist temptations. The strength model has been recently 
questioned by the process model of self-control (Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012). In a nutshell, 
the process model of self-control argues that people fail to exert self-control after previous 
regulatory efforts because they switch between goals (Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012; Inzlicht, 
Schmeichel, & Macrae, 2014). Regardless of whether ego-depletion is better understood as a 
consequence of previous regulatory efforts or as a change in people’s willingness of 
continuing efforts in a current goal and then deciding for other goals, trying to remain 
engaged in a current activity, and avoiding distractors influences motivation and usually 
results in exhaustion (e.g., Gaines & Jermier, 1983; Wright & Cropanzano, 1998). 
The concept of exhaustion is closely related to vitality; it could be said that they are 
two sides of the same coin. Vitality has been defined as the experience of having energy 
available to one’s self (Ryan & Frederick, 1997). Vitality is a concept linked to well-being in 
the sense that vitality helps people to keep motivated to pursue relevant goals (Ryan & 
Frederick, 1997), and pursuing relevant goals is one of the dimensions incorporated in the 
concept of psychological well-being (i.e., self-purpose; Ryff & Singer, 2008). Previous 
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evidence has shown that the negative consequences of continuous task engagement on vitality 
may be compensated via self-regulated actions (i.e., guided by intrinsic motivation) (Nix, 
Ryan, Manly, & Deci, 1999). 
One last aspect worth mentioning is that very recent theory stresses that control itself 
is an emotional process, alerting individuals of its need and energising its execution (Inzlicht, 
Bartholow, & Hirsh, in press; Inzlicht, Legault, & Teper, 2014). For example, the affect 
alarm model (Inzlicht & Legault, 2014) suggests that negative affect – in particular distress – 
initiates efforts to act over conflict, because such feelings signal the presence of temptations, 
and as a consequence, motivate people to act to reduce the unpleasant feeling. The theory 
further suggests that aversive experiences derived from self-control dilemmas lead people to 
disengagement from current goals, while energising the pursuit of alternative desires 
(Saunders & Inzlicht, in press). 
In sum, the examination of the effects of mixed emotions on well-being and self-
control is guided by four basic principles. First, individuals not only pursue pleasure but a 
“good life” in which there is a balance between the different aspects of life. This idea is 
clearly reflected in the concept of eudaimonic well-being, which is adopted in the current 
research, and also extended within the concept of psychological well-being. Second, self-
control is a result of a conflict between a current desire and an important goal. Whenever the 
consummation of a desire is incompatible with a goal, people usually experience a self-
control dilemma. Third, sustained efforts in a current activity usually result in exhaustion or 
less vitality, which may lead people to decide to switch goals. Finally, self-control can be 
understood as an emotional process, which means that current emotions alert people to the 




1.5. Hypotheses and research model proposed 
The aims explained above are anchored in a model that suggests some hypotheses 
about a predictor of mixed emotions and the influence of mixed emotions on well-being and 
self-control (see Figure 2, top panel A). In this section it is firstly explained why conflicting 
goals are likely to be the main predictor of mixed emotions. Second, two novel paths are 
proposed to explore the effects of mixed emotions on well-being, integrating the proposed 
predictor of mixed emotions (as a result of conflicting goals). Finally, the influence of mixed 
emotions on self-control efforts is explained, as well as how this may also assist well-being-
related processes (i.e., vitality). The paths proposed in the model are fully assessed in the 
remaining chapters; the model and, hopefully, its verification constitute the chief contribution 
of this scientific effort. 
1.5.1. Mixed emotions are elicited by the presence of conflicting goals 
Emotions have been thought to emerge from people’s perceptions of current 
circumstances (Arnold, 1960). Appraisal theories usually suggest that emotions consist of 
patterns of interpretation and correlates of the activity of the nervous system (Ellsworth & 
Scherer, 2003). For example, Smith and Ellsworth (1985) postulated that evaluations of 
actual circumstances as pleasant and certain are normally associated with emotions of 
happiness.  
Another approach to understanding how people respond to events is provided by goal 
theory, in particular Perceptual Control Theory (PCT; Powers, 1973). This theory provides 
the basis for understanding the predictor of mixed emotions as conflicting goals. Goals are 
representations of desired end states, which the individual is concerned to approach or to 
avoid (Austin & Vancouver, 1996). For example, trying exercise more or trying to quit 
smoking are common goals; although goals are sometimes much simpler, like remembering 
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to prepare dinner that night or trying to avoid putting organic products in the recycling bin. 
Goals also represent a fundamental framework in which to understand motivations to pursue 
and to attain multiple behavioural outcomes (Austin & Vancouver, 1996); goals energise and 
direct activities (Pervin, 1982), as well as give meaning to people’s lives (Baumeister, 1989). 
For example, the goal of trying to eat healthy may lead people to intend buying more fruits 
and vegetables, and avoid behaviours such as consuming products with added sugar. 
Goals are also intimately related to emotions, and in this respect, PCT (Powers, 1973) 
has significantly contributed to specifying the conditions under which goals give rise to 
emotional experiences. PCT is a cybernetic theory of behaviour, according to which 
behaviour is not a response to input, but perceptual input is controlled using behaviour 
(Powers, 1973). The critical feature that drives behavioural modification is the continuous 
monitoring between a perceptual input (i.e., representation of a meaningful signal in the 
environment) and internal references values or goals (Powers, 1973). Goals act as internal 
standards that control perceptions from an expected threshold. Goals are also hierarchically 
represented in mind, ranging from high-level principles (e.g., “to be a good father”) to low-
level motor programs (e.g., muscles movements necessary to hold a baby); different levels in 
the hierarchy of goals are integrated and operate in cascade to produce a full range of 
behaviours, from cognitions to physiological responses.  
When the resultant comparison between the perceptual input and a certain goal is 
large, an error signal is activated informing the control system to modify certain behaviours 
in order to re-establish the expected standard level (Carver & Scheier, 1999). Precisely, 
emotions arise when there is a non-zero error signal in a high-level control system (Powers, 
1973). This error is transmitted to lower-level control systems producing a set of cognitive 
and physiological responses that people commonly identify as an emotion (Powers, 2014).  
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Particularly important for the research purpose in question, Powers, Clark, and 
McFarland (1960) observed that when discrepancy arises from separate goals (e.g., impulse 
and restraint) and no common low-level goals can resolve such demands, then conflict is 
produced. Earlier, Lewin (1935, 1951) described the activation of opposite or contradictory 
goals as goal conflict. Goal conflict is defined by Lewin as the presence of two forces acting 
in opposite directions (Lewin, 1935, 1951). Typically, when goals conflict, pursuing one goal 
lessens the motivational resources to pursue an additional active goal, and may also lead to 
oppositional outcomes, so that progress towards one goal occurs at the expense of another 
active goal (Cavallo & Fitzsimons, 2012).  
Powers (1973) further asserted that conflict is usually accompanied by a continuous 
flow of different emotions because discrepancies between goals cannot be easily corrected. 
As shown in Figure 2, middle panel A.1, it is hypothesised that the activation of two or more 
contradictory goals may result in experiencing mixed emotions. Several theoretical 
approaches have mentioned that conflicting goals might be an antecedent for mixed emotions 
(e.g., Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007); nonetheless, this idea remains 
untested. In consequence, it is hypothesised that the experience of mixed emotions will be 




Figure 2. Descriptive model proposed for the current research. The upper panel A represents the simplified version of the 
model detailed in the panels below. Middle panel A.1 shows a schematic representation of the possible emotional outputs 
derived from the PCT (Carver & Scheier, 1982; Powers, 1973): (1) no emotional output; (2) experiencing a single emotion; 
and (3) the hypothesised emotional output resulting from the activation of two control systems: mixed emotions. This PCT 
diagram is not a functional model as described in a typical PCT control system because it omits aspects of the environment 
and it focuses on the error within higher level control systems rather than error within the multiple lower levels of a PCT 
hierarchy. Finally, the lower panel A.2 displays a representation of the anticipated effects that mixed emotions may have on 











































































1.5.2. Two paths to understand the effects of mixed emotions on well-
being 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, despite notable progress in the study of 
emotions, it is possible to observe certain paucity in the research of more complex emotional 
features, such as mixed emotions. In the context of individual well-being, this can be partially 
explained by the preponderance of approaches that only anticipate beneficial effects of 
experiencing positive affect only. Although proponents of the hedonic approach have 
demonstrated the negative impact of experiencing intense positive emotions on life 
satisfaction (Diener, Colvin, Pavot, & Allman, 1991), current research and theoretical 
approaches have started to investigate the benefits of experiencing negative emotions 
(McNulty, 2010; Nesse, 2004).  
Two models have suggested that mixed emotions may have a positive impact on 
individual well-being. Firstly, the dynamic model of affect (DMA; Reich, Zautra, & Davis, 
2003; Zautra, 2003) integrates positive affect and negative affect as complementary 
experiences during stressful events. The DMA departs from the idea that emotions are used to 
infer information about the environment (cf. Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Schwarz & Clore, 
2003). The model further proposes that under conditions of low stress the affect system 
allows complex information processing, but under high stress, information processing is 
concentrated on immediate demands, and as a consequence, discrimination between positive 
affect and negative affect is simplified. Therefore, the DMA anticipates that high stress will 
result in negative correlations between positive affect and negative affect (Reich et al., 2003). 
Importantly, the DMA also predicts that individual differences in the capacity to 
experience more complex affective patterns (i.e., mixed emotions) during stressful situations 
may be beneficial for individuals’ health (Davis, Zautra, & Smith, 2004; Reich et al., 2003). 
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Individual differences in mixed emotions might buffer or a moderate the negative 
consequences of stressful events on individuals’ health (Reich et al., 2003). Thus, for 
example, some evidence has demonstrated that individual differences in experiencing mixed 
emotions are associated with more resilience during bereavement (Coifman, Bonanno, & 
Rafaeli, 2007). 
The second model is the co-activation model of healthy coping (Larsen, Hemenover, 
Norris, & Cacioppo, 2003). According to this model, the co-activation of both positive and 
negative affect may facilitate sense-making processes during stressful situations, and in turn, 
this could allow individuals to gain control over their lives overcoming traumatic 
experiences. This approach calls for an optimal balance between positive and negative 
emotions when facing adverse situations. The model argues that the optimal proportion of 
positive affect necessary to benefit health will decrease as the intensity of the stressor 
increases. Finally, the model suggests that balanced co-activation of opposite affects 
facilitates problem solving and helps individuals to find meaning during stressful events by 
helping individuals to take the good with the bad; in other words, to turn adversity into 
advantage (Larsen et al., 2003). 
The current approach shares some principles with the DMA and the co-activation 
model of healthy coping, although in some respect the current work also diverges from them. 
Firstly, the present work shares the idea that a model of mixed emotions that intends to 
predict changes in psychological well-being needs to take into account the conditions that 
instigate this complex emotional experience. However, contrasting with previous models, the 
current approach understands mixed emotions as a consequence of experiencing conflicting 
goals. Goal conflict has been largely identified as a negative predictor of well-being and 
several other health-related problems (e.g., Boudreaux & Ozer, 2012; Cantor, Acker, & 
Cook-Flannagan, 1992; Emmons & King, 1988; Emmons & Colby, 1995; King & Emmons, 
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1990, 1991); although it has also been said that it is not conflict itself that has a detrimental 
effect on well-being, but the inability to resolve goal conflict (e.g., Emmons, 1996; Emmons 
& Kaiser, 1996). Therefore, it is not necessary to investigate the effects of mixed emotions on 
well-being during stressful situations exclusively. This may extend the potential impact of 
mixed emotions on well-being to more common situations in everyday life, such as common 
personal dilemmas.  
Second, the current approach shares the idea suggested by the co-activation model of 
healthy coping that mixed emotions may help individuals to make sense of complex 
situations, assisting the creation of meaning in life (Larsen et al., 2003). Accordingly, the 
model presented here (see Figure 2, bottom panel A.2.1) hypothesises that experiencing 
mixed emotions in response to goal conflict will positively predict eudaimonic well-being 
(Hypothesis 2). As previously reviewed, eudaimonic well-being is closely related to 
meaning-making processes (Ryff & Singer, 2008). Hence, it seems feasible that mixed 
emotions may have an effect on eudaimonic well-being.  
Finally, the present model acknowledges the importance of individual differences in 
mixed emotions as a buffer against harm to well-being. The DMA suggests that individual 
differences in emotional complexity may moderate the relationship between stressful events 
and well-being. Similarly, the model proposed here anticipates that one mechanism through 
which mixed emotions may favour psychological well-being is via moderating the expected 
negative association between conflicting goals and well-being (see Figure 2, bottom panel 
A.2.1). Thus, it is hypothesised that people who, on average, tend to experience mixed 
emotions more often will not suffer from the negative impact of conflicting goals on 




1.5.3. The effects of mixed emotions on self-control efforts and vitality 
One aspect not mentioned above, is that the present model shares with the DMA the 
principle that affective experiences have informational properties that assist individuals to 
interpret the environment; this idea is closely linked to the affect-as-information theory 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Schwarz & Clore, 2003). For example, someone may desire eating 
a chocolate cake partly because of the anticipated feeling of pleasure when seeing it in the 
window of the bakery store. 
Interestingly, if the desire to eat a chocolate cake interferes with a person’s goal of 
trying to eat healthy, then the desire becomes a temptation, and a self-control dilemma 
emerges (Hofmann et al., 2012). As reviewed in the previous section of this chapter, self-
control dilemmas represent a conflict between a current desire and an important goal 
(Fishbach & Converse, 2011; Fujita, 2011; Hofmann et al., 2012; Hofmann & Van Dillen, 
2012; Myrseth & Fishbach, 2009). As a reminder, it is also important to note that recent 
contributions have suggested that self-control can be understood as an emotional process, 
alerting individuals of its need and energizing its execution (Inzlicht, Bartholow, & Hirsh, in 
press; Inzlicht, Legault, & Teper, 2014), which also accords with the affect-as-information 
theory (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Schwarz & Clore, 2003). 
 Having identified the key features of self-control, and the importance of the 
identification of goal conflict in exerting self-control, it is now opportune to integrate the 
dynamics of self-control with the affective experiences derived from the identification of 
error-signals in the regulatory system. As suggested by PCT, error signals normally give rise 
to experiencing affective experiences, which in turn, initiates a sequence of changes aimed at 
restoring stability in the system (Carver & Scheier, 1982, 1999; Powers et al., 1960). Given 
that the proposed model suggests that conflicting goals result in the experience of mixed 
45 
 
emotions, and the importance of affective process in self-control, the question arises as to 
what role mixed emotions play in self-control. If goal conflict identification is a key 
component in resisting temptations (Myrseth & Fishbach, 2009), then affective experiences 
can carry useful information that assist individual’s decision-making (Schwarz & Clore, 
1983; Schwarz & Clore, 2003), it is therefore plausible that mixed emotions may provide 
information that helps individuals to resist temptations. 
 The model proposed here hypothesises that mixed emotions will mediate the 
association between goal-conflict and attempts to resist temptations (Hypothesis 4) (Figure 
2, bottom panel A.2.2). Anchored in the informational theories of emotion (e.g., Forgas, 
1995; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Schwarz & Clore, 2003), the current approach argues that the 
identification of goal conflict is better understood as the activation of mixed emotions, which 
in turn, result in attempts of resistance. Mixed emotions signal the presence of goal conflict; 
therefore, the informative properties of conflicting goals are the result of experiencing mixed 
emotions when facing temptations. If this hypothesis is correct, then mixed emotions should 
be the proximal predictor of efforts to resist temptations. 
The idea that emotions may influence self-control is not new, although evidence is not 
consistent. For example, some studies have shown that emotions of pride and guilt predict 
self-control (Hofmann & Fisher, 2012), and that negative self-conscious emotions (e.g., 
regret, shame) are associated with higher levels of self-control in response to delayed-cost 
dilemmas (e.g., eating something tasty but unhealthy; Giner-Sorolla, 2001). Additionally, 
Wegener and Petty (1994, 2001) found that positive affect undermines self-control; whereas 




Further efforts to integrate these discrepancies have claimed that emotions are signals 
to either adopt or to reject an accessible goal (Fishbach & Labroo, 2007). Thus, positive 
affect should promote self-control when a high-order goal is accessible (e.g., be a good 
father), but not when a low-level goal is accessible (e.g., remember to change nappies). 
Similarly, other approaches have suggested that people actively down-regulate the pleasant 
emotions elicited in the presence of temptations reducing their impact on behaviours 
(Hofmann, Friese, & Roefs, 2009; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). 
Contrasting with previous approaches, the current model argues that mixed emotions 
are a critical constituent of the regulatory process. One marked characteristic of some of the 
aforementioned accounts is that emotions are seen as a by-product of the activity of complex 
cognitive processing systems; emotions accompany the self-control process but ultimately it 
is the nature of the goals or certain regulatory strategies that determine further courses of 
action. However, from the present point of view, mixed emotions are seen as an affective 
experience that is elicited by the presence of conflicting goals, and as such, they are essential 
for signalling the need for self-control. Supporting this approach, relevant theories in emotion 
emphasise the properties of emotions to recruit attentional resources and ready the person for 
action (Frijda, 1986; Frijda, Kuipers, & Ter Schure, 1989).  
The current model suggests that mixed emotions do not merely coincide with self-
control but are an integral, complex emotional feature. Interestingly, a number of studies 
derived from the DMA tradition have concluded that the co-activation of positive and 
negative emotions reflects the integration of a broad range of information, which allows 
individuals to flexibly respond at any given moment (Davis et al., 2004; Potter, Zatura, & 
Reich, 2000; Zautra, Smith, Affleck, & Tennen, 2001). This flexibility could be what permits 
mixed emotional experiences to address self-control dilemmas because different sources of 
information (e.g., the rewarding features of a desire, the negative consequences of yielding to 
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temptations, the long-term benefits of persistence) are accessible and integrated in a given 
moment.  
Rozanski and Kubzansky (2005) argued that emotional flexibility may help people to 
preserve vitality when facing personal dilemmas. Thus, if mixed emotions can be also 
characterised as flexible emotional reactions that permit the accessing and integration of 
different sources of information, then it is possible that mixed emotions may also influence 
vitality. People who experience mixed emotions following a current self-control conflict are 
presumably more willing to resist temptations, and in turn, mixed emotions might also 
compensate for the negative effect that resisting temptations has on vitality. Consequently, 
the present model finally hypothesises that efforts to resist current temptations will reduce 
vitality, but that this effect will be compensated for by the experience of mixed emotions 
(Hypothesis 5) (see Figure 2, bottom panel A.2.2).  
In summary, mixed emotions are considered to be a complex emotional experience 
which requires further examination; particularly with respect to their robustness. Mixed 
emotions are also proposed to be elicited from conflicting goals and to have four potential 
effects. First, mixed emotions may have a positive influence on well-being. Second, 
individual differences in the experience of mixed emotions may moderate the negative effect 
of goal conflict on psychological well-being. Third, mixed emotions may mediate the 
expected association between goal-conflict and resistance of temptations, supported in the 
idea that mixed emotions are an integral emotional experience that signals the need for self-
control. Finally, the expected negative consequences of resisting temptations on vitality may 
be compensated for by the experience of mixed emotions following conflicting goals, 




1.6. Overview of the remaining chapters 
The present research project is divided into six chapters. In chapter 1 the fundaments 
for the succeeding chapters are offered, emphasising the aims that this project looks to 
satisfy, and the model and hypotheses that guide empirical efforts developed in further 
chapters. As mentioned above, testing the model represented in Figure 2, and justified in this 
chapter, constitute the main contribution of this work. 
Chapter 2 evaluates the robustness of mixed emotions as a phenomenon. In order to 
implement this evaluation, a meta-analysis is performed. A review of the literature showed 
that studies examining mixed emotions can be distinguished according to the structure of the 
underlying affect model – dimensional or discrete – as well as according to the type of mixed 
emotions studied (e.g., happy-sad, fearful-happy, positive-negative); therefore these variables 
are used as the main test for robustness. Additionally, several methodological (e.g. type of 
mixed emotions measure) and design (emotion induction procedure) variables are included as 
potential moderators of the effect sizes of the experience of mixed emotions. 
Chapter 3 concentrates on the antecedents of mixed emotions. Two experiments are 
presented in order to determine whether conflicting goals predict mixed emotions. The 
experiments incorporate different measures of mixed emotions and diverse procedures to 
elicit emotions. One additional goal of chapter 3 is to establish whether mixed emotions can 
be distinguished from emotional conflict. This is considered as an important step before 
examining the effects of mixed emotions on psychological well-being, because emotional 
conflict has been found to be particularly pernicious for individual well-being, and has been 
equated to mixed emotions (Carver, Sutton, & Scheier, 2000; King & Emmons, 1990). 
Chapter 4 provide an initial examination of the effects of mixed emotions on 
eudaimonic well-being. This part of the research model is firstly assessed using a cross-
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sectional survey study. This study also incorporates a questionnaire of meaning in life, in 
order to determine whether the effect of mixed emotions is strong enough to predict 
eudaimonic well-being, over and above, meaning in life. An examination of the effect of goal 
conflict on mixed emotions and eudaimonic well-being is also presented. A second 
naturalistic experimental study also aimed to examine the effects of mixed emotions on 
eudaimonic well-being, in order to establish with more certainty whether mixed emotions 
facilitate meaning-making dynamics associated with eudaimonic well-being. 
Chapter 5 examines the remaining hypotheses presented in the research model, that is: 
(a) the moderating effects of individual differences in mixed emotions on the association 
between goal conflict and psychological well-being; (b) the mediation of mixed emotions in 
the relationship between self-control dilemmas and the resistance of temptations; and (c) the 
compensatory effect of mixed emotions on vitality. To do this, a diary study is conducted 
over 10-consecutive days, including four measures per day. The implementation of an 
ecologically valid technique to evaluate the remaining portions of the model was preferred 
for two reasons. First, in consonance with recent evidence in the field of self-control 
(Hofmann et al., 2012), a diary study was chosen to observe the phenomenon of study as it 
occurs in everyday life. Second, intensive longitudinal methods, such as diary studies, permit 
one to simultaneously investigate the between-person portion of the model (i.e., individual 
differences in mixed emotions), as well as naturally occurring fluctuations in mixed emotions 
as a consequence of everyday temptations (i.e., within-person dynamics). 
Finally, chapter 6 discusses the main findings, integrates the results, and offer future 
research paths for mixed emotions both in the field of well-being and self-control. Chapter 6 




2. CHAPTER TWO: A META-ANALYSIS OF MIXED EMOTIONS 
“Our truth is the intersection of independent lies” 
Levins (1966, pg. 423).  
 
evins sought to address the practical problems that arise when science produces 
multiple models or measures to investigate a single phenomenon, arguing that all 
models are incomplete and partially false, and as a consequence, finding the common pieces 
between them may allow researchers to establish robust theorems (Levins, 1966). Wimsatt 
took inspiration partially from Levins to propose that the triangulation of divergent models 
about a common phenomenon is a legitimate way to achieve plausible theories (Wimsatt, 
1981/2012). Wimsatt (1981/2012) suggested that the concept of robustness is a meaningful 
way to determine whether different models, methods or techniques used to explore a single 
scientific phenomenon produce consistent evidence to demonstrate the plausibility of a 
construct.  
Adopting this idea of using the informational value provided by multiple models, the 
present chapter assesses how robust mixed emotions are as a measurable phenomenon by 
examining whether researchers have been equally successful in experimentally eliciting 
mixed emotions when using different theoretical frameworks and different methods. Through 
a systematic review of the literature, it will be demonstrated that research on mixed emotions 
varies substantially in terms of several variables: (a) the underlying model of affect 
considered (i.e., dimensional or discrete emotions), (b) the type of mixed emotions studied, 
(c) the type of measure used to assess the presence and intensity of mixed emotions, and (d) 
the induction procedure used to activate mixed emotions. These variations are then used to 




This chapter begin by reviewing different models of affect and the different types of 
mixed emotions that have been used to understand mixed emotions. Then the methods and 
procedures through which researchers have tried to reveal the activation of mixed emotions 
are described. To do this, a description of the basic assumptions behind the phenomenon of 
mixed emotions is provided to contextualise the methodological progress in the field. Finally, 
a meta-analysis of experimental studies investigating the elicitation of mixed emotions is 
presented, including a brief discussion of the main findings. Meta-analysis is the use of 
statistical methods to pool the results of independent studies (Chan & Arvey, 2011). Meta-
analysis has been commonly seen as the preferred technique to increase the precision and to 
broad the scope of a phenomenon, as well as help to build consensus about the nature of a 
psychological construct (Chan & Arvey, 2011), all of which are considered necessary at the 
current stage of the research on mixed emotions. Thus, the application of meta-analytic 
techniques in the present chapter is useful in order to clarify the construct of mixed emotions 
experience, its underlying models, and measures. 
2.1. Mapping the terrain of mixed emotions: Underlying models and types 
It is worth starting by introducing the distinction between mixed emotions as the co-
occurrence of oppositely valenced affects and blends of emotion as a category including all 
possible experiences combining more than one emotion (Scherer, 1998). Emotion blends 
have been largely studied and accepted in the literature of emotions (Diener & Iran-Nejad, 
1986; Folkman & Lazarus, 1985; Izard, 1972, 1992; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1996; Polivy, 
1981; Power & Dalgleish, 1997; Scherer, 1998; Schwartz & Weinberger, 1980; Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1987). For example, people report combined feelings of both happiness and 
excitement or both anxiety and fear (e.g., Vansteelandt, van Mechelen, & Nezlek, 2005; 
Zelenski & Larsen, 2000). Thus, emotion blends of similar valence are uncontentious. The 
debate about mixed emotions, however, is whether it is possible to simultaneously experience 
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oppositely valenced affects, such as happiness and sadness. Views about the possibility of 
experiencing two opposite affects depend, to an extent, on the underlying model of affect to 
which researchers subscribe, with the main distinction being between dimensional and basic 
models.  
2.1.1. Mixed emotions and dimensional models of affect 
Dimensional models of affect propose that the best representation of the underlying 
structure of feelings is to locate them on dimensions. People usually describe their feelings as 
positive or negative, pleasant or unpleasant, which suggests that one of the fundamental 
dimensions is valence. Some dimensional models of affect have postulated that opposite ends 
of the positive-negative dimension (Russell & Carroll, 1999; Watson & Tellegen, 1999) and 
the underlying appetition-aversion affect systems (Grey, 1982; Lang, 1995) correspond to 
mutually exclusive feelings. The implication of this is that, for example, happiness and 
sadness cannot be experienced simultaneously, which challenges the idea that it is possible to 
experience mixed emotions. 
In particular, scholars ascribing to the circumplex model of affect have asserted that 
mixed emotions are merely the result of measurement problems or a reactive phenomenon 
related to the expectancies of participants and/or researchers and arise from confusion in 
reports of emotion (e.g., Rusell & Carroll, 1999; Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009). For 
example, one alternative interpretation for the elicitation of mixed emotions is that people 
inferred that they were expected to report mixed emotions (Larsen et al., 2011). In the 
circumplex model, affect is represented by two orthogonal dimensions of valence and 
activation forming a circular space around which affect-items are descriptively organised 
(Russell, 1980). The dimension of valence reflects the level of pleasantness/unpleasantness 
felt; whereas the dimension of activation reflects the level of arousal. Affects lying at 
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opposite ends of each of these two bipolar dimensions are mutually exclusive, which means 
that an increase in high-activated pleasure implies the reduction of low-activated displeasure 
and vice versa. If an affective experience has a single location on these bipolar dimensions, 
mixed emotions are therefore an oxymoron.  
In contrast, the Evaluative Space Model (ESM; Cacioppo, Gardner, & Bernston, 
1999; Cacioppo, Larsen, Smith, & Bernston, 2004) contends that affect can be characterised 
by a dimension of positive affect and another dimension of negative affect forming a 
bivariate space in which it is possible to describe multiple variations of positive and negative 
emotions, including mixed emotions. The ESM (Cacioppo, et al., 1999; Cacioppo et al., 
2004) stipulates that positive affect and negative affect are biologically basic substrates of the 
affect system with identifiable brain structures, functionally represented throughout different 
levels of the neural system. This biological architecture allows multiple activation patterns, 
such as reciprocal, independent or co-activation patterns (Norman et al., 2011; Norris, 
Gollan, Berntson, & Cacioppo, 2010).  
2.1.2. Mixed emotions and theories of basic emotions 
Some theories of basic emotion also support the experience of mixed emotions. 
Theories of basic emotions usually consider emotional experiences as being measureable and 
physiologically distinct phenomena characterised by a small set of emotions (Izard, 1972). 
Izard (1992) argued that basic emotions can be blended to form new emotions in accordance 
with specific conditions occurring in the environment. Akin to a painter mixing paint colours 
on a palette, mixed emotions result from the different possible combinations of basic 
emotions, such as happiness, sadness, anxiety or disgust. Izard also noted that ‘one emotion 
can almost instantaneously elicit another emotion that amplifies, attenuates, inhibits or 
interacts with the original emotional experience’ (Izard, 1972, p. 77). Although this 
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conceptualisation is distinct from the definition of mixed emotions used in this study because 
it suggests the emergence of new emotions by blending basic emotions, it is interesting to 
note that, in this theory, emotions are freely allowed to interact regardless of valence, which 
suggests that mixed emotion experiences are feasible. This clarification is important because 
studies investigating blended emotions that form new emotions, as suggested by Izard (1992), 
do not fall within the focus of the present meta-analysis. 
More closely linked to the current understanding of mixed emotions, Oatley and 
Johnson-Laird (1996) proposed that individuals react to events by making multiple cognitive 
evaluations, which in turn, may elicit multiple basic emotions simultaneously or in rapid 
alternation many of which are mixed emotions, giving rise to facial expressions that combine 
more than one basic emotion, as previously demonstrated by Ekman and O’Sullivan (1991). 
New evidence supports this assertion demonstrating that it is possible to identify 21 different 
and consistent facial expressions (Du, Tao, & Martinez, 2014), many of which reflect 
combinations of basic emotions (e.g., happily disgusted). It is important to note, however, 
that several studies exploring the activation of mixed emotions (e.g., Hemenover & 
Schimmack, 2007; Andrade & Cohen, 2007) have focused on discrete emotional experiences, 
thereby using a distinct model of affect, without explicitly ascribing to a basic emotion 
approach.  
2.1.3. Types of mixed emotions 
Happy-sad has been the most common type of mixed emotion studied (e.g., Fong, 
2006; Larsen & Green, 2013; Larsen et al., 2001; Williams & Aaker, 2002). For example, 
one study showed that students who had just moved to their dormitories felt significantly 
sadder but also happier than on a typical day before this event (Larsen, et al., 2001, Study 2). 
Nevertheless, several other types of mixed emotions have been investigated, including the co-
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activation of fear and happiness (e.g., Andrade & Cohen, 2007), disgust and amusement (e.g., 
Hemenover & Schimmack, 2007), and hope and fear (e.g., Bee & Madrigal, 2013). 
Furthermore, different studies have conceived the experience of mixed emotions as reflecting 
either the co-activation of different dimensions of affect such as positive and negative affect 
(e.g., Henderson & Norris, 2013), and pleasure-displeasure (e.g., Schimmack & Colcombe, 
2007) or as reflecting the experience of different discrete emotions such as happy-sad or 
hope-fear. The diversity of types of mixed emotions, including both dimensional and discrete 
conceptualisations, implies relevant theoretical consequences, especially considering the fact 
that dimensional and basic (discrete) emotion approaches have discussed the experience of 
mixed emotions. If consistent evidence about the experience of mixed emotions is found 
across different models of affect, then it is possible to suggest that mixed emotions are a 
universal affective experience. That is, not necessarily restricted to certain commonly studied 
emotion combinations (e.g., happy-sad). Similarly, this diversity may suggest that the 
affective system is flexible enough to permit a plurality of affective experiences ranging from 
bipolarity to mixed emotions. 
In summary, it is possible to describe mixed emotions as a multifaceted emotional 
experience, which involves the simultaneous experience of different combinations of 
opposing emotions. Both dimensional and basic approaches to emotions have theorised about 
the possibility of experiencing mixed emotions. An empirical examination of the consistency 
with which mixed emotions have been elicited for different underlying models of affect and 
different types of mixed emotions has not, however, previously been conducted. This 
examination is needed to determine whether mixed emotions apply to the universe of 
emotions, or whether they are restricted to particular kinds or combinations of emotions and 




2.2. Measurement and elicitation of mixed emotions 
Different measures and elicitation procedures have been developed to demonstrate 
that opposite affects can be experienced concurrently and that mixed emotions are a genuine 
affective experience (Larsen & McGraw, 2014). These two assumptions – simultaneity of 
opposing emotions and the integral experience of mixed emotions – organise ongoing efforts 
to demonstrate the experience of mixed emotions. This section describes these two 
assumptions, explains the measures used to evaluate the presence/intensity of mixed emotions 
and the procedures used to elicit mixed emotions. 
2.2.1. The simultaneity of opposing emotions 
The assumption of simultaneity is that mixed emotions reflect the co-activation of 
different emotions, usually described as opposite. According to the ESM (Cacioppo et al., 
1999; Cacioppo et al., 2004), simultaneity is achieved through two different mechanisms. 
Firstly, co-activation can result from perceiving both positive and negative features of a 
single stimulus or event (Cacioppo et al., 2012). This is supported by evidence that indicates 
that attention can be directed to at least two steams of information (de Gelder & Vroomen, 
2000). Secondly, co-activation can also result from alternations between positive and 
negative stimuli that are fast enough to produce sustained activation of both (Norris et al., 
2010; Schimmack & Colcombe, 2007). Thus, the experience of feeling two opposite affects 
simultaneously may result either from rapid alternation between two emotions or the co-
activation of two emotions.  
Other theories of emotion have asserted that only one emotion can be activated and 
consciously experienced at a given time (Brehm, 1999; Brehm & Miron, 2006; Russell, 
2003). For example, Brehm (1999) proposed that emotions provide guidelines for behavioral 
responses, consistent with the level of difficulty to attain a certain outcome on a given 
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moment (i.e., deterrence). When deterrence is high enough a new affective response is 
activated, which may result in a rapid transition from one emotion to another, but they are not 
both consciously experienced at the same time (Brehm & Miron, 2006). However, this does 
not necessarily prohibit the experience of mixed emotions. As suggested by Kellogg (1915), 
the activation of two opposite affects in rapid succession can instigate the experience of 
mixed emotions until the intensity of one affect prevails, as demonstrated by Schimmack and 
Colcombe (2007). 
2.2.2. The integral experience of mixed emotions 
If mixed feelings are a genuine emotional experience, then they should involve 
distinctive states of consciousness which are experienced as personal feelings. Mixed 
emotions are a complex affective experience and not merely a collection of independent 
emotions elicited in response to separate triggers. Even though people can report identifiable 
environmental sources of mixed emotions, the subjective feeling reflects the co-occurrence of 
both positive and negative emotions. This approach assumes that mixed emotions are more 
than the sum of the emotions involved; mixed feelings are in themselves a distinct and 
integral emotional experience.  
Contrary to this assumption, Greenspan (2003) has suggested that emotions appear 
mixed when actually they are different emotional experiences pertaining to independent 
events. Thus, for example, people may report feeling happy and sad because they are feeling 
happy in relation to event ‘A’, and sad in relation to event ‘B’. Similarly, people can perceive 
and verbalise the contrasting affective qualities of external events, without experiencing any 
distinctive change in affective experience (Russell, 2003).  
However, the subjective experience of mixed emotions is grounded in the idea that 
feelings reflect two genuine affects converging upon one reference point, that is, ourselves. 
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For example, Hunter and colleagues (2008) found that musical pieces involving conflicting 
stimuli (i.e., musical pieces in fast tempo and minor mode) created more happiness and 
sadness compared to musical pieces involving non-conflicting stimuli. This study examined 
mixed emotions using one (indivisible) focus of attention, avoiding alternative interpretations 
based on the events surrounding the emotional experience and supported the assumption that 
mixed emotions are an integral experience. 
2.2.3. Measures of mixed emotions 
Several measures have been developed in order to capture the simultaneity and the 
subjective experience of mixed emotions,. Following Hershfield and Larsen (2012), it is 
possible to distinguish four different measurement methods. The first measures the extent to 
which people experience positive affect, negative affect, or both together continuously (e.g., 
Larsen & Green, 2013; Larsen & McGraw, 2011; Larsen, McGraw, Mellers, and Cacioppo, 
2004). This “simultaneous measure” asks participants to press a button every time they feel 
good and release the button when they no longer feel good and press another button 
whenever they feel bad and release it when they no longer feel bad. Participants can press 
both buttons simultaneously, when feeling good and bad, and can abstain from pressing a 
button if they feel neither good nor bad.  The measure is operationalised as the amount of 
time participants spend pressing both buttons simultaneously. This captures mixed emotions 
in real-time, avoiding confounding variables such as timescale or characteristics of the scale 
used.  
Secondly, based on previous work on attitudinal ambivalence (e.g., Priester & Petty, 
1996), the intensity of mixed emotions has been estimated using the minimum value between 
positive and negative emotions. For example, if an individual reports feeling ‘4’ for 
happiness on a scale from 1 to 5, and also reports feeling ‘2’ for sadness, the minimum index 
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of mixed emotions will be ‘2’ (i.e., the minimum value). This index therefore reflects the 
intensity of the experience of mixed emotions. A measure of mixed emotions based on 
minimum values is considered more appropriate than a simple correlation between positive 
and negative affect because it reflects the intensity of mixed emotions (Schimmack, 2001, 
2005). Other studies of mixed emotion have used similar measures based on a minimum 
value, such as the similarity intensity index (e.g., Hong & Lee, 2010; Williams & Aaker, 
2002).  
Thirdly, it is possible to infer the simultaneous experience of mixed emotions by 
counting the number of occasions during which people experience each emotion measured. 
By counting the occasions on which two or more emotions of opposite valence are 
experienced, it is possible to estimate the presence (or absence) of mixed emotions. For 
example, Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1996) provided evidence that people can experience 
mixed emotions (happiness/sadness) on almost 14% of occasions. Similar measures of mixed 
emotions can be constructed by evaluating the frequency of opposite emotions experienced 
across different groups (e.g., experimental versus control). For example, this may involve 
examining whether an experimental group experiences two opposite emotions to a greater 
extent than a control group where the manipulation is not present (e.g., McGraw & Warren, 
2010). 
Finally, mixed emotions can be measured by asking people directly whether they are 
experiencing mixed feelings. The specific subjective experience of emotions is an inherent 
part of emotional life (e.g., Helm, 2009), and self-reports of subjective feelings can be useful 
in this regard. For example, Fong (2014) demonstrated that subjective self-reports of mixed 
feelings are useful when exploring the effects of mixed emotions on creativity. Similarly, 
studies reported in chapter 3 of the present research project used a subjective measure to 
evaluate the effect of conflicting goals on mixed emotions (see also Berrios, Totterdell & 
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Kellett, 2015). Interestingly, this investigation (Study 2) produced equivalent results for 
subjective measures of mixed emotions and the minimum index.  
2.2.4. Elicitation of mixed emotions 
Several procedures have been developed to elicit mixed feelings. Common emotion 
induction procedures have been films (e.g., Larsen, 2001), music (e.g., Hunter et. al., 2008), 
pictures (e.g., Schimmack & Colcombe, 2007) and advertisements (Andrade & Cohen, 2007). 
For example, Larsen and colleagues (2011, Study 1a) demonstrated that people experienced 
both happiness and sadness whilst watching a film-clip from the movie Life is Beautiful. 
Furthermore, chapter 3 provides a more ecologically valid technique such as recalling 
personal experiences in response to conflicting goals to expand the current understanding of 
the precursors of mixed emotions. 
In summary, different elicitation procedures have been developed and tested to 
investigate the presence and intensity of mixed emotions. Moreover, multiple measures have 
been developed to support both the simultaneity and the integral experience of mixed 
emotions. From the measures described, it is possible to suggest that the simultaneous 
measure of mixed emotions would more consistently identify the co-activation of opposite 
affects because it overcomes problems arising from the timescale and the measurement scale 
used. Furthermore, subjective measures of mixed emotions rely more on the second 
assumption, according to which mixed emotions can be both mentally represented and 
experienced. Evidence demonstrating the stability of this type of measure may represent an 
important step towards understanding mixed emotions as an integral experience. The 
diversity of measures and procedures used to study mixed feelings has yet to be integrated in 




2.3. Overview of the present meta-analysis 
The present chapter examines and quantifies the robustness of mixed emotions by 
meta-analysing extant research. If mixed emotions are a robust phenomenon, then they 
should be consistent over and above any artifactual variable (such as measurement error or 
design characteristic) and across different theoretical or methodological characteristics of the 
studies included. The meta-analysis investigated the effects of: (a) distinguishing between 
dimensional and discrete emotions approaches to the study of mixed feelings, and (b) the type 
of mixed emotions tested. Differences arising from separate models and different types of 
mixed emotions enable conclusions to be drawn about the extent to which mixed emotions 
are generalizable and specific. Several methodological characteristics were included as 
moderators to determine their impact in the elicitation of mixed emotions, including: (a) 
measures used, (b) induction procedures (c) design characteristics, and (d) demographic 
characteristics. The measures used are of particular value as they reflect different 
assumptions about mixed emotions (i.e., simultaneity of opposing emotions and the integral 
experience of mixed emotions), so evidence for the validity of these assumptions can be 
gleaned from the relative effect size produced. Induction procedures and design 
characteristics (i.e., within or between person designs) were included because they help rule 
out the possibility that mixed emotions are artifacts of study design, rather than a genuine 
emotional experience. Finally, demographic characteristics were included to enable future 
research to focus on promising samples. Specifically, age and gender were studied because 
several studies have found a positive association between age and the experience of mixed 
emotions (e.g., Carstensen, Pasupathi, Mayr, & Nesselroade, 2000; Ong & Bergeman, 2004), 
while other studies have shown variations in the experience of mixed emotions as a function 





2.4.1. Selection of studies 
The sample of studies used in the meta-analysis was obtained by conducting a 
computerised search (via Web of Knowledge, and PsycINFO, Dissertation Abstracts 
International) for articles published before January 2014, using the keywords: “mixed 
emotions”, “mixed feelings”, “emotional blends”, “emotional ambivalence”, “contrasting 
emotions”, or “emotional complexity”. Articles had to include the respective terms either in 
the title, abstract or keywords. Reference lists in some articles were inspected to identify 
additional sources for inclusion. Furthermore, emails to relevant researchers in the field were 
sent in order to incorporate potential unpublished studies. Similarly, a public advertisement 
was placed on ResearchGate (an international online social network for researchers) inviting 
researchers to share any unpublished studies investigating mixed emotions. The literature 
search identified 826 articles and dissertations.  
Four inclusion criteria were considered for the meta-analysis. The selection of four 
inclusion criteria was defined in order to appropriately circumscribe the characteristics of 
mixed emotions experience, as well as to prevent relevant biases from narrowing the number 
of studies, in accordance with suggestions for defining inclusion criteria (Halvorsen, 1994). 
First, studies had to employ an experimental design and recruit a human, nonclinical sample. 
Experiments were chosen because: (a) they provide a meaningful counterfactual condition(s) 
against which to compare the activation of mixed emotions, and (b) the allocation of 
participants is random – or at least quasi-random – enhancing the interpretation of the effect 
sizes. Experiments based on comparisons between cultures were only included if the samples 
contained participants from different cultural backgrounds randomly allocated to the 
experimental and control condition(s). 
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Second, studies had to manipulate the experience of mixed emotions using films, 
images, music or any other procedure that was deemed by the authors to instigate the 
experience of mixed emotions. Importantly, studies had to manipulate mixed emotions and 
report the effectiveness of this manipulation on participants’ emotional experience in 
comparison with emotional experience in specific control condition(s) (i.e., between-
participant designs) and/or in comparison with participants’ emotional experience before the 
corresponding manipulation (between-within-participant designs). The inclusion of 
experiments that explicitly manipulated mixed emotions was important in order to provide a 
comparable estimation of the elicitation of mixed emotions across studies. 
Third, studies had to measure mixed emotions, that is, studies needed to consider the 
experience of two opposite affects as co-occurring following the definition of mixed 
emotions presented in chapter 1; studies in which other emotional combinations were 
measured were not included (e.g., anxious-fear). The classification of mixed emotions was 
based on the hedonic valence of the emotions involved. Thus, studies were included if they 
tested a positively and a negatively valenced emotion. Similarly, if the study incorporated a 
dimensional approach, the following combinations were included; positive-negative affect, 
positive activated-negative activated affect, pleasant-unpleasant affect. 
Fourth, studies had to report a measure of mixed emotions that reflected the 
magnitude of the mixed emotion experienced (for example, by using the common indices of 
mixed emotions described in section 2.2.3). Correlational indices were not considered unless 
two or more correlations were compared between experimental and control conditions (e.g., 
Andrade & Cohen, 2007, Study 3a). General correlational indices were not considered, as 
correlations are not an appropriate measure for the experience of mixed emotions 
(Schimmack, 2001; See also Appendix-1). For example, a correlation equal to zero between a 
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pair of opposite affect may hidden genuine co-activation as demonstrated by the minimum 











Figure 3. Flow of information through the different stages of the review. 
 
Of the 826 articles and theses identified by the search, 47 articles met the inclusion 
criteria from which it was possible to compute effect sizes for 35 articles involving a total of 
63 independent studies. Figure 3 shows the flow of information through the different stages 
of the review and the corresponding number of studies included/excluded in each stage. The 
other twelve articles were excluded because it was not possible to compute precise effect 
sizes nor estimate effects in the studies reported; authors were contacted where possible in an 
attempt to include these data. Each of the selected articles is identified by an asterisk in the 
reference list. Precise effect sizes were computed for 60 studies (95%) on the basis of 
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information in the article; whereas for 3 studies (5%), it was necessary to estimate some or all 
values based on the significance levels reported. 
2.4.2. Selection of comparisons within studies and selection of 
moderators 
Two types of comparisons were examined in order to provide information about the 
relevance of different models for investigating mixed emotions, and the nature of mixed 
emotions. Firstly, a comparison between dimensional models of affect and discrete emotions 
approaches was performed; studies considering dimensions of affect (e.g., positive-negative 
affect) were compared with studies in which discrete emotions were measured (e.g., happy-
sad). Second, different types of mixed emotions were compared; that is, happy-sad, fear-
happy, disgust-amusement, hope-fear, positive-negative affect, and pleasant-unpleasant 
affect. These comparisons were made to help clarify the generalizability and diversity of 
mixed emotions. 
To evaluate the effect of the moderator variables, studies were coded according to two 
methodological factors and three study characteristics. Firstly, the measure of mixed 
emotions used was coded based on a fourfold classification: (i) simultaneous measures of 
mixed emotions, (ii) measures of mixed emotions using the minimum index or derivations of 
a similar formula, such as the similarity-intensity index (e.g., Williams & Aaker, 2002), (iii) 
measures of mixed emotions based on the frequency of opposing affects, and (iv) subjective 
measures of mixed emotions. Studies reporting a combination of measures were coded as 
involving a ‘mix of measures’, and the effect sizes obtained from each measure were 
averaged. Secondly, the emotion induction procedure was coded according to whether ads, 
films, music, pictures, personal experiences, simulation or imagination (e.g., participants 
imagine a situation or remember a recent event), or another – unclassified – induction 
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procedure was used. Thirdly, the design of each study was coded according to whether it used 
a within-person or between-person design. Finally, two demographic characteristics – mean 
age and percentage of women – were coded. This two sample characteristics were chosen 
because previous research on mixed emotions has suggested that older, compared to younger 
adults (e.g., poignancy; Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2008), and women, compared to men (e.g., 
Larsen et al., 2011), may produce different patterns of mixed emotions. Further details about 
the study characteristics and the effect sizes for each study are provided in Table 1. 
2.4.3. Calculation of effect sizes 
The calculated effect sizes represented the degree to which mixed emotions were 
elicited following the manipulation of affect used in each study. Thus the presence of mixed 
emotions was represented by a positive effect size; whereas the absence of mixed emotions 
was represented by values close to zero. Although it seemed unlikely, more mixed emotions 
among the control, relative to the experimental, condition (or before, relative to after, the 
affect induction) would be indicated by a negative effect size. The inclusion of both between-
person and within-person study designs meant that it was necessary to analyse data from 
different experimental designs. Therefore, Morris and DeShon’s (2002) method for 
combining results across independent-groups and repeated measures designs was adopted. As 
the research question concerned the robustness and consistency in the activation of mixed 
emotions across different theoretical and methodological distinctions, all effect sizes were 
transformed into a common independent-groups metric (dIG) following formulations and 
procedures indicated by Morris and DeShon (2002). Transforming effect sizes into alternate 
metrics requires an estimate of the population correlation between pre- and post-test scores 
(Morris & DeShon, 2002). This is a common procedure to correct for measurement error 
which has been viewed as a typical study artifact in meta-analysis (Schmidt, 2010). This 
estimate was calculated using data from the strongest study available (Schimmack, 2005) in 
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terms of the sample size, encompassing 1,118 participants (16% of the total summed sample), 
and then the rest of the studies were corrected for this estimate (ρ = 0.35). 
2.4.4. Meta-analytic techniques 
Computations were undertaken using SPSS macros designed by Wilson (2005). 
Weighted average effect sizes (dIG+) were based on a random effects model due to the 
assumption that the true effect sizes may vary as a function of the different models of affect, 
types of mixed emotions reported, and as a function of the characteristics of the population 
(i.e., proportion of women and men; age of the participants within samples; samples from 
different countries). The restricted maximum likelihood (REML) method was used to 
calculate the effect sizes, as it estimates more conservative standard errors (Raudenbush, 
1994), and REML is more sensitive with small sample sizes (Thompson & Sharp, 1999). 
Effect sizes were interpreted using Cohen’s (1992) guidelines which suggest that, d =0.20 
should be considered a “small” effect size, d = 0.50 is a “medium” effect size, and d = 0.80 is 
a “large” effect size.  
The homogeneity Q statistic (Cochran, 1954) was used to evaluate the variability in 
effect sizes from the primary studies. Q is a diagnostic tool that can be used to determine 
whether there is unexplained variability in the studies selected (Shadish & Haddock, 1994). 
Homogeneity is rejected when the Q statistic is significant. The homogeneity Q statistic was 
also used to compare effect sizes between different models of affect and different types of 
mixed emotions. METAF macro for SPSS (Wilson, 2005) was used to estimate differences 
between models of affect and types of mixed emotions. This macro performs the analogue to 
one-way ANOVA analysis and is suitable for estimating random effects models. Similarly, 
the METAREG macro for SPSS (Wilson, 2005) was used to conduct meta-regressions to 
evaluate 16 potential moderators of effectiveness in the elicitation of mixed emotions. 
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Table 1. Characteristics and effect sizes for studies included in the meta-analysis. 
Study Experiment 






Ne Nc Effect size 
        
Aaker et al. (2008) 2 Positive, negative MIN Ads 45  1.01 
        
Andrade & Cohen (2007) 2 Fear, happy SIM Other 75  0.58 
        
Andrade & Cohen (2007) 3a Fear, happy SIM Other 81  2.12 
        
Barrett et al. (2010) 1 Positive, negative FRQ Music 226  0.52 
        
Bee & Madrigal (2013) 1 Hope, fear MIN Ads 54 106 0.41 
        
Bee & Madrigal (2013) 2 Hope, fear MIN Ads 41 80 0.71 
        
Berrios et al. (2014) 1 Positive, negative SUB Personal exper. 22 13 0.84 
        
Berrios et al. (2014) 2 Positive, negative MIX Personal exper. 30 27 0.87 
        
Carrera & Oceja (2007) 2 Happy, sad FRQ Pictures 37 39 0.94 
        
Fong (2006) 1 Happy, sad MIX Personal exper. 27 75 0.79 
        
Fong (2006) 2 Happy, sad MIX Film 74 64 0.94 
        
Fong & Tiedens (2002) 1 Positive, negative MIN Simulation 27 25 0.59 
        
Hemenover & Schimmack (2007) 1 Disgust, amusement MIN Other 49 53 0.48 
        
Henderson & Norris (2013) 1 Positive, negative MIN Simulation 30  1.76 
        
Hershfield et al. (2009) 1 Positive, negative MIN Simulation 22 23 1.37 
        
Hershfield et al. (2008) 1 Happy, sad MIN Simulation 60 60 0.73 
        
Hershfield et al. (2008) 2 Happy, sad MIN Simulation 51 59 0.45 
        
Hong & Lee (2010) 1 Positive, negative MIN Pictures 45 46 0.60 
        
Hong & Lee (2010) 2 Positive, negative MIN Pictures 37 38 0.59 
        
Hong & Lee (2010) 3 Positive, negative MIN Pictures 125 125 0.43 
        
Hong & Lee (2010) 4 Positive, negative MIN Pictures 74 75 0.20 
        





Table 1 (continued). 
Study Experiment 






Ne Nc Effect size 
        
Hunter et al. (2008) 1 Happy, sad MIN Music 40  0.70 
        
Hunter et al. (2008) 2 Happy, sad MIN Music 40  1.13 
        
Hunter et al. (2010) 1 Happy, sad MIN Music 49  0.72 
        
Kreibig et al. (2013) 1 Disgust, amusement MIN Film 43  2.50 
        
Ladinig et al. (2012) 1 Happy, sad FRQ Music 61  1.20 
        
Larsen & Green (2013) 1 Happy, sad SIM Film 40  2.39 
        
Larsen & Green (2013) 2 Happy, sad SIM Film 55  0.17 
        
Larsen & McGraw (2011) 1a Happy, sad SIM Film 22 25 0.18 
        
Larsen & McGraw (2011) 1b Happy, sad MIN Film 17 22 0.19 
        
Larsen & McGraw (2011) 2 Happy, sad FRQ Film 21 18 0.23 
        
Larsen & McGraw (2011) 3 Happy, sad SIM Film 28 24 0.14 
        
Larsen & McGraw (2011) 4 Happy, sad MIX Film 33 83 0.95 
        
Larsen & McGraw (2011) 5 Happy, sad MIX Film 33 61 0.88 
        
Larsen & McGraw (2011) 6 Happy, sad MIX Film 50 24 0.73 
        
Larsen et al. (2001) 1 Happy, sad FRQ Film 177 177 0.88 
        
Larsen et al. (2001) 2 Happy, sad FRQ Personal exper. 100 92 0.78 
        
Larsen et al. (2001) 3 Happy, sad FRQ Personal exper. 115  0.72 
        
Larsen et al. (2004) 1 Positive, negative MIN Simulation 20  0.86 
        
Larsen et al. (2004) 2 Positive, negative SIM Simulation 20  0.76 
        
Larsen et al. (2009) 2 Positive, negative MIN Personal exper. 19  0.97 
        
Larsen & Statsny (2011) 1 Happy, sad SIM Music 21  0.59 
        




Table 1 (continued). 
Study Experiment 






NE NC Effect size 
        
McGraw & Warren (2010) 3 Disgust, amusement FRQ Simulation 36  0.73 
        
McGraw & Warren (2010) 4 Disgust, amusement FRQ Simulation 80  0.81 
        
McGraw & Warren (2010) 5 Disgust, amusement FRQ Simulation 73  1.27 
        
Oceja & Carrera (2009) 1 Positive, negative MIN Pictures 37 69 0.98 
        
Oceja & Carrera (2009) 2 Positive, negative MIN Pictures 61 29 1.05 
        
Rees et al. (2013) 3a Happy, sad SUB Simulation  53  1.80 
        
Rees et al. (2013) 3b Happy, sad SUB Simulation 652  1.56 
        
Schimmack (1999) 1 Pleasure, displeasure FRQ Pictures 36  0.76 
        
Schimmack (1999) 2 Pleasure, displeasure MIN Pictures 44  0.67 
        
Schimmack (2001) 1 Pleasure, displeasure MIN Pictures 342  0.76 
        
Schimmack (2005) 1 Pleasure, displeasure MIN Pictures 1118  0.39 
        
Schimmack & Colcombe (2007) 1 Pleasure, displeasure MIN Pictures 80  0.50 
        
Spencer-Rodgers et al. (2009) 1 Positive, negative MIN Other 54 53 0.46 
        
Veilleux et al. (2013) 1 Positive, negative MIN Pictures 100  0.67 
        
Williams & Aaker (2002) 1 Happy, sad MIN Ads 204  0.52 
        
Williams & Aaker (2002) 2 Happy, sad MIN Ads 59 70 0.30 
        
Williams & Aaker (2002) 3 Happy, sad MIN Ads 88  0.61 
        
Zhang et al. (2010) 1 Happy, sad MIN Simulation 30  0.76 
        
Zhang et al. (2010) 2 Happy, sad MIN Simulation 58  0.64 
        
        
Note: NE = number of participants in the experimental condition; NC = number of participants in the control condition/s; MIN = minimum index or similar indicator; 
SIM = simultaneous measure of mixed emotions; FRQ = indicator of mixed emotions based on frequencies; SUB = subjective measure of mixed emotions; MIX 






2.5.1. The magnitude of mixed emotions as a phenomenon 
To determine the magnitude of elicited mixed emotions the sample-weighted average 
effect size from the primary studies was calculated. The result showed a significant large 
average effect size, dIG+ = 0.77, z = 15.82, p < 0.01, with a 95% confidence interval lying 
between 0.68 and 0.87, based on 63 studies and a total sample size of 7,157 participants. This 
indicates that mixed emotions were of sufficient magnitude to be reliably detected under a 
variety of conditions. The homogeneity statistic demonstrated the presence of unexplained 
heterogeneity, Q(62) = 341.11, p < 0.01, v = 0.10, which confirmed the pertinence of a 
random effects model for the present meta-analysis. The corresponding forest plot including 
all the studies and the weighted average effect size are shown in Figure 4; studies with larger 
sample sizes are represented using proportionally bigger square symbols, and the diamond 
symbol reflects the weighted average effect size. In general, studies with larger sample sizes 
(and consequently higher power) were closer to the weighted average effect size estimated, 
and only a small portion of studies – commonly those with the smallest sample sizes – 
diverged largely from the average effect size. 
2.5.2. Comparing the experience of mixed emotion between models of 
affect and between different types of mixed emotions 
There was no significant difference between studies that conceptualised mixed 
emotions using a dimensional or a discrete structure of affect, Q(1) = 0.83, n.s. (see Table 2). 
The average effect size of mixed emotions measured using dimensions of affect was large, 
dIG+ = 0.71, z = 8.28, p < 0.001, with a 95% confidence interval from 0.54 to 0.88, based on 
24 comparisons and a total sample size of 3,339.  Mixed emotions measured using a discrete 
emotions approach showed a large average effect size, dIG+ = 0.81, z = 12.14, p < 0.001, with 
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a 95% confidence interval from 0.68 to 0.94, based on 39 comparisons and a total sample size 
of 3,818. This means that dimensional and discrete emotions approaches produce similar 










Figure 4. Forest plot of effect sizes from included studies incorporating 95% CI.  
Note: The presentation of studies follows the alphabetic order displayed in Table 1. 
 
No significant difference was found between the six types of mixed emotions 
measured in the primary studies, Q(5) = 8.06, n.s. Considering first the two types of mixed 
emotions included within the dimensional approach, the average effect size for a mixed 
emotion formed from the combination of positive-negative was large, dIG+ = 0.75, 95% CI = 
0.58 to 0.94; whereas a medium to large effect size was observed for the pair pleasure-
displeasure, dIG+ = 0.61, 95% CI = 0.28 to 0.93. A comparison between the two pairs of 
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mixed emotions within the dimensional model of affect yielded no significant difference, 
Q(1) = 0.99, n.s. 
In terms of the discrete mixed emotion pairs, a large effect size was found for the 
mixed emotion combination happy-sad, dIG+ = 0.77, 95% CI = 0.62 to 0.92. A large effect 
size was also found for the mix fear-happy, dIG+ = 1.28, 95% CI = 0.74 to 1.82, and disgust-
amused, dIG+ = 1.07, 95% CI = 0.69 to 1.44. Finally, a medium effect size was found for the 
mixed emotion combination of hope-fear, dIG+ = 0.53, 95% CI = 0.08 to 0.97. These results 
indicate that different combinations of mixed emotions all produced substantial effects.  
 
Table 2. Average effect sizes across models of affect and across different types of mixed emotions. 
Variable dIG+ SE k I2 
     
Model of affect:     
     
Dimensional   .71** .09 24 0% 
     
Discrete   .81** .07 39 34.9%a 
     
Type of mixed emotions considered:     
     
Happy-sad   .77** .07 29 17.1% 
     
Fear-happy 1.28** .27 2 87.3%b 
     
Disgust-amusement 1.07** .19 5 68.0%a 
     
Hope-fear  .53* .22 3 0% 
     
Positive-negative    .75** .09 19 0% 
     
Pleasure-displeasure    .60** .17 5 0% 
     
 
Note: SE and k are standard error and number of studies, respectively. I2 is a quantification of the degree 
of heterogeneity calculated by I2 = 100%×(Q - df)/Q, where Q is Cochran's heterogeneity statistic and df 
the degrees of freedom (Higgins, Thompson, Deek, & Altman, 2003). ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. a = Qw 
significant at p < 0.05; b = Qw significant at p < 0.01. 
 
Comparisons across the discrete pairs of mixed emotions showed no significant 
differences between any of the pairs: happy-sad and fear-happy, Q(1) = 2.63, n.s.; happy-sad 
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and hope-fear, Q(1) = 1.07, n.s.; happy-sad and disgust-amused, Q(1) = 1.85, p > .10; fear-
happy and hope-fear, Q(1) = 1.93, n.s.; fear-happy and disgust-amused, Q(1) = 0.10, p > .10; 
hope-fear and disgust-amused, Q(1) = 1.94, n.s. It should be noted, however, that a high level 
of unexplained heterogeneity was found for the mixed emotions fear-happy, Qw(1) = 7.90, p 
< .05, and disgust-amusement, Qw(4) = 12.50, p < .05. 
2.5.3. Moderators of the effectiveness of mixed emotions elicitation 
Several methodological factors and study characteristics were tested as potential 
moderators of the effectiveness with which mixed emotions were elicited (see Table 3). First, 
the type of measure used to evaluate mixed emotions was tested. Studies using the minimum 
index reported smaller effect sizes on average compared to studies not using this measure, β = 
-0.20, z = -1.97, p = .04. In contrast, studies using subjective measures of mixed emotions 
reported marginally larger effect sizes than studies not including this measure, β = 0.57, z = 
1.92, p = 0.05. The use of simultaneous measures and frequency-based measures did not 
influence effect sizes. 
In terms of the procedure used to induce mixed emotions, none of the induction 
procedures influenced effect sizes (see Table 3). Similarly, the type of experimental design, 
that is, within-person designs or between-person designs, did not influence effect sizes. 
Finally, considering demographic characteristics, the magnitude of the experience of mixed 
emotions was greater when there was a higher percentage of women in the sample, β = 0.89, z 












k n 95% CI I2 
       
Indicator of mixed emotions 
(absent, present): 
      
       
Minimum index      -.20* .10 28 / 35 2,823 / 4,334 -.40 / -.01 0% 
       
Simultaneous measure     .10 .17 55 / 8 6,766 / 391 -.23 / .43 77.2%b 
       
Frequency           .04 .14 52 / 13 6,046 / 1111 -.23 / .31 0% 
       
Subjective measure      .57† .30 60 / 3 6,417 / 740 -.03 / 1.12 16.7% 
       
Mix of measures     .10 .19 57 / 6 6,576 / 581 -.27 / .46 0% 
       
Mixed emotions induction 
procedure (absent, present): 
      
       
Ads   -.25 .16 56 / 7 6,374 / 783 -.55 / .06 0% 
       
Films    .07 .14 51 / 12 6,243 / 914 -.21 / .35 66.3%b 
       
Music    .03 .17 57 / 6 6,720 / 437 -.32 / .38 0% 
       
Pictures   -.16 .12 49 / 14 4,383 / 2774 -.40 / .07 0% 
       
Personal experiences    .04 .19 57 / 6 6,637 / 520 -.33 / .40 0% 
       
Simulation or imagination    .18 .13 48 / 15 5,686 / 1471 -.07 / .43 0% 
       
Other    .24 .23 60 / 3 6,899 / 258 -.22 / .69 81.8%b 
       
Design characteristics:       
       
Within-person design    .13 .10 32 3,619 -.08 / .38 30.6% 
       
Between-person design  -.13 .11 31 3,583 -.34 / .08 0% 
       
Demographic 
characteristics: 
      
       
Percentage of women 
(range 0%- 100%) 
       .89** .25 46 5,097  .20 / 1.58 19.6% 
       
Age (range 18-47 years)         -.01 .01 27 3,153 -.02 /  .02 10.2% 
       
 
Note: Columns k and n represent number of studies and number of participants, respectively. Where applicable, 
these are reported separately for each level of the moderator variable (indicated in parentheses at the end of 
each moderator name). Where a variable is coded as “absent, present,” absent was coded as 0 and present was 
coded as 1; thus, a positive regression coefficient indicates that studies in which the variable was present had 
larger effect sizes, and a negative regression coefficient indicates that studies where that variable was present 
had smaller effect sizes. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.10.  b = Qw significant at p < 0.01. 
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2.5.4. Publication biases 
Publication biases in meta-analyses arise as a result of the publication of statistically 
significant results (Begg, 1994). Studies that find statistically significant results are more 
likely to be published than studies that find non-significant results (Begg, 1994). Thus, 
publication biases are a relevant issue necessary to address because may exaggerate the size 
of the effects (Begg, 1994) leading to inaccurate estimation of the magnitude in the elicitation 
of mixed emotions. This is particularly important in the present meta-analysis, where most of 
the studies correspond to published studies. To determine whether the estimated effect sizes 
were biased because of missing unpublished manuscripts with small or non-significant 
effects, the distribution of the effect sizes observed in the primary studies was examined 
using a funnel plot. The funnel plot shown in Figure 5 revealed some signs of asymmetry: the 
tendency for large observed effect sizes was reduced when studies had larger samples and 
lower standard errors. However, applying statistical methods to detect publication bias did 
not provide evidence that this bias existed in the sample of studies. The Begg's Rank 
Correlation method (Begg & Mazumdar, 1994) did not show a significant presence of 
publication bias, tau = 0.14, z = -1.28, p = 0.10.  Furthermore, contemporary methods to 
detect publication bias using a conditional estimator (PET-PEESE; Stanley & Doucouliagos, 
2014) did not reveal the presence of severe distortions in the effect sizes (see Table 4).  
PET-PEESE is a meta-regression technique to estimate publication bias using a 
quadratic approximation, useful when there is a nonzero effect (Stanley & Doucouliagos, 
2014), common in emotion sciences where neutrality (i.e., values of zero emotion) is 
normally hard to estimate. This technique estimates first a precision-effect-test (PET; similar 
to Egger’s regression) which is a linear function between the effect sizes and standard errors, 
useful to detect genuine non-zero effect. Next the precision-effect-estimate-with-standard 
error (PEESE) is calculated; a quadratic function using the same parameters. Combining both 
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approaches PET-PEESE has the lowest average bias compared to applying only PET or 
PEESE (Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2014), demonstrating the advantages of using this 









Figure 5. Funnel plot of effect sizes from included studies. 
 
Thus, despite evidence of asymmetry in the funnel plot demonstrated by the 
coefficients in the regression models (i.e., β1), results from applying PET-PEESE indicated 
that the null hypothesis that β0 = 0 using PET should be rejected and consequently the 
intercept from PEESE should be used as the best estimate of the true effect size. This was 
true considering both the full sample and separate samples based on the distinction between 
dimensional and discrete approaches. In detail, the results displayed in Table 4 revealed that 
the estimated effect sizes (β0) for the full dataset and separate analyses for each model 
(discrete and dimensional) were quite close to the effect sizes reported in section 2.5.1 and 




Finally, a fail-safe N test for a meta-analytic random-effects model (Rosenberg, 2005) 
determined that 167 unpublished studies with zero effect size would have to exist in order to 
overturn the finding that mixed emotions are consistently elicited across the primary studies. 
The fail-safe N test for a fixed-effects model, similar to Rosenthal’s fail-safe N (1979), 
determined that more than 10,000 studies would be needed to overturn the current findings; 
this number exceeds the suggested tolerance value of 5n + 10 (where n is the number of 
studies). Overall, the data appear to be resilient to publication bias. 
 
Table 4. Results from PET-PEESE indicator based on Stanley and Doucouliagos (2014) 
approximation to reduce publication selection bias. 




β0 β1 β0 β1 
     
     
Full .41** (.27, .54) 1.86** .53** (.43, .63) 4.66** 
     
Model of affect:     
     
Dimensional .38** (.27, .48) 1.72** .47** (.38, .55) 4.38** 
     
Discrete .55** (.21, .89)     1.28 .66** (.46, .86)     3.26 
     
     
Note: Full = the full sample. For PET and PEESE, β0 = the intercept (i.e., the corrected estimate of 
the overall effect), β1 = the coefficient for standard error or variance (i.e., the test for funnel plot 
asymmetry). Numbers given in parentheses are the lower and upper limits of the 95% confidence 
intervals. ** p < 0.01.  
 
2.6. Discussion 
This meta-analytic review examined the extent to which mixed emotions have been 
elicited across a variety of theoretical and methodological contexts. Robustness was 
understood as the stability of effect sizes across a variety of theoretical and methodological 
conditions (Wimsatt, 1981). An assessment of robustness is a desirable goal for any model of 
affect in order to determine that accrued evidence is not a result of: methodological artifacts, 
the selection of certain measures, emotional adjectives, or chance. Accurate interpretation of 
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research findings can be hampered by the influence of design artifacts. Schmidt (2010) stated 
that an effective method of avoiding this problem in meta-analysis is to use a random effects 
model so as to not leave significant variability unaccounted for. Additionally, Schmidt urged 
researchers to correct for the biasing effects of measurement errors when conducting meta-
analysis. In line with these recommendations, the current research used a random effects 
model and corrected for measurement error using the strongest study available, enhancing 
confidence that the elicitation of mixed emotions appears a non-artifactual emotional 
experience.  
Numerous studies have investigated mixed emotions, especially following several 
articles at the turn of the millennia that debated the structure of affect and the possibility that 
people can experience two opposite affects concurrently (e.g., Russell & Carroll, 1999). The 
present chapter assessed the evidence available and found that elicitation of mixed feelings is 
a robust effect. The average effect size observed from k=63 experimental studies was large, 
and the effect-sizes appeared to be resilient to publication bias. This finding serves two 
important goals for the following chapters. Firstly, it provides the necessary evidence to 
sustain that mixed emotions are a genuine emotional experience. Propositions from 
dimensional models of affect, such as the circumplex model of affect, sustain that 
experiencing two opposite emotions concurrently is questionable, and as a result, evidence 
for mixed emotions may simply reflect measurement problems (e.g., Russell, 2003; Russell & 
Carroll, 1999). The evidence presented in this chapter supported the experience of mixed 
emotions as a robust measurable phenomenon. That is, the experience of mixed emotions 
proved stable and consistent across a variety of different theoretical and methodological 
conditions. Secondly, this evidence provides an appropriate estimate to calculate necessary 
sample sizes in subsequent studies to achieve sufficient statistical power.  
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It is also important to note that this chapter considers the two major models of the 
structure of affect (i.e., dimensional and discrete) as a relevant comparison of the elicitation 
of mixed emotions. Findings showed that effect sizes were of similar magnitude regardless of 
whether the structure of affect was considered as dimensional or discrete and no significant 
difference was found when comparing effects from the different models. As a large amount 
of research has investigated the mixed emotions of happy- sad, an alternative account might 
posit that happiness/sadness constitutes an exclusive mixed emotion, because these emotions 
are specifically coupled in response to prompts of nostalgia (e.g., Barrett et al., 2010). 
However, current results indicated that it is unlikely that mixed emotions represent a 
peculiarity of certain opposing emotions (e.g., happy-sad). Findings also revealed that no-
significant differences were found between the multiple comparisons of pairs of mixed 
emotions, supporting the previous assertion. 
It is, however less clear under which circumstances the affect system follows a bipolar 
relation between positive and negative affect or activates complex affective experiences, such 
as mixed emotions. The evidence presented in this chapter emphasises the need to further 
investigate the antecedents of mixed emotions. Understanding the conditions that surround 
the elicitation of emotional experiences has been mentioned by a number of emotion theories 
emphasising the role of situations in the conceptualization of affective experience (e.g., 
Arnold, 1960; Clore & Ortony, 2013; Parkinson, 1997; Zajonc, 1984). Arnold (1960), for 
example, proposed that emotions can be represented as affective perceptions in tone with 
relevant external situations. Similar notions have been incorporated in communicational 
models of affect (Parkinson, 1997), and even by conceptualisations that dispense of any high 
level evaluative process in the experience of emotions (Zajonc, 1984). Therefore, 
understanding affective experiences requires understanding of the conditions that promote the 
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emergence of certain affects, and this extends to mixed emotions; an issue which is addressed 
in chapter 3.  
In terms of the moderators, the present review found that use of the minimum index of 
mixed emotions was associated with smaller effect sizes, whereas subjective measures of 
mixed emotions produced marginally greater effect sizes. It is possible that the minimum 
index is a more conservative indicator of the presence of mixed emotions because it reflects 
the lower threshold in the experience of mixed emotions rather than the intensity of the 
overall experience. In contrast, subjective measures may be more liberal in their estimation of 
mixed emotions because they rely on self-reports of the direct experience of mixed emotions 
and thereby encapsulate the integral experience of mixed emotions. The larger effect size for 
subjective measures provides preliminary support for the assumption that mixed emotions are 
an integral experience.  
In addition, evidence presented here showed that use of the simultaneous measure of 
mixed emotions produced a large amount of heterogeneity (expressed as I2). This is 
unexpected considering that the simultaneous measure of mixed emotions should be one of 
the strongest measures in terms of the methodological sophistication (Larsen & McGraw, 
2014). However, it is possible that one explanation for the large amount of heterogeneity may 
stem from the lack of appropriate statistical tests to estimate the presence of mixed emotions 
when using simultaneous measures of mixed emotions. Commonly, researchers using button-
press measures quantify the amount of time that subjects reported mixed emotions, and then 
they compare the proportion or distributions of ranked values obtained from each group in the 
experiment (e.g., Larsen & McGraw, 2011; Larsen et al., 2001). However, when normally 
distributed, non-parametric tests are less statistically powerful, and even under conditions of 
non-normality the power of non-parametric statistics vary across different distributions 
(Vickers, 2005). Thus, the heterogeneity observed may reflect different data distributions, 
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and as a consequence, different degrees of type-II error present across studies. Another 
explanation for the heterogeneity is the dependency present in the data using measures like 
the button-press technique. It is possible to say that time-points are nested within person 
giving place to a hierarchical data structure. This means that computation of the effect size 
may need further refinement when using simultaneous measures. One alternative may be the 
use of generalized linear mixed models (GLMM). GLMM analyses hierarchical data using 
categorical outcomes (Heck, Thomas, & Tabata, 2012), such as the dummy coded variables 
resulting from using the simultaneous measure of mixed emotions. Thus, applying this type 
of statistical technique, it is possible to reduce the uncertainty resulting from the 
nonindependence in the data structure, and potentially leading to more stable effect sizes 
across studies. 
Other moderators, such as the elicitation procedure and methodological variables (i.e., 
between or within-subject designs) did not reveal an effect on the elicitation of mixed 
emotions experiences. However, one final finding of note is that gender moderated the 
elicitation of mixed emotions. Specifically, the present findings suggest that, compared to 
men, women either: (a) tend to experience more intense mixed emotions in response to 
induction procedures, (b) are more aware of experiencing mixed emotions or (c) are more 
inclined to report the experience. Fujita, Diener, and Sandvik (1991) reconciled previous 
research showing that women report as much happiness as men but simultaneously also 
report greater levels of unpleasant affect, demonstrating that women experience more intense 
positive emotions that balances any negative bias. Results of the present meta-analysis may 
offer an alternative explanation that is based on a gender difference in the experience or 
reporting of mixed emotions that is not effectively or adequately captured by the most 
commonly used affect measures.  
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Limitations. It is important to higlight that the current meta-analysis was based 
exclusively on studies involving experimental designs. This limitation means that it is not 
possible to infer the extent to which mixed emotions occurr in everyday life. In order to 
address this limitation, chapter 5 will investigate the mechanisms linking mixed emotions, 
well-being and self-control using ecologically valid methods. This is important because 
several diary studies have explored the within-person association between positive and 
negative affect (e.g., Ong & Bergeman, 2004), so it is expected to contribute to a clearer 
understanding of mixed emotions applying methods such as experiencing sampling 
techniques.  
Additionally, it is worth noting that the present review investigated the hypothesis that 
mixed emotions are consistently activated across different theoretical and methodological 
conditions. This involved testing the null hypothesis that, following an induction, people did 
not experience more mixed emotions than a control group, leading to effect sizes close to 
zero. However, in line with assumptions derived from the ESM which suggests that the affect 
system can operate in multiple modes of activation (Cacioppo et al., 1999; Cacioppo et al., 
2004), future studies should investigate under which circumstances the affect system tends to 
activate one affect exclusively or two affects concurrently. This limitation is partly remedied 
in chapter 3, where one condition that might promote the experience of mixed emotions is 
studied; namely, goal conflict.   
Conclusion. In summary, the current meta-analysis has made four distinct 
contributions to the present research project. Firstly, it has demonstrated that mixed emotions 
are a robust and non-artifactual experience. The evidence provided here shows that the 
average effect size for the elicitation of mixed emotions is large in magnitude, and that the 
effect is similar across different types of mixed emotions. Second, this meta-analysis has 
demonstrated that mixed emotions have been elicited when conceptualised as dimensions or 
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as discrete entities. Third, the effect size for mixed emotions was shown to be sensitive to the 
type of measure used (it is smaller for minimum index measures, and larger for direct 
measures) and to the gender makeup of the sample (larger for women) but not to the type of 
induction procedure used. Fourth, the results for the limited set of studies using subjective 
measures permit speculation that the experience of mixed emotions might be more than the 
sum of its constituent emotions, suggesting the importance of further investigating the 
subjective experience of mixed emotions. Overall, this meta-analysis provides a foundation 




3. CHAPTER THREE: CONFLICTING GOALS PREDICT MIXED 
EMOTIONS 
“For pleasure is a state of soul, and to each man that which he is said to be a lover of is 
pleasant […] Now for most men their pleasures are in conflict […]” 
Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics; I.8) 
 
veryday life often reminds people that Aristotle was probably correct in asserting that 
our greatest pleasures usually collide. Imagine that you are finishing an important 
project at the office and need to call your partner to say that you will be late for dinner. On 
the one hand, it would feel good to finish your work and receive some recognition for it but, 
on the other hand, it would feel bad to hurt your partner’s feelings, especially if you wanted 
to spend more time together. So you experience mixed feelings as you decide what to do.  
Following the model proposed in chapter 1, the aim of the present chapter is to 
determine whether conflicting goals can lead to the experience of mixed emotions. Another 
important goal of the present chapter is to distinguish mixed emotions from emotional 
conflict. Emotional conflict has been equated to mixed emotions (Carver, Sutton, & Scheier, 
2000), and has also been associated with detrimental consequences for individual well-being 
(King & Emmons, 1990). Thus, the differentiation of these constructs constitutes an 
important step prior to investigating the potential benefits of mixed emotions for well-being. 
In chapter 1 it was proposed that the proximal cause of mixed emotions is conflicting 
goals. This is consistent with recent conceptualisations of goal conflict (Ellsworth & Scherer, 
2003; Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007), and it is also consistent with Perceptual Control Theory 
(PCT; Powers, 1973; Powers et al., 1960). Previous research in the field of mixed emotions 
has not dedicated much effort to understanding the antecedents of mixed emotions, and this is 




Alternative explanations for the origin of mixed emotions have been drawn from affective 
responses across different situations in Western versus Eastern cultures (Miyamoto et al., 
2010). In two different studies, participants produced free descriptions of their feelings in a 
range of different situations (e.g., transitions into a new life, self-other comparison 
situations), and then rated their emotions using different emotional adjectives (e.g., happy, 
proud, jealous) which encompassed two broad dimensions of positive and negative affect. 
Miyamoto and colleagues (2010) found that, across both Western and Eastern cultures, some 
situations typically elicited greater levels of mixed emotions. In particular, situations related 
to self-success (e.g., admission to the university), self-failure (e.g., failing midterm exams), 
and transitions (e.g., leaving home and moving to a different town to study) commonly 
elicited mixed emotions.  
A problem with investigating life events as determinants of mixed emotions is that 
they typically involve many individual situations which could elicit mixed emotions but do 
not accurately capture what it is about those situations that gives rise to the experience of 
mixed emotions. Thus, although the previous evidence is relevant because it demonstrates 
that common situational features across cultures produce similar levels of mixed emotions, 
conflicting goals could be the common variable underling the elicitation of mixed emotions. 
Instead of investigating multiple situations that may elicit mixed emotions, the present 
chapter hypothesised that the common feature that instigate the experience of mixed emotions 
is the presence of goal conflict.  
Individuals often face situations where they need to decide between multiple potential 
courses of action both of which simultaneously offer benefits, and undesired consequences 
derived from the impossibility of achieving both ends. The model examined in this chapter is 
anchored in the PCT (Powers, 1973; Powers et al., 1960), which is briefly outlined in the 
following section. Next, current theories suggesting an association between conflicting goals 
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and mixed emotions are discussed. Then, two experimental studies are presented which 
examine the association between goal conflict and mixed emotions. Finally, a brief discussion 
summarises the implications of the findings for the current research model and mixed 
emotions in general. 
3.1. Perceptual Control Theory, goal conflict and emotions 
According to PCT, organisms control perceptions, not observed actions (Powers, 
1973; Powers et al., 1960). This means that people do not necessarily monitor their behaviour 
when trying to achieve a goal, but instead they monitor the discrepancy between goals and 
perceptual inputs (Carver & Scheier, 1982; Powers, 1973). Behaviour is varied, not 
controlled; what matters is whether people are successful in creating or conserving certain 
desired states despite environmental disturbances or individuals’ actions (Bourbon, 1995).  
For example, if a student is urgently finishing an important assignment and suddenly 
realises that she has made a mistake meaning that a large section will need to be re-written, 
an emotion will likely emerge; the palms of her hands may start sweating and thoughts about 
how to work quickly and accurately will begin to cross her mind. An error signal was 
detected because a discrepancy was perceived between the need to complete the assignment 
soon (her goal) and the perception of a mistake that may seriously delay the process 
(perceptual input). Thus, control systems work in closed-loops including perceptual inputs 
that act as feedback signals and are compared against mentally represented goals or reference 
signals. Comparisons between perceptual inputs and reference signals are continuously 
monitored, correcting potential discrepancies and changing behaviour (Carver & Scheier, 
1982; Powers, 1973). 
Critically, PCT states that control systems are hierarchically organised (Carver & 
Scheier, 1982; Powers, 1973), such that the outputs of goals higher in the hierarchy 
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(principles, such as “be a good father”) are the reference signals or goals for lower systems 
(behaviours as simple as muscles movements necessary to hold a baby). Thus, reference 
values become more concrete and specific as one moves down the goal hierarchy (Carver & 
Scheier, 1999; Powers, 1973). 
According to PCT, emotions arise from discrepancies between goals high in the 
hierarchy (principles and programs in Powers’ terminology) and progress towards (or away 
from) such goals (Powers, 1973, 2014). Perceptual inputs are compared against internally 
represented standards or goals; if no discrepancy is observed, then there is no need for change 
and individuals can continue with current behaviours (Carver & Scheier, 1982; Powers, 1973, 
2014). However, if an error signal is detected then an emotional experience is created, which 
activates a cascade of changes involving cognitions and motor responses to correct perceived 
deviations (Powers, 1973, 2014). In other words, emotions arise as a consequence of the 
efforts of the system to restore certain states; these emotions inform people about the need to 
adjust behaviours until equilibrium is achieved. 
An important feature of PCT is that perceptions can be controlled by several control 
systems working in parallel, usually interacting. Importantly, when discrepancies arise from 
the activation of two different control systems, goal conflict is usually observed (Powers et 
al., 1960). Powers (1973, 2014) emphasised that conflict is usually accompanied by a 
continuous flow of different emotions because discrepancies between goals cannot be easily 
corrected. It is plausible that this continuous flow of emotions when facing goal conflict, 
described by Powers (2014), may correspond to the experience of mixed emotions. 
3.2. Goal conflict and mixed emotions 
Two different approaches have been suggested to understand the relationship between 
conflicting goals and mixed emotions. Firstly, some theories have suggested that conflicting 
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goals are a relevant source of mixed emotions (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Fishbach & 
Ferguson, 2007) such that mixed emotions may derive from conflicting goals. According to 
Fishbach and Ferguson (2007), setting multiple goals may hinder the attainment of some 
goals which can lead to the experience of mixed emotions, especially when the means 
available for progress on one of these goals are incongruent with the means necessary to 
progress on another. For example, mixed emotions may arise when a scholar evaluates a 
recent offer to move abroad with very advantageous conditions in light of her spouse’s recent 
promotion that requires that they do not relocate. In this way, mixed emotions can be thought 
of as resulting from conflicting goals, rather than being the conflict itself. 
In contrast, other theories have considered mixed emotions as a particular type of 
emotional conflict (Carver, Sutton, & Scheier, 2000). According to Carver et al. (2000), 
people’s lives can be characterised by conflicting tendencies between eagerness (conceptually 
related to the approach affect system) and anxiety (conceptually related to the avoidance 
affect system) which make people vulnerable to experiencing mixed emotions. Closely linked 
with this is the notion that people can experience high levels of ambivalence over the 
emotions that they feel in one particular moment (King & Emmons, 1990). Emotional 
conflict has been viewed as a pernicious type of conflict, negatively influencing well-being 
and health-related variables (King & Emmons, 1990). This might indicate that mixed 
emotions are not elicited by conflicting goals, but instead represent a particular type of 
conflict related to emotional ambivalence, a particularly pernicious type of conflict (King & 
Emmons, 1990).  
Previous evidence has supported the idea that conflicting goals may be a proximal 
predictor of mixed emotions (Boudreaux & Ozer, 2013; Mukhopadhyay & Johar, 2007). For 
example, Mukhopadhyay and Johar (2007, Study 1) investigated the affective responses 
triggered when people make decisions about unintended purchases in consumer scenarios. 
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Unintended purchases can be thought of as a scenario where goal conflict is present because 
the scenario activates both the goal of avoiding spending money unnecessarily and the goal of 
acquiring and using products (Mukhopadhyay & Johar, 2007). Results showed that 
participants who decided to buy a product felt happier, guiltier, and more remorse than 
participants who decided not to buy the product, which could be conceived of as initial 
evidence for the idea that goal conflict elicits mixed emotions. 
However, the fact that the buyers experienced higher average scores for different 
emotions does not demonstrate the presence of more mixed emotions compared to those who 
did not buy; in fact, the study did not provide a clear indicator of the presence of mixed 
emotions (e.g., minimum index). As shown in chapter 2, different measures of mixed 
emotions exist, but Mukhopadhyay and Johar (2007) did not report a measure of mixed 
emotions. Furthermore, it is not clear whether the people who decided not to buy experienced 
more, equal, or less conflict between goals compared to those who bought an item; therefore 
it is difficult to conclude that the outcome of this study reflects the influence of conflicting 
goals on mixed emotions.   
In another study, Boudreaux and Ozer (2013) surveyed a sample of participants in two 
different occasions. On each occasion participants rated both their goals in terms of the 
degree of commitment, ambivalence, and stress and their subjective well-being and 
psychological distress. In this study, the measure of ambivalence was equated to mixed 
emotions (i.e., “Do you have mixed feelings about wanting to work toward and attain this 
goal?”). Participants also rated the degree of perceived conflict between their goals (i.e., 
“judge whether working toward one goal interferes with working toward and attaining 
another goal”), and the degree of facilitation among goals (i.e., “judge whether working 
toward one goal helps support your efforts at working toward and attaining another goal”). 
Results showed that people who experienced more conflict among their goals also reported 
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greater levels of mixed feelings (i.e., ambivalence) compared to goals that facilitated each 
other. However, this study captured mixed emotions using a single item measure, which casts 
some doubts as to whether mixed emotions can be distinguished or not from emotional 
ambivalence. Furthermore, in this study, it was not possible to infer a causal relationship 
between goal conflict and mixed emotions because no experimental procedures were 
implemented.  
In sum, initial theoretical and empirical contributions suggest that goal conflict may 
be linked to the experience of mixed emotions. However, to date, this hypothesis has been 
only partially tested in a few studies without directly investigating the influence of conflicting 
goals on mixed emotions. It is also unclear whether mixed emotions are best conceptualised 
as a form of emotional conflict related to the concept of emotional ambivalence, meaning that 
the concept of mixed emotions have no additional explanatory value. 
3.3. Overview of Study 1 and Study 2 
The basic hypothesis tested in this chapter, and also explained in chapter 1, is that the 
experience of mixed emotions will be predicted by goal conflict; this hypothesis is studied in 
two experimental studies. Study 1 examined whether people dealing with an elicited conflict 
between a pro-social goal and a self-interest goal would experience more mixed emotions 
compared to people dealing with the same goals when they were not in conflict (hypothesis 
1.1). The distinction between pro-social and self-interest goals has been commonly viewed as 
one of the basic conflicts that people face when navigating social encounters (Van Lange, De 
Cremer, Van Dijk, & Van Vugt, 2007). Living in a society involves making continuous 
valuations between individual versus societal interests, and as such is a prototypical example 
of goal conflict. 
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Study 2 also examined whether mixed emotions were a consequence of conflicting 
goals but this time using naturally occurring goal activation. The study specifically compared 
conflicting goals and facilitating goals to verify that it is the conflict, and not just multiple 
goal activation, that predicts mixed emotions. Recent theoretical contributions have suggested 
that multiple goal dynamics can be described (Cavallo & Fitzsimons, 2012). One of the main 
distinctions is between goal conflict and goals that facilitate each other (e.g., Boudreaux & 
Ozer, 2013). Goal facilitation is understood as the activation of multiple goals that help each 
other in the consummation of their respective ends, such as, for example, trying to learn more 
about your field of study, dedicating more time to revise, and avoiding parties before an 
exam. Thus, the hypothesis was that mixed emotions would be higher following conflicting 
goals compared to facilitating goals (hypothesis 1.2). Study 2 also examined whether 
experiencing mixed emotions is simply a reflection of the individual’s tendency to experience 
emotional conflict, or should be treated as a separate construct. 
3.4. Study 1 
3.4.1. Method 
Participants. The participants in this experiment were 35 student volunteers (Mage = 
29.60 years, SD = 9.18 years; 22 females) who completed the study online. The expected 
sample size was N = 50 participants, which was estimated to be adequate to achieve a 80% 
power given the average effect size estimated in the meta-analysis presented in chapter 2. 
However, due to a programming error when preparing the study, a portion of the sample was 
lost because the dependent variable was inadvertently randomised. Once the error was 
corrected, the remaining sample was n = 35. This study received ethical approval from the 
Department of Psychology ethics sub-committee (DESC) prior to beginning the data 
collection process. For reasons related to the accessibility of the sample, participants were 
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recruited from a student volunteers list. Participants were informed that the study aimed to 
better understand the relationship between personal goals and emotional experiences. Once 
the informed consent form was read and accepted, participants initiated the participation in 
the experiment. 
Procedures. Participants completed a procedure designed to activate goals, similar to 
the procedures used in previous studies (e.g., Köpetz, Faber, Fishbach, & Kruglanski, 2011). 
Firstly, participants completed two separate questions to indicate the level of importance that 
they attached to trying to contribute to charitable organisations (pro-social goal; “I try to 
contribute to charitable organisations”) and to trying to use their time efficiently (self-
interest goal; “I try to save my time and use it efficiently”), using a scale ranging from 1 (not 
important at all) to 5 (very important). To ensure activation of goals, participants were asked 
to write two reasons why they believed in contributing to charity and trying to use time 
efficiently. 
After this initial goal activation procedure, participants were informed that they were 
about to make a real decision involving the two goals. Following these instructions 
participants were assigned by a computer program to either an experimental or a control 
condition. The experimental group (n = 22) was instructed to choose between two conflicting 
options, in which the first had higher self-interest value and the second had higher prosocial 
value. The first option implied that the researcher would donate £4 to a charitable 
organisation in return for the participant spending three minutes completing a task. The 
second option implied that the researcher would donate £24 to a charitable organisation in 
return for the participant spending 18 minutes completing the same task. In contrast, the 
control group (n = 13) was presented with two non-conflicting options. One option implied 
that the researcher would donate £24 to a charitable organization and in return the participant 
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would spend five minutes completing a task; the second option kept the amount of money 
offered identical, but involved spending seven minutes completing the same task.  
A four-item self-report scale was used to directly measure mixed emotions was 
administered immediately after participants saw the options in both conditions (M = 2.38, SD 
= 1.05; α = 0.90; i.e., “I’m feeling contrasting emotions”; “I’m feeling a mixture of 
emotions”; “I’m feeling different emotions at the same time”; “I’m feeling a combination of 
different emotions at the same time”). This scale was constructed by the author and its 
construct and convergent validity, as well as its reliability was appropriately tested in a large 
sample of participants (n > 400; Berrios, Totterdell, & Kellett, 2013). Participants were 
requested to rate the extent to which they were experiencing mixed emotions while deciding 
between the options presented on a five-point Likert format-scale from 1 (Not at all) to 5 
(Very much).  
Conflict was measured using two separate items: (1) rating whether contributing to a 
charitable organisation had harmful effects on time-saving (M = 1.77, SD = 1.09; “Did 
contributing to the charity have harmful effects on saving your time?”) and (2) rating whether 
saving personal time had harmful effects on contributing to a charitable organization (M = 
2.14, SD = 1.31; “Did saving your time have harmful effects on contributing to the 
charity?”), using a 5-point Likert format-scale from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Very much).   
 
3.4.2. Results  
Simple correlations showed that the items corresponding to the subjective measure of 
mixed emotions were all positively and significantly correlated, with correlations indices 
ranging between 0.53 and 0.82. A significant and moderate correlation was also found 
between the subjective measure of mixed emotions and the average of the items measuring 
goal conflict (r = .41, p < 0.05; 95% CI: 0.19 and 0.63), suggesting only a moderate overlap 
between these constructs. The mixed emotions variable was approximately normally 
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distributed for each category of the independent variable (goal conflict vs. no goal conflict) 
and no outliers were identified. 
Manipulation checks demonstrated that participants in the conflicting goals condition 
(M = 2.10, SD = 1.23) perceived more harmful effects of contributing to the charity on saving 
personal time, t(33) = 2.42, p < 0.05, compared to participants in the no-conflicting goals 
condition (M = 1.23, SD = 0.44).  Participants in the conflicting goals condition (M = 2.64, 
SD = 1.36) also perceived more harmful effects of saving personal time on trying to 
contribute to the charity, t(33) = 3.29, p < 0.01, compared to the no-conflicting goals 
condition (M = 1.31, SD = 0.63). 
More importantly, results showed that participants in the conflicting goals condition 
(M = 2.69, SD = 0.98) felt significantly more mixed, F(1, 33) = 5.98, p < 0.05, d = 0.84, 
compared to the control group (M = 1.85, SD = 0.99). Significant differences were found for 
gender on mixed emotions, t(33) = 2.28, p < 0.05, such that women tended to experience 
greater mixed emotions than men. However, the inclusion of gender in the model did not 
change the main effect observed, F(1, 32) = 5.67, p < 0.05. The results support hypothesis 1.1 
that eliciting conflicting goals can significantly instigate mixed emotions when compared to a 
condition where the same goals are not in conflict. 
In summary, Study 1 showed that mixed emotions can be elicited by manipulating the 
degree of conflict between a pair of artificially activated goals. Perceived conflict between a 
pair of goals significantly predicted greater levels of mixed emotions compared to a condition 
where the same goals were not in conflict. However, it is possible that this effect could have 
be due to chance (i.e., the sample size was very small). Furthermore, Study 1 cannot 
determine whether mixed emotions are similar to emotional conflict or emotional 
ambivalence. Finally, it is possible that mixed emotions are elicited by the simultaneous 
presence of multiple goals, regardless of whether they are in conflict. To address these 
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limitations, a second study was conducted which evaluated the association between mixed 
emotions and emotional conflict. Study 2 also compared the elicitation of mixed emotions 
with alternative goal dynamics (i.e., facilitating goals) and incorporated an alternative 
measure of mixed emotions based on the minimum index in order to determine the 
consistency of the findings, regardless of the measure of mixed emotions.  
 
3.5. Study 2 
3.5.1. Method  
Participants. Participants were fifty eight undergraduate students (Mage = 19.41 
years, SD = 2.46 years; 48 females) who voluntarily participated in exchange for course 
credits and were told that the study intended to understand the effects of recalling recent 
events related to personal goals on their affective experiences. The sample size was estimated 
a-priori using G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) in order to achieve 
80% power, with two groups, a probability error of .05, and a medium to large effect size 
(based on the meta-analysis presented in chapter 2). One female participant was excluded 
from the sample because she dropped out of the study before completing the experimental 
procedure, so the final sample size was composed of 57 participants.  
Procedure. Participants were randomly allocated (using a computer randomiser) to 
one of two conditions. In the conflicting goals condition (n = 30), participants were asked to 
recall as vividly as possible a recent event involving conflicting goals. A specific definition 
of goal conflict (i.e., “when goals conflict it means that working toward one goal interferes 
with working towards and attaining another goal”) and some examples (e.g., “Maintain or 
increase my current GPA, spend more time with my friends”) were provided.  
Participants in the facilitating goals group (n = 27) were instructed to recall a recent 
event involving facilitating goals and were provided with a specific definition of facilitating 
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goals (i.e., “when goals complement each other it means that working toward one goal helps 
support your efforts at working towards and attaining another goal”) as well as some 
examples (e.g., “Get in shape for the summer, eat healthier”). In both conditions, 
participants wrote a detailed description of the event. Participants were encouraged to write 
what happened in the event, what they thought about, and how they felt.  
Mixed emotions were measured directly using four items designed to capture the 
subjective experience of mixed emotions (i.e., “I’m feeling contrasting emotions”; “I’m 
feeling different emotions at the same time”. See Table 5), on a five-point Likert format-scale 
from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Very much). This brief scale included two new items that were 
reverse-coded to exclude instances where participants experienced multiple emotions of one 
valence (positive or negative; i.e., I’m feeling clearly positive or negative emotions, not both; 
“I’m feeling mostly one type of emotion”). Averaged scores produced a single subjective 
measure of mixed emotions (M = 3.15, SD = 0.98; α = 0.74).  
In order to calculate the minimum index (estimated using the minimum value between 
positive and negative affect of mixed emotions, Schimmack, 2001), participants completed a 
scale based on 16-emotion adjectives. This was adapted from a measure developed by Giner-
Sorolla (2001) using a unipolar format. Dimensions of positive affect (i.e., enthusiasm, proud, 
calm, excited, confident, at ease, satisfied and relaxed; α = 0.91) and negative affect (i.e., sad, 
nervousness, angry, frustrated, worried, regretful, bored and ashamed; α = 0.81) were 
calculated. For those emotions that were recorded as felt (i.e., marked as “yes”), the scale 
ranged from 1 (very little) to 7 (extremely). Emotional adjectives marked as “no” were coded 
as zero.  
The level of conflict between goals was measured after mixed emotions using one 
item (“To what extent did one goal have harmful effects on the other goal?”) that evaluated 
the extent to which one of the goals had harmful effects over the other, using a scale ranging 
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from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). The level of facilitation between goals was also 
measured using one item (“To what extent did one goal help the other goal?”) that measured 
the extent to which one of the goals had beneficial effects over the other one (same response 
scale). Finally, participants completed a short 12-item version of the ambivalence over 
emotional expression questionnaire1 (AEQ; King & Emmons, 1990) – e.g., I would like to 
express my affection more physically but I am afraid others will get the wrong impression (α 
= 0.81) – in order to measure emotional conflict. Response were made on a five-point Likert 
format-scale from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (A great deal). 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics and Spearman rho correlations for the direct items to measure mixed 
emotions in Study 2 (N = 57). 
 M SD 1 2 3 4 
 
1. I’m feeling contrasting emotions. 
2.79 1.24 -    
       
2. I’m feeling different emotions at the same 
time. 
3.02 1.20 0.58** -   
       
3. I’m feeling clearly positive or negative 
emotions, not both. 
2.44 1.46 -0.43** -0.40** -  
       
4. I’m feeling mostly one type of emotion. 
2.84 1.37 -0.38** -0.23† 0.42** - 
       
 





                                                     





Correlations (see Table 6) revealed that the minimum index was positively and 
significantly related to the subjective measure of mixed emotions (r = 0.45; 95% CI: 0.21 and 
0.60). Importantly, both the minimum index of mixed emotions and the subjective measure of 
mixed emotions showed similar patterns of association with positive and negative affect. 
These findings provide greater confidence in the appropriateness of the subjective measure of 
mixed emotions. The variable reflecting mixed emotions was approximately normally 
distributed for each category of the independent variable (goal conflict vs. facilitating goals) 
and no outliers were identified. 
Manipulation checks showed that participants who wrote about a recent event 
involving conflicting goals (M = 3.70, SD = 1.06) reported significantly more harmful 
consequences between the goals involved, t(55) = 8.98, p < 0.01, compared to participants 
who wrote about a recent event involving facilitating goals (M = 1.37, SD = 0.89). 
Furthermore, participants in the conflicting goals group (M = 1.43, SD = 1.01) reported 
significantly less beneficial effects between the goals involved, t(55) = 12.43, p < 0.01, 
compared to the facilitating goals group (M = 4.37, SD = 0.74). So as intended, the recent 
conflicting goals event was perceived as having more harmful effects and less beneficial 
effects between goals compared to the facilitating goals event.  
A multivariate omnibus test showed that the conflicting goals condition produced, on 
average, higher mixed emotion scores compared to the facilitating goals condition, F(2, 53) = 
6.83, p < 0.01. In particular, results yielded a significant effect of condition on the subjective 
measure of mixed emotions, F(1, 54) = 12.94, p < 0.01, d = 0.98. Participants in the 
conflicting goals condition reported more mixed emotions (M = 3.54, SD = 0.78) than 
participants in the facilitating goals condition (M = 2.67, SD = 1.01). Similarly, the test of the 
between-subject effect of condition on the minimum index of mixed emotions produced a 
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significant effect, F(1, 54) = 4.47, p < 0.05, d = 0.57. Participants in the conflicting goals 
condition reported more mixed emotions (M = 0.68, SD = 0.75) than participants in the 
facilitating goals condition (M = 0.34, SD = 0.38), using the minimum index. These results 
remained significant after the inclusion of emotional conflict as a covariate. The effects of 
emotional conflict on both measures of mixed emotions were not significant, F’s < 1.5, p > 
0.10). ANOVA revealed no significant differences for gender or age on mixed emotions, F’s 
< 1. Overall, the evidence supports hypothesis 1.2, which stated that mixed emotions will be 
greater when describing recent conflicting goals compared to describing recent facilitating 
goals. 
As shown in Table 6, the raw correlation between positive and negative affect in the 
conflicting goals group was medium and non-significant (r = -0.28; 95%CI: -0.62 / 0.13); 
whereas the facilitating goals group exhibited a strong and significant negative correlation (r 
= -0.75; 95% CI: -0.89 and -0.44). These findings are in line with the Hypothesis 1, which 
broadly states that mixed emotions are elicited following the activation of conflicting goals. 
This pattern remained similar when using polichoric correlation, as suggested by Schmukle 
and Egloff (2009). 
Although not hypothesised, mixed emotions correlated positively with positive affect 
and correlated negatively with negative affect in the conflicting goals condition, but showed 
the inverse relationship in the facilitating goals condition (see Table 6). Finally, the non-
parametric correlation between mixed emotions and emotional conflict was almost null (r = -
0.01; 95%CI: -0.28 / 0.25), with the same pattern as the correlation between the minimum 
index of mixed emotions and emotional conflict, (r = -0.11; 95%CI: -0.37 / 0.16). This 
provided additional evidence to support the idea that emotional conflict and mixed emotions 




Table 6. Descriptive statistics and Spearman rho correlations for the different measures of affect in 
Study 2 (N = 57). 
        












Conflicting goals group        
Positive affect 0.79 0.88 -     
Negative affect 2.26 1.19 -0.28 -    
Emotional conflict 2.91 0.82 -0.26   0.38* -   
Mixed emotions indices        
Subjective measure 3.54 0.79   0.38* -0.24 -0.13 -  
Minimum index 0.68 0.75    0.98** -0.22 -0.20 0.36* - 
 
Facilitating goals group        
Positive affect 2.75 1.91 -     
Negative affect 0.63 0.81    -0.75** -    
Emotional conflict 2.64 0.70    -0.20 0.34† -   
Mixed emotions indices        
Subjective measure 2.67 1.00 -0.42* 0.53** -0.01 -  
Minimum index 0.34 0.38 -0.45*   0.76* -0.06 0.50** - 
 
Full sample        
Positive affect 1.70 1.75 -     
Negative affect 1.50 1.31   -0.69** -    
Emotional conflict 2.78 0.78 -0.28* 0.39** -   
Mixed emotions indices        
Subjective measure 3.15 0.98 -0.25†    0.37** -0.01 -  
Minimum index 0.53 0.62  0.18 0.24† -0.11 0.45** - 
 
 
Note: † p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01. Polychoric correlations showed a similar pattern between positive affect 
and negative affect across groups: conflicting goals group = -0.29, ASE: 0.18; facilitating goals group = -0.80, 





Study 1 showed that mixed emotions were triggered by activating goal conflict and 
demonstrated that mixed emotions emerge when a person decides about a situation involving 
conflicting goals in the moment. This effect has only been previously recorded when 
evaluating the outcomes of personal decisions (e.g., Larsen, McGraw, Mellers, & Cacioppo, 
2004). In Larsen et al.’s study, participants reported their emotional experiences immediately 
after being exposed to a series of gambling tasks manipulated to generate mixed outcomes 
(i.e., disappointing wins or relieving losses) or outright outcomes. Results showed that people 
experienced greater mixed emotions after winning less than they expected or losing less than 
they expected compared to outright wins. However, Study 1 evaluated mixed emotions 
during the decision-making process adding value to the idea that mixed emotions are not a 
by-product of certain outcomes; rather, mixed emotions are produced by a situation involving 
decisions where an actual goal conflict is present.  
Study 2 confirmed that it is conflict between goals that prompts mixed emotions, 
rather than multiple goal activation of another kind (i.e., facilitating goals). Moreover, Study 
2 showed that the effect of goal conflict on mixed emotions was equivalent when two 
different measures of mixed emotions were employed: a subjective measure of mixed 
emotions, and an indirect measure using the minimum index. Finally, Study 2 showed 
negligible correlations between emotional conflict and both the subjective measure of mixed 
emotions and the minimum index suggesting that emotional conflict is distinct from mixed 
emotions. Overall, Study 1 and Study 2 support notions derived from PCT that conflicting 
goals are followed by a flow of emotions. The flow of emotions originally described by 
Powers (2014) may be the experience of mixed emotions. Although other flows of emotions 
may be equated with Powers’ ideas, the evidence of these two studies indicates that goal 
conflict is a significant precursor of mixed emotions.  
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Contributions. This chapter has made three distinct contributions to the 
understanding of mixed emotions. Firstly, the studies presented identify goal conflict as a 
meaningful precursor or antecedent of mixed emotions. This finding is in accordance with 
previous conceptualisations of goal conflict as a predictor of mixed emotions (e.g., Ellsworth 
& Scherer, 2003; Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007), but extends these conceptualisations by, for 
the first time, providing empirical evidence that goal conflict elicits mixed emotions. 
Specifically, conflicting goals were found to be a reliable predictor of mixed emotions, both 
for artificially activated and naturally occurring goal conflicts. 
In light of recent research showing that experiencing conflicting goals seems to be the 
rule rather than the exception in life (Köpetz et al., 2011), the current evidence about the 
impact of conflicting goals on mixed emotions suggests that mixed emotions have a 
pervasive role in everyday life. It has previously been argued that mixed emotions may be a 
rare event (Larsen et al., 2003; Larsen & McGraw, 2011), but several studies have 
demonstrated that conflicting goals occur frequently (Hofmann, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2012; 
Köpetz et al., 2011), and as a consequence, mixed emotions may be similarly ubiquitous.    
Secondly, the present research suggests that previous conceptualisations of mixed 
emotions as equivalent to emotional conflict may not be accurate. Carver and colleagues 
(2000) conceptualised mixed emotions as the emotional ambivalence that results from 
conflict between approach and avoidance motivations, which in turn, may produce negative 
consequences for individual well-being. However, the evidence presented in Study 2 showed 
that mixed emotions are only moderately correlated with emotional conflict. Mixed emotions 
do not represent a marked emotional conflict itself, but instead appear as an expected 
consequence of goal conflict. Mixed emotions and emotional conflict should therefore not be 
treated as the same construct. 
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The schism between mixed emotions and emotional conflict that was established is 
important for understanding how mixed emotions may contribute to well-being. Previous 
research has shown that feelings of self-worth (self-esteem) assist in the resolution of goal 
conflict, alleviating people’s tension resulting from situational risks involving incompatible 
action tendencies (Cavallo, Holmes, Fitzsimons, Murray, & Wood, 2012). Similarly, other 
studies have suggested that optimism may moderate the association between goal conflict and 
well-being, helping people to overcome the negative consequences of experiencing conflict. 
However, the distinction between emotional conflict and mixed emotions suggests that 
another way by which people can overcome the negative consequences of goal conflict on 
well-being (e.g., Emmons & King, 1988; Emmons & Colby, 1995; King & Emmons, 1990, 
1991) is through the experience of mixed emotions. The elicitation of mixed emotions from 
goal conflict is, therefore, a fundamental step towards examining the association between 
mixed emotions and well-being, which will be fully explored in forthcoming chapters. 
Finally, this chapter also contributed with new evidence about the utility of using a 
subjective measure of mixed emotions. Previous studies have led some researchers to 
maintain that directly asking people to report whether they are experiencing mixed emotions 
could be inappropriate (e.g., Larsen et al., 2001).  However, the evidence provided here 
supports the utility and validity of subjective measures of mixed emotions. This resonates 
with previous ideas presented in chapters 1 and 2 about the importance of the subjective 
experience of mixed emotions. Chapter 1 emphasised the relevance that the subjective 
experience of complex emotions has to understanding phenomena such as dialecticism. 
Similarly, the conclusions presented in chapter 2 stressed the importance of incorporating a 
broader conceptualisation of mixed emotions, which recognises the subjective experience as a 
constituent component of “feeling mixed”. The evidence presented here substantiates these 
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assertions, and provides initial support for the conceptualisation of mixed emotions as an 
integral experience. 
Importantly, across two studies, the subjective measure of mixed emotions reflected 
the expected influence of conflicting goals on mixed emotions. Moreover, the subjective 
measure was significantly correlated with measures of mixed emotions inferred from the 
minimum value between positive affect and negative affect, which, discussed in chapter 2, 
has been used extensively in the mixed emotions literature. It is possible that previous 
attempts to measure mixed emotions using subjective measures did not produce consistent 
findings (e.g., Larsen et al., 2001) because they assessed combinations of emotions (e.g., 
bittersweet) rather than directly assessing the subjective experience of mixed emotions. The 
advantage of using a subjective measure of mixed emotions is that it does not require 
measurement of a large set of emotional adjectives to estimate the presence of mixed 
emotions. This may be particularly useful in intensive longitudinal designs where the use of 
emotional adjectives to infer mixed emotions would be cumbersome. 
Limitations. It is important to take into account several limitations of the current 
studies. Firstly, the generalisability of the findings reported in Study 1 and 2 is limited. It is 
possible that different types of conflict, especially conflict involving long and short-term 
goals may not result in the experience of mixed emotions. Furthermore, the samples consisted 
mostly of students which may limited the generalisability of the present findings to other, 
more diverse, populations. 
Additionally, the evidence presented here focussed only on emotional conflict related 
to emotional expression. The variable used to evaluate emotional conflict was the degree of 
ambivalence over emotional expression. Although previous research has shown an 
association between emotional expression and actual feelings (e.g., Kraft & Pressman, 2012), 
it is possible that the association between mixed emotions and emotional conflict could be 
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different using alternative measures of emotional conflict, such as inner feelings. This 
limitation should be addressed in future studies incorporating broader and different methods 
to unravel the relationship between emotional conflict and mixed emotions. Further 
replications of the association between goal conflict and mixed emotions may also help to 
clarify the distinction between emotional conflict and mixed emotions. 
Another limitation of the studies presented in the current chapter is that they were 
exclusively based on experimental designs, which although provide evidence for causal 
processes, suffer from reduced ecological validity. For example, it is possible that conflicting 
goals do not predict mixed emotions in everyday life, and that the evidence presented here is 
an artifact produced by the experimenter or participants biases, such as desirability.  
Conclusion. In sum, as expected from Hypothesis 1, evidence derived from two 
experiments demonstrated that goal conflict was a relevant antecedent of mixed emotions. 
Importantly, mixed emotions were also found to be distinguishable from emotional conflict. 
This is important because emotional conflict (i.e., ambivalence over the expression of 
emotions) has shown consistent negative associations with well-being (e.g., Emmons & King, 
1988; Emmons & Colby, 1995; King & Emmons, 1990, 1991). Thus, further research 
investigating the association between mixed emotions and well-being may hypothesise that 
mixed emotions have beneficial effects, as suggested in chapter 1. The investigation of the 
beneficial effects of mixed emotions on eudaimonic well-being is the main goal of chapters 4 
and 5. Studies presented in the following chapters will incorporate different designs (e.g., 
experience sampling methods, cross-sectional designs) to confirm the effects of goal conflict 
on mixed emotions and will examine the association between mixed emotions and 
eudaimonic well-being. Finally, several of the limitations identified in the present chapter 
will be addressed in the following chapters by using different study designs (i.e., cross-
sectional design in Study 3 and experiencing sampling design in Study 5) and different 
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analytical techniques (e.g., structural equation modelling, multilevel modelling) in order to 
provide additional support for the idea that goal conflict predicts mixed emotions.  
 




4. CHAPTER FOUR: MIXED EMOTIONS AND EUDAIMONIC WELL-
BEING 
“And this very thing constitutes the virtue of the happy man and the smooth current of life, when all 
actions promote the harmony of the spirit dwelling in the individual man with the will of him who 
orders the universe.” 
Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers; VII.87).  
 
iogenes Laertius wrote these lines reflecting on the contribution of Zeno of Citium in 
defining what constitutes living a life guided by virtue, in balance with nature. 
According to Diogenes Laertius (trans. 1925), a good life for Zeno was linked to a sense of 
harmony between human and natural order. This notion of well-being was later continued by 
Aristotle, who developed his own rationale of virtues. For Aristotle, the ultimate aim of life is 
eudaimonia (trans. 1999). In Aristotelian ethics, eudaimonia corresponds to the cultivation of 
all the virtues accessible to the human spirit in correct and well balanced proportions. For 
example, Aristotle mentioned that bravery is an important human virtue, which needs to be 
moderated with the correct regulation of our own appetites, the virtue of temperance (trans. 
1999). Aristotelian ethics also conceive that eudaimonia is about living consistently with 
one’s true self (daimon), exploiting human potential through virtue (trans. 1999). Thus, the 
concepts of harmony between the different aspects that constitute human existence and 
integrity have been largely acknowledged in philosophy to define human wellness. 
Likewise, in psychology, eudaimonic well-being refers to the integration of multiple 
human potentials that permit people to live congruently with their values, ideals, and actions 
(Ryan & Deci, 2001; Ryff & Singer, 1998, 2008). Similar approaches to eudaimonic well-
being have emphasised the importance of achieving goals that foster a meaningful life, in 




between different aspects of life and the development of human potential are therefore 
preserved in the psychological concept of eudaimonic well-being.  
The concept of eudaimonic well-being diverges from the positive psychology 
approach which emphasises that positive emotions and satisfaction with life are the hallmarks 
of a good life (Diener, 1984; Diener et al., 1999; Kahneman et al., 1999). Although 
eudaimonic and hedonic approaches are distinct constructs, they are related to, and predicted 
by, similar factors (e.g., education, age; Keyes, Shmotkin, & Ryff, 2002). Hedonic accounts 
assume that people are driven by pleasure, and therefore, that well-being is enhanced to the 
extent that pleasure is maximised and pain is minimised (Diener, 1984; Diener et al., 1999; 
Kahneman et al., 1999). 
However, research has started to provide initial evidence suggesting that negative as 
well as positive emotions may have beneficial effects for individuals’ well-being (e.g., Tamir 
& Ford, 2012; McNulty, 2010). For example, Tamir and Ford (2012) found that people who 
preferred to feel angry in situations characterised by confrontation and happy in situations 
characterised by collaboration reported higher levels of psychological well-being and life 
satisfaction, and also had better University grades; whereas those that preferred to feel happy 
in confrontation situations or angry in collaborative situations reported lower psychological 
well-being and life satisfaction. These findings reveal that the experience of positive 
emotions is not sufficient to predict a better life; the examination of the conditions under 
which certain characteristics promote or hinder well-being are equally important. 
The relevance of the antecedents that promote certain emotional experiences which 
may positively influence well-being has been also recognised by the dynamic model of affect 
(DMA; Reich et al., 2003; Zautra, 2003). The DMA argues that people who experience 
mixed emotions when facing stressful situations can benefit from these complex emotional 
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experiences and boost their well-being (e.g., Coifman et al., 2007; Reich et al., 2003). For 
example, recent evidence has shown that inducing emotional experiences characterised by 
sadness and joy in the context of nostalgia-provoking events significantly predicted resilience 
to stress (Braniecka, Trzebinska, Dowgiert, & Wytykowska, 2014, Study 3).  
In accordance with theories emphasising the importance of the conditions that 
promote well-being (McNulty & Finchman, 2011), the approach considered in this research 
project is that goal conflict is the main precursor of mixed emotions (as shown in chapter 3), 
and in turn, that the experience of mixed emotions may help people to overcome the negative 
effect of these conflicting goals, benefiting from their resolution. This research therefore 
expands the implications of mixed emotions on individual well-being beyond recovery from 
(or resilience to cope with) stressful situations. Understanding goal conflict as the main 
predictor of the experience of mixed emotions insinuates that transient mixed emotions 
experiences may be beneficial under some circumstances. 
Precisely, the present chapter explores whether mixed emotions can positively 
influence eudaimonic well-being. Responding to complex social environments usually 
involves dealing with conflicting scenarios, offering multiple courses of action. In such 
situations, gaining a balance between different needs, ideals, and behaviours may be 
particularly difficult. Mixed emotions are proposed to be responsible for helping individuals 
to consider the full nature of the situation, assisting equilibration between multiple aspects of 
complex events, and ultimately, enhancing eudaimonic well-being.  
Hence, the goal of chapter 4 is to investigate the effects of mixed emotions on 
eudaimonic well-being. This goal looks to satisfy Hypothesis 2 presented in chapter 1, which 
states that experiencing mixed emotions in the context of goal conflict will positively predict 
eudaimonic well-being. Firstly, two approaches to understand eudaimonic well-being are 
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described to offer support for this hypothesis. This section of the chapter is useful because it 
reflects two main methodological streams employed to investigate the construct of 
eudaimonic well-being, which in turn, serves as general background for the selection of the 
eudaimonic well-being measures used in this chapter and chapter 5. Next, research linking 
mixed emotions and well-being is presented. This section includes research showing an 
association between mixed emotions and well-being as a broad concept (not specifically 
related to eudaimonic well-being as it is understood here). This section does not include 
longitudinal research directly investigating the association between mixed emotions and well-
being (e.g., Hershfield et al., 2013), which has mainly relied on correlational indices of mixed 
emotions (Appendix 1 can be consulted on this respect). Finally, two studies investigating the 
effect of mixed emotions on eudaimonic well-being are reported and later discussed in terms 
of what they contribute to the investigation of eudaimonic well-being and the relevance of 
mixed emotions for individuals’ life.  
4.1. Conglomerated and meaning-based theories of eudaimonic well-being 
As mentioned in chapter 1, eudaimonic well-being is understood as the meaning-
making process that creates balance between different spheres of an individual’s life (e.g., 
purpose in life, autonomy, social relationships). Eudaimonic well-being also entails 
individual engagement with life challenges and goals (Keyes et al., 2002), and congruency 
between personal goals and individual values (Sheldon & Elliot, 1999). 
The concept of eudaimonic well-being is important because it introduces the idea that 
human thriving can be understood as progression towards meaningful goals and equilibrium 
between multiple strands of experience, contrasting with approaches that favour hedonistic 
principles (e.g., Diener, 1984; Diener et al., 1999; Kahneman et al., 1999). Experiencing 
greater eudaimonic well-being has been also associated with relevant health-related variables. 
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For example, Wood and Joseph (2010) investigated the association between eudaimonic well-
being and depression. A sample of 5,556 individuals completed the psychological well-being 
scale and also completed a validated measure of depression 10-years later. Results revealed 
that people who scored lower on the psychological well-being scale were seven times more 
likely to be depressed 10 years later, even after controlling for relevant personality, 
socioeconomic, and health-related variables. 
Theories of eudaimonic well-being can be classified into two types. The first type 
emphasises the integration of multiple features of people’s lives (conglomerated theories; 
Ryff, 2014; Ryff & Singer, 1998, 2008; Seligman, 2002, 2011); this approach stresses the 
multifaceted nature of well-being by integrating different aspects of human flourishing. 
Conglomerated theories of eudaimonic well-being emphasise the integration of different 
aspects of eudaimonic well-being. Emulating Aristotle’s tradition, conglomerated theories 
favour the balance of multiple virtues as the main definition of eudaimonic well-being. 
The second type of theory emphasises the meaning-making processes that facilitate 
the realisation of human potential (meaning-based theories; Huta & Ryan, 2010; Ryan et al., 
2008; Waterman, 1990a, 1990b, 2008). Meaning-based theories understand eudaimonic well-
being mostly as personal integrity or living consistently with one’s goals and actions. The 
notion of integrity is similar to Aristotle’s idea of finding the true self through virtues. These 
theories usually understand the construct of eudaimonic well-being as a unidimensional 
construct, even though they acknowledge that the concept of eudaimonic well-being is 
constituted by multiple aspects (e.g., Waterman et. al., 2010). 
Of course this classification is arbitrary because most theories of eudaimonic well-
being commonly acknowledge both aspects as relevant determinants of eudaimonia (e.g., 
Jayawickreme, Forgeard, & Seligman, 2012; Ryff, 2013), but the distinction between 
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conglomerated and meaning-based theories is useful in terms of the methods used to 
investigate the antecedents and consequences of eudaimonic well-being. This distinction is 
also useful because it can be used to address previous criticisms about the relevance of 
separating hedonic and eudaimonic well-being (Kashdan, Biswas-Diener, & King, 2008). It 
has been mentioned that making finer distinctions between hedonic and eudaimonic well-
being may be scientifically inappropriate because the lack of measurement tools to tap into 
the construct of eudaimonic well-being (Kashdan et al., 2008). 
The distinction between conglomerated and meaning-based theories of eudaimonic 
well-being accounts for recent methodological advances in the measurement of eudaimonic 
well-being. Measures corresponding to each approach vary from scales such as the 
psychological well-being scale (Ryff, 1989), which encompasses six dimensions, to scales 
such as the eudaimonic well-being scale (Waterman et al., 2010), which is a unidimensional 
scale that privileges the congruency between values and goals as the key components of 
eudaimonia. This distinction also reflects the inflections that different psychological theories 
have given to a conceptualisation of well-being mainly inherited from Aristotelian 
conceptions of what it is to live a good life. The present chapter emphasises a meaning-
making perspective, whereas chapter 5 uses the psychological well-being model (Ryff, 1989, 
1995; Ryff & Keyes, 1995; Ryff & Singer, 1998), which is closer to the conglomerated 
approach. 
4.1.1. Conglomerated theories of eudaimonic well-being 
The psychological well-being theory (Ryff, 1989, 1995; Ryff & Keyes, 1995; Ryff & 
Singer, 1998) can be characterised as a conglomerated theory of eudaimonic well-being. 
According to this theory, the philosophical roots of well-being as well as classic existential 
and humanistic theories have proposed a number of overlapping conceptions to understand 
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positive psychological functioning (Ryff, 1995, 2013, 2014; Ryff & Singer, 2008). The 
theory distils points of convergence between these different psychological and philosophical 
traditions into six key strands of well-being: Self-acceptance, which refers to having positive 
perceptions towards oneself; positive relations with others, defined as having warm, trusting 
interpersonal relationships; autonomy, understood as self-determination and an internal locus 
of evaluation; environmental mastery, which refers to having the ability to choose or create 
environments appropriate to healthy psychological conditions; purpose in life, defined as 
holding beliefs about individual’s meaning in life; and personal growth, related to developing 
one’s potential and thriving as a person. These dimensions are measured using the 
psychological well-being scale (Ryff, 1989; Ryff & Keyes, 1995).  
Each of these dimensions represents critical aspects of well-being (Ryff & Singer, 
1998). People who maintain satisfactory levels on these dimensions are presumed to be 
fulfilled and healthy. Furthermore, it is said that balance between these dimensions and 
making progress in each of them characterises what it is to feel well and fully functioning 
(Ryff & Singer, 2008). Human fulfilment is achieved by personally developing these 
dimensions and, as in Aristotle’s virtues, finding a middle ground between excess and 
deficiency (Ryff & Singer, 2008).  
Research evaluating the impact of the six dimensions of psychological well-being has 
shown that Ryff’s approach is not only a valid and reliable method to assess individual well-
being (Ryff, 1989; Ryff & Keyes, 1995), but also that higher scores on the measure are 
associated with health-related outcomes. For example, a study investigating the 
neurobiological correlates of psychological well-being showed that higher scores on the 
psychological well-being scale predicted lower levels of salivary cortisol and lower levels of 
inflammatory markers (both common physiological markers of stress), as well as higher level 
of HDL cholesterol (commonly called the “good” cholesterol) (Ryff, Singer, & Love, 2004). 
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Similarly, data from the Survey of Midlife Development in the US (MIDUS; Morozink, 
Friedman, Coe, & Ryff, 2010) demonstrated that psychological well-being moderated the 
association between low socioeconomic status and elevated inflammatory markers. In 
particular, people from low socioeconomic groups who scored higher in environmental 
mastery, positive relations with others, purpose in life, and self-acceptance had lower levels 
of IL-6 (interleukin, associated with pathogenic inflammatory processes) compared to people 
from the same socioeconomic group who scored lower on the same psychological well-being 
dimensions. 
Another theory that fits with the conglomerated approaches is Seligman’s well-being 
theory (Seligman, 2002, 2011). This theory states that five dimensions define well-being: 
engagement, defined as the state of being fully concentrated in what one is doing; positive 
relationships, defined as the pursuit of gratifying relationships for their own sake; pursuit of 
meaning, which involves having beliefs about the importance of certain goals beyond 
immediate gratifications; accomplishment, which refers to the sense of achievement of 
relevant goals; and finally, positive emotions, which consists of maximising happiness.  
Contrasting with the psychological well-being theory, this approach recognises the 
importance of maximising pleasure, much like hedonistic theories. Furthermore, the 
decomposition of well-being into five dimensions is neither exclusive nor exhaustive, but 
rather represents a preliminary approximation of the scientific exploration of what constitutes 
a good life (Jayawickreme et al., 2012). Therefore, a fulfilled life can be obtained by pursuing 






4.1.2. Meaning-based theories of eudaimonic well-being 
Self-determination theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2000) has 
embraced a meaning-based conception of eudaimonic well-being. According to SDT, 
individuals are driven to pursue three basic psychological needs: autonomy, competence, and 
relatedness, from which people foster the most elevated forms of motivation. SDT also 
asserts that if people are unable to support some of these basic needs, then they will 
experience detrimental consequences for well-being. Thus, SDT states that the fulfilment of 
these three psychological needs accounts for psychological growth and well-being (Deci & 
Ryan, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2000, 2001). 
Importantly, SDT maintains that the fulfilment of these needs fosters eudaimonic 
well-being (Ryan & Deci, 2001). Fulfilment of these needs is what delineates the meaning 
and purposes behind human actions, which ultimately, permits people to live well (Ryan & 
Deci, 2000). One interesting correlate of this approach is that well-being is maximised by 
achieving congruency between multiple needs and outputs (Ryan & Deci, 2001). For 
example, someone would feel happier if she managed to be successful while feeling 
autonomous performing her actions compared to just being successful (Nix, Ryan, Manly, & 
Deci, 1999). By attaining congruency between different needs and behavioural outputs it is 
possible to reach a sense of vital functioning (Ryan & Deci, 2008). For example, one study 
found that declines in vitality observed while performing repetitive actions were reversed in 
those participants who experienced a greater sense of competence while performing the same 
task (Ryan, Rigby, & Przybylski, 2006). 
In a recent upgrade of the eudaimonic well-being approach derived from the SDT, 
Ryan and colleagues (Ryan, Huta, & Deci, 2008) argued that eudaimonic well-being 
concerns the processes and facets of life that help people to live well, whereas hedonic well-
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being is the result of improving eudaimonic well-being (Ryan et al., 2008). People are likely 
to achieve enduring happiness to the extent they are able to live a life that is full of meaning. 
In contrast, too much emphasis on hedonic outcomes (e.g., positive affect, life satisfaction) 
may lead people to live a life that is devoid of depth (Ryan et al., 2008). Thus, eduaimonic 
well-being is “a way of living that is focused on what is intrinsically worthwhile to human 
beings” (Ryan et al., 2008, pg. 147). This means that eudaimonia is associated with the 
preeminence of intrinsic, meaningful goals (e.g., love, coherence; Ryan et al., 2008). The 
attainment of meaningful goals is thought of as satisfying the three basic needs suggested by 
the SDT, and in turn, satisfaction of those basic needs benefits well-being. 
In an effort to gauge the validity of the afforementioned ideas, Huta and Ryan (2010) 
developed  the hedonic and eudaimonic motives for activities questionnaire measure. This 
measure evaluates the extent to which people pursue hedonic-related goals (e.g., seeking 
pleasure) or eudaimonic-related goals (e.g., seeking meaning). Findings showed that people 
who scored higher in both hedonic and eudaimonic motives also had higher levels of 
satisfaction with life, positive affect, meaning in life, and vitality. In accordance with the 
theory, people who had higher scores on the eudaimonic-motive dimension reported more 
meaning in life and vitality compared to those who scored higher on the hedonic-motives 
dimension only (Huta & Ryan, 2010). Finally, results from an intervention study (Huta & 
Ryan, 2010, Study 4) showed that higher levels of eudaimonic-motives were associated with 
greater well-being (vitality and positive affect) after three months; whereas stronger hedonic-
motives produced greater well-being (vitality and positive affect) at short-term follow-up. 
Another approach that can also be classified as a meaning-based theory is Waterman’s 
personal expressiveness construct (Waterman, 1990, 1993). Waterman argued that if an 
individual engages in an activity and as a result she/he reports one or more of the following 
experiences: (a) an intense involvement, (b) a special fit with the activity, which is not 
118 
 
characteristic of daily activities, (c) a feeling of being completed or fulfilled, (d) strong 
impression of meaningfulness, and (e) feelings of being alive, then this person is 
experiencing an activity as personally expressive (Waterman, 1990, 1993). An activity is 
personally expressive to the extent that such activities aid the development of goals that are 
consistent with purpose in life (Waterman, 1990). This approach emphasises the subjective 
experience of eudaimonic well-being. Eudaimonic well-being is the subjective “by-product of 
engaging in actions consistent with the development and expression of one’s best potentials 
and the pursuit of intrinsic goals” (Waterman et al., 2010, pg. 42). Eudaimonic well-being is 
driven by the value and meaning of the activities in which individuals are engaged, rather 
than the feelings that may accompany these experiences or pure enjoyment (Waterman, 
1990). The subjective experience of eudaimonic well-being is used as an indicator to evaluate 
whether relevant goals are furthered (Waterman et al., 2010). 
This theory states that experiences of personal expressiveness are conceptually related 
to intrinsic motivation (Waterman, 1990). In fact, one study found that participants who 
generally had higher scores in the subjective scales of intrinsic motivation also reported 
having a greater amount of activities perceived as personally expressive (Waterman, 
Schwartz, Goldbacher, Green, Miller, & Phillip, 2003). Another study (Waterman, 1993) 
found that feelings of personal expressiveness related more strongly to perceptions of striving 
for excellence (i.e., self-realisation) compared to hedonic enjoyment. Similarly, personal 
expressiveness was associated with making progress on personally significant goals and 
feelings of being alive – vitality (Waterman, 1993). 
In a recent effort to develop a stronger measure to evaluate the aforementioned 
notions of eudaimonic well-being, Waterman and colleagues (2010) developed the 
questionnaire for eudaimonic well-being. This scale is grounded in the ideas of personal 
expressiveness, according to which eudaimonic well-being mainly refers to the pursuit of 
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excellence and self-realisation. Evidence has shown that this measure has good validity and 
reliability (Waterman et al., 2010). Confirmatory factor analyses confirmed that a 
unidimensional construct fitted the data very well. Additionally, participants who scored 
higher on this scale also reported stronger personal identity and greater development of 
personal potentials (Waterman et al., 2010). 
Overall, both conglomerated and meaning-based theories of eudaimonic well-being 
have received considerable attention and have also developed appropriate measures to assess 
eudaimonic well-being, either emphasising the congruency between multiple facets of 
individual life or considering self-concordance and meaningful experiences as key 
determinants of eudaimonic well-being. Of the approaches reviewed here, the psychological 
well-being model is one of the most studied and widely employed in the literature. Within the 
meaning-based theories of eudaimonic well-being, Waterman’s approach (1990; Waterman et 
al., 2010) and the evidence derived from the SDT have produced useful measurement 
instruments that have been proved to be reliable and valid. 
4.2. Mixed emotions and well-being 
Evidence connecting mixed emotions and eudaimonic well-being is scarce. The two 
theories reviewed in chapter 1 that have recognised the importance of mixed emotions in 
improving well-being - the DMA (Reich et al., 2003; Zautra, 2003) and the co-activation 
model of healthy coping (Larsen et al., 2003) – have not considered that mixed emotions may 
benefit eudaimonic well-being. Both theories emphasise the importance of experiencing 
mixed emotions when facing difficult situations to boost individuals’ well-being, but only the 
DMA provides empirical evidence for this idea.  
The DMA (Reich et al., 2003; Zautra, 2003) asserts that individual differences in 
mixed emotions when facing a stressful situation may be beneficial, with evidence 
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investigating the impact of individual differences in mixed emotions on health-related 
variables. For example, Dowd, Zautra and Hogan (2010), investigated the effects of stress on 
the experience of positive affect and negative affect and how this influenced cardiovascular 
reactivity and recovery. In this study, participants were artificially exposed to a stressful 
situation (giving a speech in front of a camera) and were then asked to report on their positive 
and negative affect, while cardiovascular activity was monitored throughout exposure to the 
stressful stimulus. Findings showed that those participants who experienced higher levels of 
positive affect and negative affect during the stressful event had greater cardiovascular 
recovery, which is an indicator of healthy stress-coping. 
The remainder of this subsection briefly overviews three aspects of the literature 
relevant to the relationship between mixed emotions and well-being. First, indirect findings 
are reviewed linking mixed emotions and well-being from the socioemotional selectivity 
theory (Carstensen, 2006; Carstensen, Isaacowitz, Charles, 1999). This approach has linked 
aging, mixed emotions and well-being, although it has not provided direct evidence of the 
effects of mixed emotions on well-being. Second, some evidence is reviewed that has tried to 
establish a negative effect of mixed emotions on well-being, emphasising the conditions that 
may explain these effects. Finally, some evidence is presented that predicts a direct and 
positive association between mixed emotions and well-being. 
4.2.1. The relationship between mixed emotions and well-being from 
the socioemotional selectivity theory 
Evidence based on socioemotional selectivity theory (SST; Carstensen, 2006; 
Carstensen et al., 1999) suggests a link between aging, poignancy – mixed emotions in the 
face of meaningful endings – and well-being (e.g., Carstensen et al., 2000; Carstensen et al., 
2011; Ong & Bergeman, 2004). SST is a life-span theory of motivation that asserts that, as 
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people age, they are increasingly aware of time constraints and the fragility of life, and as a 
consequence, they prioritise emotionally meaningful goals in the present that lead them to 
focus on the most important aspects of life. In contrast, young adults tend to pursue 
knowledge-related goals and seek new experiences as they perceive the future as expansive 
(Carstensen, 2006). 
Theoretically, these differences are a result of contrasting perceptions of future time, 
with older adults perceiving time from a limited time perspective, whereas young adults 
perceive broader time horizons (Carstensen et al, 1999). A main assumption of this theory is 
that time perspective influences the selection of expansive goals (e.g., making new social 
contacts) or goals related to feelings (e.g., balancing emotional states) (Carstensen, Fung & 
Charles, 2003). Whenever time is assessed as limited, individuals will prioritise more 
present-oriented goals, regulating their emotions to maximise meaningful experiences 
(Carstensen et al., 1999). The foremost emotional consequence of experiencing a limited time 
event (e.g., graduation) is poignancy (Ersner-Hershfield, et al, 2008). When facing a limited 
time experience, people of all ages tend to experience mixed emotions of happiness and 
sadness concurrently (Ersner-Hershfield, et al, 2008). 
However, evidence is not conclusive in demonstrating that the experience of 
poignancy in the elderly predicts better well-being or health. For example, in one study, 
Carstensen et al. (2000) surveyed a sample of 184 people, ranging in age from 18 to 94 years. 
Participants completed a questionnaire designed to evaluate a set of physical and mental 
health-related problems, and they then reported their affective states five times daily for one 
week using a list of emotional adjectives. Results showed that mixed emotions, measured as 
the within-person correlation between positive affect (i.e., the average for positive emotions) 
and negative affect (i.e., the average for negative emotions), were associated with age but 
were not related to better mental health. Both older and younger adults experienced 
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comparable negative emotions in terms of intensity, but older people were more successful at 
regulating negative emotional states, recovering to a state of positive affect more quickly 
(Carstensen et al., 2000). This evidence is consistent with research showing that older adults 
have a greater sense of control over their emotions (Gross, Carstensen, Pasupathi, Tsai, 
Götestam-Skorpen, & Hsu, 1997).  
Similar evidence was found in another study, which showed a high prevalence of 
mixed emotions in older adults, but again, this is only indirect evidence of their impact on 
individuals’ well-being. Specifically, Carstensen and colleagues (2011) found that people 
tended to more commonly report feelings of both positive and negative emotions during the 
same sampling episode when they were older. Furthermore, growth curve analyses showed 
that positive emotions outweighed negative emotions as people aged, and in turn, positive 
emotions predicted less mortality, whereas mixed emotions were unrelated to mortality.  
4.2.2. When feeling mixed might be bad 
McNulty and Fincham (2011) proposed that a number of constructs that have been 
traditionally seen as beneficial for well-being could be harmful under certain circumstances. 
For example, they showed that positive thoughts and optimistic expectations in marriage are 
beneficial for individual well-being, but only among couples who are satisfied with their 
relationship. In accordance with this approach, the current research project has suggested that 
mixed emotions may have beneficial effects on eudaimonic well-being in the context of 
experiencing conflicting goals. Experiencing mixed emotions under different circumstances 
may not necessarily predict better well-being. 
An example of this is a recent study that showed that mixed feelings in the context of 
close relationships predicted poorer well-being (Fingerman, Pitzer, Lefkowitz, Birditt, & 
Mroczek, 2008). In this study, families reported on their positive feelings (e.g., “How much 
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does he or she makes you feel loved and cared for?”) and negative feelings (e.g., “How much 
does he or she criticise you?”) towards each other, and also completed measures of well-
being. Results showed that, when a family member felt more positive and negative feelings 
concurrently towards another member of the family, s/he also had higher levels of 
psychological distress. One possible interpretation of these results (derived from the evidence 
presented in chapter 3) is that people experienced a form of goal conflict towards a family 
member (e.g., wanting to be loved, but not wanting to be criticised), but serious conflicting 
goals within a family might be particularly difficult to solve because of the challenges of 
getting away from a family member. This in turn, may explain the detrimental effects of 
mixed emotions. 
Another situation where mixed emotions may predict poorer well-being is in the 
context of contrahedonic motivation (Riediger et al., 2009). Contrahedonic motivations 
correspond to momentary tendencies to intensify negative affective experiences or to lessen 
positive ones (Riediger et al., 2014; Tamir, 2009), such as when someone wants to intensify 
her feelings of anger in order to demonstrate how disappointing an event made her feel. 
Evidence has shown that mixed emotions may result from such contrahedonic motivations 
(e.g., Andrade & Cohen, 2007). For example, students who enjoy horror movies are more 
likely to experience both fear and happiness simultaneously compared to people who avoid 
horror movies (Andrade & Cohen, 2007, Study 1). Riediger and colleagues (2009) found that 
contrahedonic motivation was associated with lower levels of emotional well-being, 
measured as the difference between positive and negative affect. That is, participants who 
reported the motivation to inhibit positive affect experienced less positive affect on average; 
whilst when they reported the motivation to enhance negative affect, they also experienced 
greater negative affect on average. Interestingly, mixed emotions were commonly associated 
with increased motivation to maintain negative affect, but not the motivation to maintain 
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positive affect (i.e., prohedonic motivation; Riediger et al., 2009). However, it is less clear 
from these results whether mixed emotions in the context of contrahedonic motivation 
produced poorer well-being beyond differential effects between positive and negative 
emotions. It is possible to presume that these findings only reveal affective fluctuations that 
do not necessarily predict lower levels of well-being using common well-being measurement 
instruments, such as those reviewed in section 4.1. 
4.2.3. Beneficial effects of mixed emotions on well-being 
Miyamoto and Ryff (2011) investigated the beneficial effects of mixed emotions on 
well-being in the context of cultural differences between Japanese and American samples in 
the experience of mixed emotions. Mixed emotions were understood as dialectical emotions, 
which are characterised as the propensity to experience both positive and negative emotions 
over time, maintaining a balance between the two (Miyamoto & Ryff, 2011). Cultural 
differences in the experience of mixed emotions were investigated as a function of 
differences in the frequency with which individuals experienced these complex emotions 
over time. Thus, it was hypothesised that mixed emotions experienced moderately frequently 
within Eastern cultures may be better for individuals’ well-being compared to highly frequent 
mixed emotions or infrequent experiences of mixed emotions. This hypothesis was founded 
in the notion of an East Asian cultural script which emphasises maintaining balance between 
positive and negative emotions, contrasting with a Western cultural script which values 
maximising positive emotions and minimising negative emotions. 
Results showed that Japanese participants experienced more mixed emotions as 
compared to their American counterparts (Miyamoto & Ryff, 2011). Furthermore, Japanese 
participants were more likely to experience a moderate amount of mixed emotions; that is, 
they experienced moderately frequent mixed emotions, whereas American participants were 
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more likely to report a high frequency of positive emotions only (Miyamoto & Ryff, 2011). 
More importantly, Japanese participants who experienced mixed emotions in moderate 
amounts reported better health and fewer symptoms related to illness; the opposite pattern 
was observed for American participants who experienced mixed emotions moderately 
frequently, after controlling for cultural differences in the level of health (Miyamoto & Ryff, 
2011). One explanation for these findings is that a measure of subjective well-being was used 
(i.e., life satisfaction), which is different from eudaimonic approaches suggested in the 
current chapter. 
The aforementioned research demonstrates the beneficial effects of mixed emotions 
on well-being for Eastern cultures exclusively. It is worth noting that these findings indicate 
that the beneficial effects of mixed emotions on well-being can be observed at moderate 
levels. Too much or too few mixed emotions, measured in terms of either intensity or 
frequency, could be detrimental for individuals’ well-being when experiencing conflicting 
goals. This evidence sits comfortably with eudaimonic approaches which suggest equilibrium 
as a means to achieve optimal wellness (e.g., Ryan & Deci, 2001; Ryff & Singer, 1998, 
2008). 
Recent theoretical contributions (Fredrickson, 2013; Grant & Schwartz, 2011; Warr, 
2007) have stressed the importance of investigating non-monotonic effects on well-being, 
whereby beneficial variables reach inflection points at which their effects turn detrimental. 
For example, Warr (1987, 2007) proposed that certain job characteristics such as job 
demands and job autonomy resemble vitamins A and D because, above certain thresholds, 
they can have negative consequences for employee well-being (i.e., job-related anxiety, 
reduced job satisfaction, emotional exhaustion). Research in emotion science has also found 
that individuals who experience high cheerfulness are more likely to engage in risky 
behaviours (Martin, Friedman, Tucker, Tomlinson-Keasey, Criqui, & Schwartz, 2002) which 
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are detrimental to well-being, suggesting a nonlinear trend in the relationship between the 
positivity of emotions and well-being. 
Grant & Schwartz (2011) reviewed a large body of evidence showing that variables 
which have been traditionally seen as linearly predicting well-being (e.g., optimism, vitality, 
self-esteem), are in fact better represented as curvilinear effects, demonstrating that a 
mechanism that accounts for balanced levels in the form of an inverted-U curve may fit the 
data better. Thus, following previous evidence and recent theoretical contributions, it is 
relevant to explore whether nonmonotonic effects of mixed emotions on well-being may 
provide further evidence about the benefits of experiencing mixed emotions. 
In conclusion, evidence linking mixed emotions and well-being is unfortunately 
limited and mostly indirect, such as the evidence derived from tests of socioemotional 
selectivity theory (e.g., Carstensen et al., 2000; Carstensen et al., 2011; Ong & Bergeman, 
2004). Other research has even suggested that mixed emotions negatively predict well-being, 
such as feeling mixed towards significant others (e.g., Fingerman et al., 2008). Crucially, 
none of these previous findings, or the evidence that directly demonstrates the beneficial 
effects of mixed emotions (Miyamoto & Ryff, 2011), have investigated the potential effects 
of mixed emotions on eudaimonic well-being. The concept of eudaimonic well-being is a 
relevant construct that should be explored in conjunction with mixed emotions. If, as 
suggested in previous chapters, mixed emotions facilitate the integration of complex 
information, helping individuals to gain equilibrium between disparate courses of action 
when facing conflicting goals, then it is reasonable to speculate that mixed emotion may 
participate in the process through which individuals engage in meaningful goals, achieving 
balance among multiple strands of individual experience. Finally, in this exploration, it is also 
worth investigating whether the effect of mixed emotions on eudaimonic well-being follow a 
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non-monotonic pattern, as previous evidence (Miyamoto & Ryff, 2011) and recent theoretical 
accounts would imply (e.g., Grant & Schwartz, 2011). 
4.3. Overview of Studies 3 and Study 4 
The main goal of chapter 4 is to evaluate whether the experience of mixed emotions 
positively influences eudaimonic well-being. In doing so it is expected to provide evidence 
for Hypothesis 2, which states that experiencing mixed emotions, in the context of goal 
conflict, will positively predict eudaimonic well-being. This was achieved by conducting two 
studies, numbered Study 3 and Study 4 in the current chapter. 
Study 3 used a cross-sectional design to firstly confirm whether mixed emotions are 
experienced after situations involving conflicting goals, as presented in chapter 3 dedicated to 
test Hypothesis 1. Secondly, Study 3 had the objective of distinguishing the concept of 
mixed emotions from the concept of emotional conflict. This was also done in Study 2, but it 
is necessary to provide further evidence of the extent to which these constructs can be 
distinguished because previous findings have demonstrated the negative impact of emotional 
conflict on well-being (e.g., King & Emmons, 1990). Examination of the distinguishability of 
these constructs was performed by testing their respective association with positive and 
negative emotions. Thirdly, Study 3 evaluated the association between mixed emotions and 
eudaimonic well-being, over and above emotional conflict and meaning in life. It is important 
to demonstrate that the hypothesised effect of mixed emotions experiences on eudaimonic 
well-being is supported accounting for related constructs, because the concept of eudaimonic 
well-being derived from meaning-based theories strongly emphasises purpose in life and the 
relevance of meaningful experiences (e.g., Huta & Ryan, 2010; Waterman et. al., 2010). 
Study 4 used an experimental design, which predicted that experiencing mixed 
emotions in the face of a meaningful ending (namely, graduation from University) would 
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enhance perceptions of eudaimonic well-being. The selection of a situation involving a 
meaningful ending was chosen because it provides a context to assess the main hypothesis of 
this chapter using a well-tested paradigm (i.e., poignancy; Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2008, 
2009). Proximity to graduation was chosen because it has been linked to opposing tendencies 
(e.g., wanting to maintain close-relationships, whilst simultaneously, expecting to further 
expand interpersonal horizons in the near future; Zhang & Fung, 2009), which is close to the 
notion of conflicting goals investigated in this research project. Study 4 also explored the 
potential for non-monotonic effects of mixed emotions on eudaimonic well-being. 
Formally, the following hypotheses were therefore derived (as more specific versions 
of Hypothesis 2). 
H2.1: Mixed emotions will be positively associated with both positive and negative 
emotions.  
H2.2: Ambivalence over emotional expression (i.e., emotional conflict) will be 
negatively related to positive emotion and positively related to negative emotions. 
H2.3: Mixed emotions will positively predict eudaimonic well-being, over and above 
emotional conflict and meaning in life. 
H2.4: Mixed emotions will be positively associated with eudaimonic well-being in 
response to a poignant event (graduation). 
4.4. Study 3 
4.4.1. Method 
Four hundred and twenty nine students (295 females and 134 males, Mage = 23.7 
years; SD = 6.9 years), participated in the study in exchange for the opportunity to win 
vouchers worth £40. The sample size required for the present study was based on the general 
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recommendations of Bentler and Chou (1987) for conducting Structural Equation Modelling 
(SEM) analyses. They suggested that the ratio of sample size and number of free parameters 
should be close to 5:1. For the present study, the models had between 20 and 90 free 
parameters, which meant that a sample size of about N=400 was appropriate to detect 
innacurate models for most of the models tested. This study received ethical approval from 
the Department of Psychology ethics sub-committee (DESC) prior to beginning the data 
collection process. Because of reasons related to the accessibility of the sample, participants 
were recruited from a list of volunteer students and completed a set of questionnaires online. 
Participants were informed that the study aimed to better understand the relationship between 
personal goals and emotional experiences.  
Measures. Once the informed consent form was read and accepted, participants 
completed the following scales. 
Conflicting goals scale. A new measure of conflicting goals was developed based on 
the strivings instrumentality matrix, which is a self-report measure that evaluates an 
individual’s most important goals (Emmons & King, 1988). The measure consisted of a list 
of personal goals likely to be relevant to the sample (see Table 7) using the goal taxonomy 
provided by Austin and Vancouver (1996). From the list of goals presented, participants 
selected the five currently most important goals for them. Based on this selection, participants 
were asked to rate the extent to which these goals had been in conflict within the last few 
days by answering three different items, based on the same items used by Emmons and King 
(1988) in the strivings instrumentality matrix (e.g., “I think that pursuing some of these goals 
hurts the pursuit of the other ones”; “these goals usually compete for my time”) on a five-
point Likert format-scale from 1 (Disagree strongly) to 5 (Agree strongly) (M = 3.43, SD = 
0.97; α = 0.69). This measure was less time-consuming to complete than the original scale, 
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which involves generating a list of goals and then comparing each goal with every other in 
terms of goal conflict. 
Ambivalence over emotional expressiveness questionnaire (AEQ). Participants 
completed the same short version of the AEQ (King & Emmons, 1990) used in Study 2. This 
scale measures the level of conflict in emotional expression. Participants were required to rate 
the extent to which each statement represented their feelings on a five-point Likert format-
scale from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (A great deal) (M = 2.78, SD = 0.86; α = 0.88).  
Mixed emotions scale. This was the same scale used in Study 1, but this version was 
re-phrased to measure the presence of mixed emotions in relation to an important event or 
experience in the last few days. Participants rated the extent to which they had been 
experiencing mixed emotions within the last few days (e.g., “I felt contrasting emotions”), on 
a five-point Likert format-scale from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Very much) (M = 3.31, SD = 0.98; α 
= 0.85). 
State basic emotions scale. Participants completed a validated state basic emotions 
scale (Power, 2006), which measured five basic emotions experienced during the last few 
days. Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they felt twenty one affective 
adjectives comprising five basic emotions: happiness (e.g., cheerful; M = 4.59, SD = 1.23; α 
= 0.86), sadness (e.g., despair; M = 2.67, SD = 1.29; α = 0.84), disgust (e.g., guilt; M = 2.29, 
SD = 1.05; α = 0.81), fear (e.g., tense; M = 3.88, SD = 1.32; α = 0.84), and anger (e.g., 
irritation; M = 3.37, SD = 1.15; α = 0.79), on a seven-point Likert format-scale from 1 (Not 




Table 7. List of personal goals used in Study 3 (N = 429).  
 
Personal goal Mentions Percentage 
 
Getting a good qualification. 321 14.8% 
Having a healthy life style. 204 9.4% 
Gaining more knowledge in my field of study. 175 8.0% 
Keeping positive thoughts in my mind. 138 6.3% 
Having an active social life. 137 6.3% 
Spending more time with a partner / close friends. 128 5.9% 
Earning some money. 124 5.7% 
Saving some money. 124 5.7% 
Learning new skills (e.g., playing an instrument, speaking foreign languages). 105 4.8% 
Stop overthinking in my daily life. 101 4.6% 
Trying to eat right. 86 4.0% 
Reading more frequently. 77 3.5% 
Having more intimate relationships. 71 3.3% 
Being personable. 63 2.9% 
Engaging in beneficial social activities (e.g. charities, volunteering). 53 2.4% 
Avoiding being dependent on others (e.g., boyfriend/girlfriend, friends, parents). 48 2.2% 
Being open to new relationships. 44 2.0% 
Trying to think more before I speak. 43 2.0% 
Avoiding being selfish. 43 2.0% 
Avoiding being hurt by others. 31 1.4% 
Avoiding being rejected by others. 24 1.1% 
Being tidier. 19 0.9% 
Quitting smoking. 16 0.7% 
 





Meaning in life questionnaire. Participants also completed a validated measure of 
meaning in life, the Meaning in Life Questionnaire (MLQ; Steger, Frazier, Oishi, & Kaler, 
2006). This scale evaluates two dimensions of meaning in life. The presence of meaning in 
life dimension evaluates the degree to which people are certain about the sense of 
significance in their lives (e.g., “my life has a clear sense of purpose”; M = 4.37, SD = 1.52; 
α = 0.91). In contrast, the dimension of searching in meaning in life refers to personal 
motivations to find out meaning in life (e.g., “I’m seeking a purpose or mission for my life”; 
M = 4.48, SD = 1.45; α = 0.90). Participants were required to rate the extent to which 10 
statements represented what makes their life important and meaningful on a seven-point 
Likert format-scale from 1 (Absolutely untrue) to 7 (Absolutely true). 
Hedonic and eudaimonic motives for activities. Finally, participants completed the 
hedonic and eudaimonic motives for activities questionnaire (HEMA; Huta & Ryan, 2010). 
This is a 10-item questionnaire which evaluates the degree to which people approach their 
activities according to hedonic and eudaimonic principles. The hedonic well-being sub-scale 
was evaluated using five items (e.g., “seeking pleasure?”; M = 4.65, SD = 1.00; α = 0.80) 
presented on a seven-point Likert format-scale ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much). 
The eudaimonic well-being sub-scale was evaluated using four-items (e.g., “seeking to use 
the best in yourself?”; M = 5.37, SD = 0.99; α = 0.76). This scale has shown correspondence 
with alternative measures of well-being (e.g., life satisfaction, positive and negative affect) 
both in cross-sectional and longitudinal studies (Huta & Ryan, 2010). 
4.4.2. Data analysis  
The data analysis section is presented in a separate sub-section to help the reader to 
find the information on data analyses easier when examining the results. Much of the data 
analyses for the current study were conducted using Mplus 7.3 (Muthén & Muthén, 2012), a 
133 
 
dedicated statistical package to perform a broad range of structural equation modelling 
(SEM) analyses. SEM is the mathematical integration of factor analysis and path analysis 
(Wang & Wang, 2012). The critical characteristic is the estimation of unobservable latent 
constructs (i.e., what researchers think they are measuring, such as motivation or self-esteem) 
from observed indicators (i.e., the items which purport to measure the corresponding 
constructs; Wang & Wang, 2012). These latent constructs can be associated, as in regression 
analysis, but SEM also takes into account measurement error in the observed indicators of the 
model. Thus, SEM can simultaneously assess the quality of measurement and investigate 
relationships between constructs (Wang & Wang, 2012). 
  SEM was used to analyse the data of Study 3 because this technique addresses 
several limitations that arise from cross-sectional designs, such as lack of control over the 
variables in the study and the consequent increase in measurement error. Furthermore, SEM 
enables the researcher to model multiple relationships using more than one dependent 
variable, also providing several indices (usually called goodness of fit indices) to determine 
whether the proposed model fits the data well. In other words, SEM makes it feasible to 
determine whether the model suggested is the best representation among multiple possible 
associations between the constructs being studied (Wang & Wang, 2012). 
Goodness of fit indices can be classified in two types: relative fit indices and absolute 
fit indices (Little, 2013). Relative fit indices use the null model (i.e., no relationships between 
variables, also called the worst-fitting model) to index the improvement in model fit that the 
hypothesised model achieves (Little, 2013). In contrast, absolute fit indices compare the 
hypothesised model to the saturated model (i.e., the model without degrees of freedom, also 
called the perfect-fitting model; Little, 2013). Table 8 provides a description of the most 
common goodness of fit indices reported in the literature, and used in the current study, as 
well as some guidelines to interpret them. 
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The data analysis strategy consisted of three stages. In the first stage, each model was 
formulated, specifying the constructs and parameters to estimate; this stage involved 
preparing the structural figures and necessary codes in Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 2012). In 
the second stage, each model was estimated using maximum likelihood. This stage provided 
the estimates (beta values, standard errors, and p-values), as well as the goodness-of-fit 
indices. Finally, in the last stage, each model was evaluated using the guidelines provided in 
Table 8. 
At the end of the results section, ancillary analyses are provided to explore potential 
mechanisms that may mediate the effects of mixed emotions on eudaimonic well-being. 
Although chapter 5 elaborates in greater detail the mechanisms behind the beneficial effects 
of mixed emotions on eudaimonic well-being, these analyses serve to extract as much 
information as possible from Study 3. All these analyses were conducted using PROCESS 
(Hayes, 2013). This is a dedicated application for conducting a large range of mediation and 
moderation analyses using bootstrapping, and provides direct and indirect effect size 
calculations, as well as confidence intervals and standard errors (Hayes, 2013). The main 
statistics reported are effect sizes and confidence intervals for the indirect effect (the effect of 
the independent variable on the dependent variable passing through the mediator), the direct 
(the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable only), and the total effect 
(the aggregated effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable, the mediator 
variable on the dependent variable, and the indirect effect), following Hayes (2013) 
recommendations for conducting mediational analyses using PROCESS. The effect sizes 
selected were the proportion of the total effect accounted for by the indirect effect (PM; Wen 




Table 8. Description and interpretation guidelines for the goodness-of-fit indices used in Study 3. 






Interpretation guideline for 
a good model 
    
Chi-square test χ2 
Calculated using the degrees of freedom 
and number of parameters in a model. It 
follows the Pearson chi-square statistic, 
so that the higher the value the poorer the 
model fit.  
χ2/df  ratio > 3  
(Tay & Drasgow, 2012) 
Although the utility of this 
ratio is matter of debate 
(Brown, 2014). 




The CFI is a relative fit index that 
indicates how much the hypothesised 
model fits better than a model assuming 
there are zero covariances, adjusting for 
sample size. 
≥ 0.95 
(Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
    
Root mean 
square error of 
approximation 
RMSEA 
The RMSEA is an absolute model fit 
index calculated using the χ2 and degrees 
of freedom of the hypothesised model. It 
estimates the amount of error per model 
degrees of freedom, taking sample size 
into account. 
≤ 0.08, plus 90% CI. 
(Browne & Cudeck, 1992). 





The SRMR is an absolute model fit index 
calculated using the standardised 
difference between the observed 
correlations between variables and the 
predicted correlations based on the 
saturated model. 
≤ 0.08 
(Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
 
4.4.3. Results 
The results of Study 3 are separated into three subsections. The first subsection sought 
to replicate the findings presented in chapter 3. In particular, it assessed whether conflicting 
goals predicted mixed emotions, and secondly, whether mixed emotions were distinct from 
emotional conflict. The second sub-section is dedicated to examining the influence of mixed 
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emotions on eudaimonic well-being. Finally, some ancillary analyses are reported describing 
potential mechanisms that might mediate the effect of mixed emotions on eudaimonic well-
being. 
Conflicting goals, mixed emotions, and emotional conflict. Firstly, the path model 
representing the effect of conflicting goals on mixed emotions, controlling for gender and 
age, exhibited satisfactory goodness-of-fit indices, χ2(25, N = 392) = 34.56, CFI = 0.99, 
RMSEA = 0.03 [90%CI: 0.001 / 0.055], SRMR = 0.03. More importantly, findings showed 
that conflicting goals significantly predicted mixed emotions, β = 0.14, p < 0.05, though the 
explanatory power was low, R2 = 0.06 (SE = 0.03), p < 0.05. This association did not change 
after the inclusion of emotional conflict as a predictor in the model. Interestingly, the 
reversed path for mixed emotions predicting conflicting goals was not significant, R2 = 0.03 
(SE = 0.02), p = 0.16. This finding mirrored the evidence presented in chapter 3, and 
confirmed, once again, Hypothesis 1 that perceptions of greater goal conflict predict higher 
levels of mixed emotions. 
The correlation between emotional conflict and mixed emotions was estimated using 
SEM. The model fitted the data well, χ2(102, N = 429) = 388.77, CFI = 0.91, RMSEA = 0.08 
[90%CI: 0.073 / 0.090], SRMR = 0.06. Importantly, the correlation between emotional 
conflict and mixed emotions was positive and significant, r(429) = 0.28, p < 0.05, but it was 
not large in magnitude, suggesting a modest overlap between the two constructs. In order to 
further explore whether mixed emotions can be equated with emotional conflict, the partial 
correlation between mixed emotions and basic emotions was computed, partialling out the 
influence of emotional conflict. The model estimated using SEM revealed satisfactory 
goodness-of-fit indices, χ2(608, N = 429) = 1632.20, CFI = 0.87, RMSEA = 0.06 [90%CI: 
0.059 / 0.066], SRMR = 0.06. A positive and significant correlation was found between mixed 
emotions and all the basic emotions (happiness, sadness, anger, fear, and disgust). Emotional 
137 
 
conflict was significantly and positively correlated with sadness, fear, anger, and disgust, but 
significantly and negatively correlated with happiness (see Figure 6). Thus, mixed emotions 
behaved in accordance with the theory by exhibiting a positive association with all the basic 
emotions, a markedly different pattern compared to emotional conflict. This evidence 
provides support for both hypothesis 2.1 and hypothesis 2.2. Despite the correlations being 
small in magnitude, mixed emotions manifested a positive correlation with all the basic 
emotions measured; whereas emotional conflict showed a positive correlation with the 








Figure 6. Conceptual model of the relationship between mixed emotions and the basic emotions scale, 
controlling for AEQ. **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05. 
 
Mixed emotions as a predictor of eudaimonic well-being. In order to determine the 
influence of mixed emotions on eudaimonic well-being, a preliminary model was built using 
SEM including mixed emotions as the independent variable, and hedonic well-being and 
eudaimonic well-being as the dependent variables, controlling for searching for meaning in 
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The model exhibited satisfactory goodness-of-fit indices, χ2(611, N = 429) = 1620.65, CFI = 
0.86, RMSEA = 0.07 [90%CI: 0.061 / 0.069], SRMR = 0.07. As expected, the path analyses 
showed significant positive associations between mixed emotions and eudaimonic well-
being, β = 0.14, p < 0.05, and mixed emotions and hedonic well-being, β = 0.15, p < 0.05. 
Searching for meaning in life also significantly positively predicted eudaimonic well-
being, β = 0.26, p < .05, but not hedonic well-being, β = 0.05, p = 0.45. Presence of meaning 
in life significantly positively predicted both eudaimonic well-being, β = 0.40, p < 0.05, and 
hedonic well-being, β = 0.12, p < 0.05. Emotional conflict did not predict eudaimonic well-
being, β = -0.07, p = .30, or hedonic well-being, β = -0.07, p = 0.28. Finally, age significantly 
positively predicted eudaimonic well-being, β = 0.12, p < 0.05, and significantly negatively 
predicted hedonic well-being, β = -0.12, p < 0.05. Gender did not significantly influence 
eudaimonic or hedonic well-being. It is also worth noting that the subjective experience of 
mixed emotions was positively related to searching for meaning in life (r = 0.17, p < 0.01), 
whereas a negative association was found between mixed emotions and presence of meaning 
in life (r = -0.15, p < 0.05). The structural model is shown in Figure 7. 
Altogether, the model explained R2 = 0.21 (SE = 0.05), p < 0.05 of the variance in 
eudaimonic well-being, and R2 = 0.05 (SE = 0.02), p = 0.05 of the variance in hedonic well-
being. These findings indicate that mixed emotions positively predicted eudaimonic well-
being, even after controlling for relevant variables such as meaning in life. There was also an 
effect of mixed emotions on hedonic well-being, although its magnitude was small and the 
amount of variance explained was only marginally significant. All in all, this evidence 
supports hypothesis 2.3 that mixed emotions are a positive predictor of eudaimonic well-











Figure 7. Conceptual structural model of the effect of mixed emotions on well-being, controlling for 
relevant variables. **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05. 
 
Ancillary analyses. Several supplementary analyses were conducted in order to (a) 
examine whether mixed emotions mediate the relationship between conflicting goals and 
eudaimonic well-being;  (b) evaluate potential mechanisms through which mixed emotions 
may impact eudaimonic well-being; and (c) assess previous theoretical assumptions presented 
by the eudaimonic well-being approach derived from SDT. 
 
Firstly, it was tested whether mixed emotions mediated the relationship between 
conflicting goals and eudaimonic well-being. Results from over 10,000 bootstrap resamples 
yielded no significant total indirect or indirect effects. Although conflicting goals did positively 
predict mixed emotions, t(419) =  1.99, p < 0.05 [95%CI: 0.01 / 0.19], conflicting goals did not 
account for eudaimonic motives through mixed emotions, as interpreted from the effects sizes 
and corresponding confidence intervals, PM = 0.20 [95%CI: -0.06 / 25.31], k2 = 0.01 [95%CI: 
0.00 / .03]. Similarly, conflicting goals did not directly predict eudaimonic well-being motives, 





























Secondly, it was tested whether the mechanism through which mixed emotions 
enhanced eudaimonic well-being was via facilitating the initiation of searching for meaning in 
life. Results showed that although the direct effect was not different from zero, t(418) =  1.70, 
p = 0.09 [95%CI: -0.01 / 0.18], the total effect was significant, t(417) =  2.12, p < 0.05, [95%CI: 
0.01 / 0.20]. More importantly, the indirect effect of mixed emotions on eudaimonic well-being 
through searching for meaning in life was statistically different from zero, PM = 0.19 [95%CI: 
0.01 / 1.51], k2 = 0.02 [95%CI: 0.01 / 0.05], providing evidence of a mediational process 
because the 95% confidence intervals did not include zero. This model also accounted for a 
small but significant amount of variance, R2 = 0.01, F(1, 418) = 4.49, p < 0.05. Thus, greater 
levels of mixed emotions appeared to be associated with greater eudaimonic well-being, as a 
result of a heightened search for meaning in life. 
Thirdly, it was explored whether mixed emotions enhanced hedonic well-being as a 
result of increasing eudaimonic well-being. Results showed that although the direct effect was 
not different from zero, t(418) =  1.50, p = 0.13 [95%CI: -0.02 / 0.17], the total effect was 
significant, t(417) =  1.97, p < 0.05 [95%CI: 0.01 / 0.20]. The indirect effect from mixed 
emotions on hedonic well-being through eudaimonic well-being was statistically different from 
zero, PM = 0.25 [95%CI: 0.01 / 2.06], k2 = 0.02, [95%CI: 0.01 / 0.05], supporting a mediation 
explanation due to the corresponding 95% confidence intervals not including zero. This model 
also accounted for a small but significant amount of variance, R2 = 0.01, F(1, 419) = 3.86, p < 
0.05. Thus, participants who reported greater levels of mixed emotions appeared to also have 
higher levels of hedonic well-being as a result of heightened eudaimonic well-being. 
Finally, the previous two mediational models were put together in a serial multiple 
mediation model (see Figure 8). Results revealed that the direct effect of mixed emotions on 
hedonic well-being was not different from zero, t(419) = 1.57, p = 0.12 [95%CI: -0.02 / 0.18], 
whereas the total effect was marginally significant, t(419) = 1.94, p = 0.05 [95%CI: -0.01 / 
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0.20]. However, the indirect effect of mixed emotions on hedonic well-being transmitted via 
searching for meaning in life and, in turn enhanced eudaimonic well-being was different from 
zero, PM = 0.05 [95%CI: 0.01 / 0.65], providing preliminary evidence of a serial multiple 
mediation. Furthermore, although the overall explanatory power of the model was modest, it 
was possible to observe an improvement from the simple model of mixed emotions predicting 
searching for meaning in life, R2 = 0.02, F(1, 418) = 4.55, p < 0.01, to the more complex model 
including two mediators in series, R2 = 0.06, F(3, 416) = 8.66, p < 0.01. Age and gender were 
not significant when included in the model. Findings support the mediation of searching for 
meaning in life and eudaimonic well-being as key mechanisms for explaining how mixed 
emotions can yield hedonic well-being.  
 
 
Figure 8. Conceptual diagram of the serial multiple mediation model involving mixed emotions 
predicting hedonic well-being, through the effect of searching for meaning in life and eudaimonic 






















4.5. Study 4 
4.5.1. Method 
Participants. Fifty eight students in the final year of their undergraduate or 
postgraduate studies (36 females and 22 males, Mage = 24.0 years; SD = 4.3 years), 
participated in the study in exchange for the opportunity to win vouchers worth £30. The 
sample was exclusively composed by students who were about to shortly leave University. 
From this sample, six participants (two females and four males) dropped out of the study, so 
the final sample size was composed of N = 52 participants. This sample size satisfied 
calculations of the required sample size for the present study. The power analysis was 
performed using G*Power 3.1 (Faul et. al., 2007) in order to achieve 80% power, with a 
within-person design involving one group, two measurement points (pre-post), a probability 
error of .05, a medium effect size (based on the meta-analysis presented in chapter 2), and a 
correlation of zero between the repeated measure variables (use of zero correlation between 
within-person variables means a more stringent criterion has been applied). This study 
received ethical approval from the DESC, prior to beginning the data collection process. 
Because of reasons related to the accessibility of the sample, participants were recruited from 
a student volunteers list and completed the experiment online. Participants were informed 
that the study aimed to understand how watching a short video-clip about life in the 
University affected their thoughts and feelings.  
Procedures. This study was conducted at the end of the academic year and was 
specially designed for those students about to leave the University. This information was 
communicated in the invitation email sent to the student volunteers list. At the beginning of 
the experiment participants were asked to confirm whether they were leaving University that 
year, which all participants confirmed. Next, participants read the informed consent form. 
Those participants who agreed to take part in the study (N = 58) were requested to self-report 
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how they felt right now, using six emotional adjectives extracted from a measure of state-
affect containing eight emotional adjectives (Eisenkraft & Elfenbein, 2010), excluding the 
emotional adjectives “calm” and “angry”, in order to make the scale shorter. This measure of 
state-affect has been demonstrated to clearly reflect discrete emotional adjectives that are 
opposite in valence (Eisenkraft & Elfenbein, 2010). The measure assessed the intensity with 
which each emotional adjective was felt using a Likert-format scale ranging from 1 (Not at 
all) to 5 (A great deal). The order of the emotional adjectives was randomised to help 
overcome potential order effects. The list of emotional adjectives used and their descriptive 
statistics are shown in Table 9.  
After assessing participants’ emotional state, they were informed that they were about 
to watch a short video-clip (two minutes) about life in the University. The video-clip was a 
compilation of pictures of the city of Sheffield and the University of Sheffield. 
Accompanying the pictures were messages suggesting that participants were ending one stage 
in their lives and beginning a new one (e.g., “You'll miss the University and the friends 
you've made…but you're also looking forward to the future and the exciting possibilities it 
holds”). The messages were displayed in conjunction with the musical piece La Noyée (Yann 
Tiersen, 2011). The video-clip can be watched in the following web link: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ymyZkeHmcg4 
This video-clip was the experimental manipulation because it was designed to elicit 
mixed emotions. Previous studies in consumer research have used a combination of pictures 
and messages to elicit mixed emotions (e.g., Aaker et al., 2008; Williams & Aaker, 2002). 
The sample was about to graduate so it was possible to anticipate that they would be likely to 
experience mixed emotions in response to images and messages about university life (i.e., 
poignancy; Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2008, Study 2). Furthermore, the particular musical piece 
that was chosen to accompany the images and messages had been demonstrated to elicit 
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mixed emotions (Hunter et al., 2008) because it combines conflicting musical cues (i.e., 
musical pieces in fast tempo and minor mode).  
 
Table 9. Descriptive statistics and correlations between mixed emotions indicators and the respective 
emotional adjectives used to calculate the minimum index in Study 4 (N = 52). 




M SD  M SD 
     
Sad 2.23 1.23  2.48 1.00 
Stressed 2.52 1.26  2.10 1.21 
Enthusiastic 2.65 1.08  2.62 1.16 
Bored 2.10  1.10  1.98 1.11 
Happy 3.00  1.02  2.71 1.02 
Relaxed 2.92 1.33  2.58 1.04 
MI happy-sad 1.81  0.77  2.10 0.87 
MI enthusiastic-sad 1.71  0.80  1.96 0.71 
MI positive-negative 1.76 0.47 1.73 0.42 
     
Correlations r  r 
   
MI happy-sad with happy 0.05 0.50** 
MI happy-sad with sad     0.71** 0.60** 
MI enthusiastic-sad with enthusiastic   0.31* 0.47** 
MI enthusiastic-sad with sad    0.61** 0.57** 
     
Note: MI = minimum index of mixed emotions. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. 
 
Once participants had watched the video-clip, they immediately completed the same 
state-affect measure used at the beginning of the experiment (see Table 9). The order of the 
emotional adjectives was again randomised. Previous studies evaluating mixed emotions in 
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students close to graduation revealed that the most common mixed emotion experience was 
happy-sad (e.g., Ersner-Hershfield, et al., 2008, Study 2; Larsen et al., 2001, Study 3). Thus, 
for the sake of parsimony, and following previous evidence, the measures of sadness, 
enthusiasm and happiness were used to calculate two mixed emotions indices using the 
minimum index (Schimmack, 2001): enthusiasm-sad and happy-sad. Additionally, in order to 
control for demand effects resulting from requesting the same emotional report twice, the 
average of all of the positively valenced emotions and the average of all of the negatively 
valenced emotions were used to calculate another minimum index score (positive-negative). 
Next, participants completed a brief version of the questionnaire for eudaimonic well-
being (Waterman et al., 2010). This scale evaluates the level of eudaimonic well-being using 
21 statements concerning perceptions and personal beliefs about current life, and has been 
validated in a previous study (Waterman et al., 2010). In the current experiment three items 
(M = 2.63, SD = 1.04; α = 0.85) were selected based on factorial loadings of the original 
questionnaire and the correspondence with the measure of eudaimonic well-being used in 
Study 3. These items were answered using a Likert-format scale ranging from 1 (Strongly 
disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). The items, correlations and descriptive statistics are shown in 
Table 10. 
Lastly, participants completed two short questions to evaluate whether they finished 
the experiment in one sitting (“Did you complete this study in one round?”), and whether 
they were interrupted while completing the experiment (“Did you complete this study without 
interruptions (e.g., mobile calls, friends around)?”); both of these questions were answered 
in a yes/no format. These last two questions were included to establish whether interruptions 
or delays in completing the study may have influenced the results, as the experiment was 
completed online and it demanded participants’ attention while watching the video. 
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Participants were thanked at the end of the study and were given the opportunity to provide 
their email to participate in the raffle prize, under the condition of complete confidentiality. 
 
Table 10. Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations between the items of the eudaimonic 
questionnaire (Waterman et al., 2010) in Study 4 (N = 52). 
      
 M SD 1 2 3 
      
1. I believe I have discovered who I really am. 2.88 1.29 -   
      
2. I can say that I've found my purpose in life. 2.56 1.62 0.59** -  
      
3. I believe I know what I was meant to do in my 
life. 
2.46 1.11  0.53** 0.88** - 
      
Note:  **p < 0.01. 
 
4.5.2. Results 
Preliminary analyses did not identify significant outliers and eudaimonic well-being 
was approximately normally distributed. Descriptive statistics shown in Table 9 revealed that, 
on average, participants reported feeling more intense negative emotions (e.g., sad, bored, 
stressed) after watching the video-clip compared to before watching it. In contrast, 
participants reported feeling less intense positive emotions (e.g., happy, inspired, relaxed) 
after the video-clip. Paired sample t-tests revealed significant differences between sadness 
pre- and post-video, t(51) = -2.59, p < 0.05, Mdifference = -0.39 [95%CI: -0.68 / -0.09], stress 
pre- and post-video, t(51) = 3.18, p < 0.05, Mdifference = 0.42 [95%CI: 0.16 / 0.69], happiness 
pre- and post-video, t(51) = 2.48, p < 0.05, Mdifference = 0.29 [95% CI: 0.05 / 0.53], and relaxed 
pre- and post-video, t(51) = 2.48, p < 0.05, Mdifference = 0.35 [95% CI: 0.07 / 0.63]. In terms of 
the quality control variables (i.e., whether participants completed the experiment without 
interruptions and in one round), only one participant did not complete the study in one round, 
and two participants reported being interrupted while completing the experiment. No effects 
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were found after including these variables as between-subject factors in the elicitation of 
mixed emotions (p > 0.15). All participants were considered for subsequent analyses. 
As mentioned above, in order to evaluate the presence of mixed emotions, two 
minimum indices were calculated: enthusiasm-sad and happy-sad. In accordance with 
previous research, it was expected that the video-clip would elicit a combination of sadness 
and happiness and/or sadness and enthusiasm. The descriptive statistics (shown in Table 9) 
showed that, on average, participants reported more mixed emotions after, as compared to 
before, watching the video-clip. One may think that because negative emotions had lower 
values, on average, compared to positive emotions, the minimum index tended to track 
negative emotions. However, correlational analyses (shown in Table 9) revealed that the 
minimum indices after the experimental manipulation were positively and strongly correlated 
with the corresponding positive emotions and negative emotions alike, suggesting that mixed 
emotions estimated using the minimum index did not correspond with the effect of negative 
emotions only. Furthermore, the difference test of the minimum index positive-negative 
before watching the video-clip was not different from zero compared to the minimum index 
positive-negative after the video (p > 0.60), indicating that changes in mixed emotions were 
not necessarily the result of demand effects. 
Manipulation checks. A paired sample t-test based on 10,000 bootstrapped samples 
was conducted to estimate whether participants felt more mixed emotions after the video-clip 
compared to before. Results showed that participants felt significantly more enthusiastic-sad 
after (M = 1.96) compared to before (M = 1.71) having watched the video clip, t(51) = -2.04, 
p < 0.05, Mdifference = -0.25 [95%CI: -0.48 / 0.00], d = 0.57. Likewise, participants reported 
feeling more happy-sad after (M = 2.10) compared to before (M = 1.80) they watched the 
video-clip, t(51) = -2.27, p < 0.05, Mdifference = -0.29, [95%CI: -0.56 / -0.04], d = 0.63. The 
inclusion of the mixed emotion positive-negative, and the age and gender of the sample did 
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not influence the experience of the mixed emotions of happy-sad or enthusiastic-sad  (p > 
0.20). 
Effect of mixed emotions on eudaimonic well-being. In order to determine whether 
mixed emotions predicted eudaimonic well-being, hierarchical linear regressions based on 
10,000 bootstrapped samples were used to test a set of models. Firstly, the pre-video measure 
of the mixed emotion enthusiastic-sad was entered at step 1 and the post-video measure of 
mixed emotion enthusiastic-sad was entered at step 2. The minimum index for enthusiastic-
sad measured after participants had been exposed to the video-clip explained a significant 
amount of the variance in eudaimonic well-being, F(2,49) = 4.06, p < 0.05, R2 = 0.14. The 
analysis showed that greater mixed emotion experience of enthusiastic-sad significantly 
predicted eudaimonic well-being, β = .58, p < 0.05 [95%CI: 0.20 / 0.96]. It was notable that 
enthusiastic-sad before the video-clip did not predict eudaimonic well-being at step 1, β = -
0.06, p = 0.75 [95%CI: -0.44 / 0.30], or at step 2, β = -0.22, p = 0.19 [95% CI: -0.60 / 0.12]. 
A second model included the mixed emotion happy-sad before having watched the 
video-clip at step 1, and the post-video measure of the mixed emotion happy-sad at step 2. 
Mixed emotion pre-video at step 1 did not predict eudaimonic well-being, β = -0.02, p = 0.93, 
[95%CI: -0.51 / 0.36]. At step 2, the minimum index for happy-sad post-video explained a 
significant amount of the variance in eudaimonic well-being, F(2,49) = 4.67, p < 0.05, R2 = 
0.16. The mixed emotion happy-sad after the video-clip significantly predicted eudaimonic 
well-being, β = 0.52, p < 0.01 [95%CI: 0.14 / 0.84]; the pre-video measure of mixed emotion 
happy-sad did not predict eudaimonic well-being at step 2, β = -0.25, p = 0.19 [95%CI: -0.64 
/ 0.13]. 
The previous models were re-ran including sadness after watching the video-clip at 
step 3 to control for potential effects of changes in sadness as a predictor of eudaimonic well-
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being. There was no significant effect of sadness on eudaimonic well-being for the model 
including the mixed emotion enthusiastic-sad (p = 0.70) or for the model including the mixed 
emotion happy-sad (p = 0.88); the main effects of the corresponding mixed emotion indices 
on eudaimonic well-being were still significant. Similarly, the inclusion of happiness after 
watching the video-clip at step 3 did not reveal a significant effect on eudaimonic well-being 
for the model including the mixed emotion enthusiastic-sad (p = 0.65) or the model including 
mixed emotion happy-sad (p = 0.61); the main effects of the corresponding mixed emotion 
indices on eudaimonic well-being were still significant. 
Overall, these results indicate that the experience of the mixed emotions of happy-sad 
and enthusiastic-sad experienced post-video predicted eudaimonic well-being, and that the 
effect of mixed emotions was prompted by the video. This evidence supports hypothesis 2.4 
that mixed emotions will be positively associated with eudaimonic well-being in response to 
a poignant event (graduation). This was true over and above the inclusion of sadness or 
happiness in the corresponding models. 
To evaluate a potential non-monotonic effect of mixed emotions on eudaimonic well-
being the squared terms for the mixed emotion enthusiastic-sad pre- and post-video were 
entered at step 3 in the model. The squared term for enthusiastic-sad after the video-clip 
explained a significant amount of eudaimonic well-being variance, F(4,47) = 3.60, p < 0.05, 
R2 = 0.23, which was larger than the amount explained at step 2. Furthermore, the squared 
term for enthusiastic-sad post-video significantly predicted eudaimonic well-being, β = -0.53, 
p < 0.05 [95%CI: -1.10 / -0.07], which indicated a concave curvilinear effect, as shown in 
Figure 9. The figure suggests that the beneficial effect of mixed emotions on eudaimonic 
well-being was greatest when mixed emotions were experienced at moderate intensity. No 
significant effects were found for the squared term of mixed emotions before the video-clip 
(p > 0.25). 
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Similarly, the squared terms for the mixed emotion happy-sad were entered at step 3. 
Likewise, mixed emotions of happy-sad pre- and post-video were entered at step 3 in the 
second model. The mixed emotion of happy-sad explained a significant amount of 
eudaimonic well-being variance, F(4,47) = 3.34, p < 0.05, R2 = 0.24, which was a greater 
amount than at step 2. The squared term for mixed emotion happy-sad after the video was 
this time marginally significant, β = -.27, p = 0.08 [95%CI: -.75 / 0.07], whereas the effect of 
the squared term for mixed emotion happy-sad before the video was non-significant (p > 









Figure 9. Curvilinear effect of mixed emotion enthusiastic-sad on eudaimonic well-being in Study 4 
(N = 52). 
4.6. Discussion 
The goal of this chapter was to determine whether mixed emotions, in the context of 
goal conflict, may have beneficial effects on eudaimonic well-being. This goal was in 
keeping with Hypothesis 2, as stated in chapter 1. Two studies provided evidence to support 






















varied in design (cross-sectional, Study 3; experimental, Study 4), measures (different 
measures of eudaimonic well-being and mixed emotions) and a diversity of statistical 
methods. Overall, the findings supported the hypothesis that the experience of mixed 
emotions can have beneficial effects on eudaimonic well-being.     
In Study 3, a large sample of participants completed a survey designed to evaluate 
whether conflicting goals predict mixed emotions, continuing with the evidence presented in 
chapter 3 about the conditions under which mixed emotions are displayed. Findings showed 
that conflicting goals significantly predicted mixed emotions and that the reverse path did not 
fit the data. Furthermore, Study 3 distinguished the concepts of mixed emotions and 
emotional conflict. This distinction was made by comparing the association between each 
construct and five basic emotions (happiness, sadness, disgust, anger, fear). Following 
previous research (Larsen & McGraw, 2011, Larsen et al., 2001; Schimmack, 2001), mixed 
emotions should positively relate both with positively valenced emotions (e.g., happiness) 
and negatively valenced emotions (e.g., sadness). Evidence confirmed this assumption 
revealing that mixed emotions had a positive association with all the basic emotions, having 
controlled for the effects of emotional conflict. The distinction between emotional conflict 
and mixed emotions was affirmed by the former construct correlating positively with the 
negatively valenced emotions only, whereas a negative association was found between 
emotional conflict and happiness (in contrast to the positive association found between mixed 
emotions and happiness).  
The previous findings provide the necessary framework to determine whether mixed 
emotions positively influence eudaimonic well-being. Having separated the constructs of 
emotional conflict and mixed emotions, it was possible to establish whether mixed emotions 
foster eudaimonic well-being; contrary to what would have been expected if mixed emotions 
were equivalent to emotional conflict. Thus the last objective of Study 3 was to determine the 
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influence of mixed emotions on eudaimonic well-being. Results confirmed that mixed 
emotions predicted eudaimonic well-being and hedonic well-being, over and above relevant 
constructs such as emotional conflict and meaning in life. Furthermore, it was found that age 
was positively associated with eudaimonic well-being, but negatively associated with hedonic 
well-being. Despite the limited age range of the sample in Study 3, this evidence seems to 
indicate that, as people get older, they tend to report greater eudaimonic well-being. This is 
consistent with the SST (Carstensen, 2006; Carstensen et al., 1999), which stipulates that as 
people age they tend to attribute greater importance to more meaningful experiences. 
Study 4 used an experiment based on a real event (i.e., graduation) to further 
demonstrate that mixed emotions foster eudaimonic well-being. In this study, a sample of 
participants who were about to graduate watched a video-clip that was intended to elicit 
mixed emotions and completed the eudaimonic well-being questionnaire immediately after 
the video. Participants experienced more mixed emotions after watching the video clip, and 
positive changes in mixed emotions were related to higher scores on the measure of 
eudaimonic well-being. Manipulating mixed emotions in real-time and using an ecologically 
valid paradigm (experiencing poignancy in response to a life transition) provided stronger 
evidence to support the hypothesis that mixed emotions can enhance eudaimonic well-being. 
Additionally, Study 4 provided initial evidence of the curvilinear effects of mixed 
emotions on eudaimonic well-being. This evidence is in accordance with recent 
conceptualisations that have called for exploration of whether variables that presumably 
benefit well-being may reach inflection points after which their positive effects decay 
(Fredrickson, 2013; Grant & Schwartz, 2011; Warr, 2007). In particular, in the field of 
emotion science, Fredrickson (2013) has argued for the importance of testing for nonlinear 
trends when evaluating the effects of positive emotions on human flourishing. The current 
evidence updates this conceptualisation by suggesting that not only positive emotions may 
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reach inflection points in the form of an inverted-U, but also that mixed emotions follow 
nonlinear trends, placing complex emotional experiences at the heart of contemporary 
approaches in the study of emotions and individual well-being.    
Contributions. Overall, chapter 4 has made four distinct contributions to this 
research project. Firstly, chapter 4 has added new sources of evidence to demonstrate that the 
experience of mixed emotions results from experiencing conflicting goals. Although cross-
sectional designs lack control of the variables under investigation, the evidence presented in 
Study 3 supported the idea that conflicting goals are the primary cause of experience of 
mixed emotions. Something similar could be inferred from Study 4. Although the experiment 
conducted in Study 4 did not evaluate whether graduation is a form of goal conflict, Zhang 
and Fung (2009) have shown that graduation gives rise to poignancy only among students 
who identify more with their university, suggesting that the degree of engagement with the 
university versus the willingness to expand personal horizons might be the underlying desires 
that conflict and thereby trigger mixed emotions.  
Secondly, chapter 4 has further distinguished the concept of mixed emotions and 
emotional conflict. This distinction is not trivial because previous research has shown that 
experiencing conflict between two emotional tendencies, such as wanting to express affection 
but being afraid of being hurt can have a negative impact on individuals’ well-being and 
physical health (e.g., Emmons & Colby, 1995; King & Emmons, 1990; Porter, Keefe, Lipkus, 
& Hurwitz, 2005). Therefore, by separating these constructs it is possible to speculate that 
their impact on well-being may also be different. 
The third contribution of this chapter is the evidence derived from the two studies 
indicating that the experience of mixed emotions has a positive influence on eudaimonic 
well-being; this is the first time that this type of evidence has been reported. People perceived 
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their lives as more meaningful and more in accordance with relevant goals and values when 
they experienced greater levels of mixed emotions, either in response to recalling relevant 
goal-conflict situations that had occurred in the last few days (Study 3), or in the moments 
after watching a video-clip designed to enhance poignancy (Study 4). 
Finally, the fourth contribution of chapter 4 is the provision of preliminary evidence 
that may help to explain how mixed emotions can impact well-being. Ancillary analyses in 
Study 3 revealed that mixed emotions initiated the search for meaning in life, which in turn, 
was associated with enhanced eudaimonic well-being. Although this finding is based on 
cross-sectional data, from which it is not possible to establish causality or ruled out third 
variable explanations, it is interesting to note that this evidence is consistent with the idea that 
mixed emotions facilitates the integration of complex information. In particular, facilitating 
the searching for meaning that ultimately made participants perceived greater eudaimonic 
well-being.  
A mechanism formally tested in this chapter was the hypothesised mediational effect 
of eudaimonic well-being in predicting hedonic well-being. According to SDT (Ryan & Deci, 
2001; Ryan et al., 2008), eudaimonic well-being represents the process through which people 
can engage in relevant activities that favour the achievement of three basic needs (autonomy, 
competence, and relatedness). The satisfaction of these needs leads to hedonic outcomes, 
such as pleasant emotions and greater satisfaction with life (Ryan et al., 2008). Evidence 
reported in this chapter lends support for this idea. Mixed emotions predicted eudaimonic 
well-being, and in turn, eudaimonic well-being mediated the effect of mixed emotions on 
hedonic well-being. Moreover, the evidence partially supported a complex model including 




Limitations. Although these supplementary analyses are interesting, several 
limitations cast some doubts on the relevance of meaning in life as the chief psychological 
processes explaining the beneficial effects of mixed emotions on eudaimonic well-being. 
Firstly, some authors have viewed meaning in life as resulting from experiencing greater 
eudaimonic well-being (e.g., Steger, Kashdan, & Oishi, 2008; McMahan & Renken, 2011), 
whereas others have considered meaning in life as a predictor of better well-being (e.g., Ho, 
Cheung, & Cheung, 2010; Steger, Oishi, & Kesebir, 2011). For example, Steger and 
colleagues (2008) investigated the characteristics that best describe eudaimonic well-being in 
everyday life. They argued that many of theories of eudaimonic well-being prescribe 
activities that foster greater well-being (e.g., cultivating positive relationships, maintaining a 
positive self-image), and as a consequence, it should be possible to translate these activities 
into a set of everyday behaviours. Thus, a pool of 46 behaviours was created (e.g., 
“volunteered my time”, “gave money to a person in need”) representing a eudaimonic 
lifestyle; these behaviours were then surveyed in a diary study over 20-days (Steger et al., 
2008, Study 1). Results showed that the more individuals engaged in eudaimonic behaviours 
over time, the greater their sense of meaning in life, life satisfaction and positive affect 
reported (Steger et al., 2008, Study 1). Thus, the reverse path of eudaimonic well-being 
predicting meaning in life is perfectly feasible, making it difficult to clearly determine the 
causal direction. 
Related to the previous concern, it is clear that there exists a certain theoretical 
equivalence between eudaimonic well-being and meaning in life. Meaning-based theories of 
eudaimonic well-being have asserted that engaging in activities that are congruent with 
personal values and meaning in life are components of the definition of eudaimonic well-
being (Ryan et al., 2008; Ryff, 1995; Waterman, 1990). Thus, it is possible that these two 
constructs are so closely related that it does not add much value to consider them in a 
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sequence to explain the process through which mixed emotions foster eudaimonic well-being. 
It seems to be more appropriate to consider meaning in life as part of what has been called 
eudaimonic well-being, such as the dimension of purpose in life in psychological well-being 
theory (Ryff, 1989, 1995). 
Other limitations of the current chapter include that the experimental design presented 
in Study 4 lacked a control group. Therefore, it is not possibly to clearly infer a causal effect 
of mixed emotions on eudaimonic well-being. Although the incorporation of an alternative 
mixed emotions index (minimum index positive-negative) is useful to address potential 
demand effects, it is still possible that general demand effect on self-report could explain the 
result. Finally, it was not possible to clearly demonstrate that mixed emotions followed goal 
conflict to crucially determine the incremental benefits on eudaimonic well-being. Probing a 
mechanism that includes conflicting goals, mixed emotions and eudaimonic well-being is 
particularly relevant considering that chapter 3 showed that conflicting goals were the main 
predictor of mixed emotions. 
Conclusion. In conclusion, the evidence presented in this chapter is consistent with 
the proposal that mixed emotions have a positive effect on eudaimonic well-being. Although 
the mechanisms that may explain this effect are less clear, the two studies reported here 
represent the first attempts to investigate the impact that mixed emotions can have on 
eudaimonic well-being. The investigation of the association between mixed emotions and 
eudaimonic well-being is particularly important considering that the concept of eudaimonic 
well-being is closely linked to the achievement of relevant goals and engaging in meaningful 
activities, which may be threatened when experiencing conflicting goals. Thus, understanding 
how mixed emotions may help people to integrate disparate courses of actions when 
experiencing conflicting goals and how this ultimately can promote the improvement of 
eudaimonic well-being is the focus of chapter 5.   
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5. CHAPTER FIVE: EXPLAINING THE EFFECTS OF MIXED 
EMOTIONS ON EUDAIMONIC WELL-BEING 
 
“With regard to the pleasures and pains […] it possible to be in such a state as to be defeated even by 
those of them which most people master, or to master even those by which most people are defeated; 
among these possibilities, those relating to pleasures are incontinence and continence, those relating 
to pains softness and endurance. The state of most people is intermediate, even if they lean more 
towards the worse states”  
(Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VII.7). 
 
 
ristotle’s wisdom envisioned that people’s wellness mostly consists of gaining 
balance between multiple desires that normally collide. Sometimes people struggle to 
overcome the bitterness of having to decide between two equally important goals. Other 
times those conflicts lead people to fluctuate between restraint and self-indulgence, trying to 
keep themselves on track for important goals when facing temptations. Desires, conflict, and 
the regulation of ongoing behaviours are continuously intertwined as people attempt to find 
what is meaningful and worthy of their efforts, the constituents of eudaimonic well-being. 
This research project has thus far established that mixed emotions experiences are a 
result of the presence of conflicting goals. As such, it makes sense to connecting the 
emergence of conflicting goals with the experience of mixed emotions and eudaimonic well-
being. A considerable amount of evidence has shown that it is the inability to resolve goal 
conflict which impairs satisfaction with life (Emmons & King, 1988; Emmons & Colby, 
1995), increases physical symptomatology and GP visits (King & Emmons, 1991), as well as 
prompting depression and anxiety (Emmons & King, 1988), rather than the presence of goal 




as goal facilitation, they report an improvement in well-being (Riediger & Freund, 2004). 
Theory concerning goal conflict resolution also suggests that individuals actively try to 
resolve goal conflict, and that success in these attempts may help them to achieve better well-
being (Emmons, 1996; Emmons & Kaiser, 1996). Given that mixed emotions arise from goal 
conflict (chapter 3) and contribute to eudaimonic well-being (chapter 4), it seems likely that 
mixed emotions play a part in the conflict resolution process. 
However, one pending question is to understand the mechanisms that explain how 
feeling mixed emotions might be good for individuals. Some authors have demonstrated the 
beneficial effects of mixed emotions on well-being (e.g., Hershfield et al., 2013), although 
they have explicitly acknowledged that future work needs to consider the situations under 
which people experience mixed emotions in order to better understand the processes 
explaining these results. Similarly, chapter 4 discussed the need for greater clarification of the 
processes that explain the influence of mixed emotions on eudaimonic well-being.  
The present chapter proposes two psychological processes that might explain how 
mixed emotions positively influence eudaimonic well-being. One psychological process, 
which I shall refer to as the “restorative” mechanism, suggests that individual differences in 
mixed emotions will ameliorate the negative consequences of conflicting goals on 
eudaimonic well-being; whereas the other process, which I shall refer to as the “balancing” 
mechanism, implies that mixed emotions can help people to balance short and long term 
gratifications, enabling individuals to resist temptations when experiencing self-control 
dilemmas (i.e., conflicts where one relevant, long term goal is threatened by the immediate 
demands of another goal, a temptation).  
These processes build on the evidence presented in chapter 3 and chapter 4. In 
previous chapters was found that mixed emotions are primarily elicited following conflicting 
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goals, and mixed emotions foster eudaimonic well-being. Both of the proposed processes 
share the assumption that mixed emotions facilitate the integration of complex information 
thus enhancing the process that permits people to create meaning in their lives, engage in 
relevant, meaningful activities, and maintain a balance between the multiple possibilities that 
life commonly holds.  
Therefore, the main goal of this chapter is to examine how mixed emotions may 
positively influence eudaimonic well-being, in the context of experiencing conflicting goals. 
This goal will be achieved by evaluating Hypothesis 3, 4, and 5. Hypothesis 3 states that 
individual differences in mixed emotions will moderate the negative effect of conflicting 
goals on psychological well-being (a conglomerated construct of eudaimonic well-being). 
Mainly derived from the dynamic model of affect (DMA; Reich et al., 2003; Zautra, 2003), 
the restorative mechanism suggests that those people who are more susceptible to 
experiencing mixed emotions in general, will be able to soften the hypothesised negative 
impact of experiencing conflicting goals on eudaimonic well-being.  
Concurrently, the present chapter also aims to evaluate Hypothesis 4 which states that 
mixed emotions will mediate the association between goal-conflict and attempts to resist 
temptations. Perceptions of goal conflict help individuals to resist temptations (Hofmann et 
al., 2012; Hofmann & Van Dillen, 2012). Thus, it is presumed that the identification of goal 
conflict is driven by the experience of mixed emotions, which in turn, signals the need to 
recruiting self-control resources. 
Finally, this chapter also hypothesises that efforts to resist temptations will reduce 
vitality, but that this effect will be compensated by the experience of mixed emotions 
(Hypothesis 5). That is, people will experience exhaustion (less vitality) as a result of 
investing efforts to resist temptations. However, the accompanying experience of mixed 
emotions should permit individuals to address self-control dilemmas more efficiently because 
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different sources of information (e.g., the rewarding features of a desire, the negative 
consequences of yielding to temptations, the long-term benefits of persistence) are accessible 
and integrated at a given moment, and may therefore compensate for the negative impact of 
resisting temptation on vitality. Hence, mixed emotions will enable individuals to integrate 
complex information and promote greater behavioural flexibility (Cacioppo et al., 2004; 
Davis et al., 2004; Potter, Zatura, & Reich, 2000; Zautra, Smith, Affleck, & Tennen, 2001). 
These hypotheses were tested in an intensive longitudinal study, where participants 
completed a short questionnaire several times a day over ten consecutive days (i.e., an 
experiencing sampling method was used; Bolger & Laurenceau, 2013). However, before 
presenting this study and its results, the present chapter firstly explains the theoretical 
reasoning supporting the two psychological processes described above (i.e., a restorative 
mechanism and a balancing mechanism). 
5.1. Processes explaining the beneficial effects of mixed emotions on 
eudaimonic well-being 
Emotions fluctuate in a fashion that is attuned to changes in the environment 
(Mesquita & Boiger, 2014; Parkinson, 2009; Scherer, 2009, 2004). Even emotions in facial 
expressions, which have been thought to be tightly linked to evolutionary pressures (e.g., 
Ekman, 1993), are determined by social situations (e.g., Fernandez-Dohls, Carrera, Barchard, 
& Gacitua, 2008) or contextual variables such as body-posture (Aviezer et al., 2008). 
Parkinson (2009) eloquently suggested that emotions align objects and people, helping 
individuals to create meaning. People do not need to appraise the meaning of a situation 
before experiencing emotions; rather, meaning emerges as a result of the continuous 
adjustment of emotions to the current situation (Parkinson, 2009). Similarly, Mesquita and 
Boiger (2014) asserted that emotions and situations constitute a single system which 
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determines the social function of emotions; for example, being angry with your child is not 
the same as being angry with a colleague. 
One notable corollary of understanding emotions as a continuous adjustment to 
environmental demands is that emotional experiences are not only defined in terms of their 
constituent components (e.g., somatovisceral changes, feelings, and appraisals), but also in 
terms of their functions. Frijda (2009) argued that emotions are better described by their 
functions, rather than as distinct categories relying on dimensions or discrete approaches. For 
some authors (e.g., Niedenthal & Brauer, 2012), emotions are endowed with the function to 
regulate social perception and interactions. For example, the ability to process the facial 
expression of fear in others facilitates the perception of people in need, boosting prosocial 
behaviours (Marsh, Kozak, & Ambady, 2007). 
Both the Evaluative Space Model (ESM; Cacioppo et al., 1999; Cacioppo et al., 2004) 
and the communicative model of emotion (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1996) anticipate that one 
consequence of experiencing mixed emotions is that they enable disparate courses of action 
to be followed. An organism that processes both positive and negative affects in parallel is 
capable of displaying a larger set of behaviours appropriate to the circumstances. At the 
simplest level, consider a springbok drinking at the shore of the river, while a crocodile 
watches nearby. This springbok is ready to flee and yet still willing to keep drinking. The 
DMA (Reich et al., 2003; Zautra, 2003) also asserts that individual differences in mixed 
emotions reflect differences in the capacity to respond to changes in the environment in a 
flexible way. Thus, mixed emotions facilitate the integration of complex information at a 
given moment, providing greater behavioural flexibility to respond to incompatible cues in 
the environment.  
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A common stance between the aforementioned understanding of the functionality of 
mixed emotions and other functional approaches to emotion is the view that affect (in the 
form of transient emotions or moods) directly or indirectly influences judgments and actions 
(e.g., Forgas, 1995; Frijda, 1988; Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, & Kassam, 2015; Loewenstein & 
Lerner, 2003; Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 2003; Zeelenberg, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Pieters, 
2008). Frijda (1988, 2004) asserted that emotions elicit changes in action readiness: they 
prepare individuals to take certain actions in the environment. Emotions motivate people to 
act, but only to the extent that (a) events affect one or more important goals, and (b) if a 
feasible repertoire of behaviours is available (Frijda, 2004). Similarly, Zeelenberg and 
colleagues (2008) asserted that emotions have the primary function to drive goal-directed 
behaviour. Different emotions serve different motivational functions that guide people’s 
behaviour when implementing decisions (Zeelenber et al., 2008). In this theory, as well as in 
Frijda’s approach, rather than dictating specific behaviours, emotions constrain the number of 
possible actions that could be performed in a situation.  
Emotions can also influence behaviour by shaping the contents of individuals’ 
judgments. Schwarz & Clore (1983, 2003) proposed the mood-as-information theory 
according to which mood conveys information which people use heuristically to make 
judgements about their current situation. For example, in one study Schwarz and Clore (1983, 
Study 2) interviewed a sample of participants either on a sunny day or a rainy day, expecting 
that people would be in a correspondingly good or a bad mood. Results showed that people in 
a good mood (i.e., those interviewed on a sunny day) were more satisfied with their lives 
compared to participants in a bad mood (i.e., those interviewed on a rainy day). These 
findings demonstrate that mood can have a misleading effect on judgments. However, current 
elaborations of the theory have considered that more transient forms of affect (i.e., emotions) 
also provide information, which is less likely to be misattributed, because emotions generally 
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inform individuals’ about the meaning of specific objects in the environment (Schwarz & 
Clore, 2003). 
Forgas (1995) further proposed the Affect Infusion Model (AIM) to explain the 
circumstances that promote or inhibit the influence of affect on judgment. This model states 
that affect influences cognitive processing only when active elaboration of the available 
stimuli is required. In contrast, the impact of affect on judgments is unlikely to occur when 
people are dealing with highly familiar information (i.e., direct access strategy) or intending 
to accomplish a specific, single goal (i.e., motivated processing strategy). Affect will impinge 
on cognitive processing when more elaborate processing is needed (i.e., substantive 
processing). Importantly, for the purpose of this chapter, Forgas (1995) argues that when 
there are multiple goals to achieve (and as a result, cognitive processing is demanding) affect 
will permeate cognition and decision-making. 
In summary, affect likely drives goal-directed behaviours by assisting the decision-
making process (Frijda, 1988; Zeelenber et al., 2008). Affect motivates individuals to follow 
courses of actions that will attain desired ends. One way in which affect impacts behaviour is 
through directly influencing people’s judgments (Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, & Kassam, 2015; 
Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). Moods and emotions provide relevant informational cues that 
guide people’s judgments and decision-making (Schwarz & Clore, 2003). People often 
consult their emotions when deciding about courses of action (Schwarz & Clore, 2003). 
Importantly, the impact of affective experiences on judgment seems to largely depend on the 
characteristics of the situation. People facing complex events, demanding high levels of 
cognitive processing, are more likely to be influenced by their affect when making a decision 
(Forgas, 1995). Thus, emotions and moods guide peoples’ thoughts and decisions as they 
navigate the ebb and flow of everyday life, especially when life turns more complicated. 
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Conflicting goals are clearly the kind of events which demand greater elaboration of multiple 
stimuli at once.  
The remainder of this section briefly outlines the two psychological processes 
intended to explain how mixed emotions impact eudaimonic well-being (i.e., the restorative 
mechanism and the balancing mechanism). Several elements of these mechanisms were 
explained in chapter 1, when justifying Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5. Therefore, the following two 
sub-sections are intended to refresh the main ideas behind these mechanisms. 
5.1.1. The restorative mechanism 
The idea that individual differences in emotional experiences influence well-being is 
not new. For example, previous research has shown that extraverts have a greater tendency to 
experience positive emotions, whereas neurotics have a greater tendency to experience 
negative emotions (Larsen & Ketelaar, 1989). This has been thought to reflect two orthogonal 
dimensions of personality (extraversion and neuroticism) which are closely related to positive 
and negative affect, respectively (Rusting & Larsen, 1997). Likewise, scholars have found 
that the personality traits of extraversion and neuroticism consistently predict better and 
worse subjective well-being, respectively (Costa & McCrae, 1980). 
Similar to previous accounts, the restorative mechanism anticipates that individual 
differences in mixed emotions may also play a role in determining psychological well-being. 
Rafaeli et al. (2007) found that a significant portion of the variance in individuals’ reports of 
mixed emotions were explained by individual differences. Some people consistently reported 
more positive and negative emotions concurrently, in a manner that was stable over time 
(Rafaeli et al., 2007). Further research has shown that individuals that more commonly 
experience concurrent opposite emotions, are better able to perceive the rewarding aspects of 
negative situations (Wilt et al., 2011). These findings have been interpreted as suggesting that 
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mixed emotions provide a buffer against the negative consequences of difficult situations 
(Wilt et al., 2011). Thus, individuals that experience more mixed emotions will be better able 
to perceive the benefits of experiencing goal conflict, which may help them to maintain 
positive levels of eudaimonic well-being. 
This approach can be defined as a situated account, in which the context in which 
individual differences are displayed is essential to determining the effects on well-being. 
Zautra and colleagues (Reich et al., 2003; Zautra, 2003) emphasised that experiencing 
positive and negative emotions concurrently is beneficial for individuals’ well-being in the 
context of stressful events. The restorative mechanism is consistent with theories suggesting 
that adverse events, such as the presence of goal conflict, impair well-being (Headey & 
Wearing, 1989). However, the restorative mechanism suggests that those individuals who 
tend to experience greater levels of mixed emotions will restore the negative impact of 
conflicting goals on eudaimonic well-being. 
5.1.2. The balancing mechanism  
The balancing mechanism postulates that the presence of immediate desires, in 
conjunction with the pursuit of relevant goals, makes people aware of the presence of goal 
conflict, which in turn, helps individuals to deploy regulatory resources to resist temptations. 
The balancing mechanism further postulates that it is the experience of mixed emotions that 
ultimately mobilises efforts to resist temptations. In other words, the presence of a conflict 
between an immediate desire and a relevant goal signals the presence of a temptation, but it is 
the elicitation of mixed emotions that helps people to deploy regulatory resources, facilitating 
intentions to resist temptations. As previously reviewed, emotions influence further courses 
of action when complex information processing is required (Forgas 1995). Furthermore, 
taking inspiration from Parkinson’s ideas (2009), it is proposed that mixed emotions allow 
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the integration of complex information at a given moment. This enhances the meaning 
making process that permits people to engage in relevant, meaningful, goal pursuit and 
maintain a balance between multiple courses of action at any given moment. This means that 
the balancing mechanism is related to eudaimonic well-being in terms of assisting the pursuit 
of meaningful goals in spite of immediate desires. As indicated in chapter 4, meaning-based 
theories of eudaimonic well-being emphasise the relevance of pursuing, and making efforts to 
achieve meaningful goals as an indicator of eudaimonic well-being (e.g., Ryan et al., 2008). 
This mechanism may help to resolve conflicting evidence concerning the influence of 
emotions on self-control. Some findings have shown that positive affect undermines self-
control (e.g., Wegener & Petty, 1994, 2001), whereas others studies have demonstrated that 
positive affect improves self-control (e.g., Aspinwall, 1998; Raghunathan & Trope, 2002), 
and previous theories, including PCT, have suggested that negative affect is a critical 
affective cue that facilitates self-control (Inzlicht & Legault, 2014; Powers, 1973, 2014). 
Based on the balancing mechanism hypothesis, I suggest that the previous disparate findings 
are a result of not considering mixed emotions as the more parsimonious explanation for the 
relationship between emotional experiences and self-control. Mixed emotions simultaneously 
signal the rewarding features of a desire, the negative consequences of yielding to 
temptations, and the long-term benefits of persistence. It is presumed that all of these features 
are accessible and integrated at a given moment when feeling mixed emotions, offering 
substantial benefits compared to feeling only positive or negative emotions. The relationship 
between emotion and self-control may be obscured when only single affects are considered, 
which may explain previous inconsistencies. 
One final aspect derived from the functionality of mixed emotions is that mixed 
emotions in the face of a self-control dilemma will help people to replenish vitality after 
making an effort to resist temptations. Vitality is defined as the feeling of possessing energy 
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available to the self, and includes both subjective feelings of being alive and physical energy 
(Ryan & Frederick, 1999). Vitality is considered a component of eudaimonic well-being that 
promotes engagement with current activities (i.e., personal expressiveness; Waterman, 1990, 
1993). The strength model of self-control (Baumeister et al., 2007; Muraven & Baumeister, 
2000) predicts that people will be less likely to exert self-control after previous regulatory 
efforts. Although this theory has been recently questioned (e.g., Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 
2012), an interesting derivate of the strength model is that efforts to resist temptations reduce 
people’s mental vitality (Muraven, Gagné, & Rosman, 2008). Vitality presumably enhances 
the perception of regulatory resources leading to better subsequent self-control performance 
(Muraven et al., 2008). The current chapter hypothesised that efforts to resist temptations 
have a negative impact on vitality, but that the interaction between efforts to resist 
temptations and the experience of mixed emotions replenishes vitality.  
5.2. Overview of Study 5 
The aim of Study 5 is to examine the two psychological processes that might explaini 
how mixed emotions positively impact eudaimonic well-being in the context of experiencing 
conflicting goals. These two mechanisms are assessed in the Study 5 using an intensive 
longitudinal methodology, in which people report on relevant variables (e.g., desires, conflict, 
mixed emotions) several times every day for 10 consecutive days (i.e., an experience 
sampling method).  
It is hypothesised that conflicting goals will negatively predict psychological well-
being (hypothesis 3.1). Secondly, it is hypothesised that individual differences in mixed 
emotions will moderate the association between conflicting goals and eudaimonic well-being 
(hypothesis 3.2). Thirdly, it is anticipated that the presence of conflicting goals involving 
immediate desires and relevant goals will positively predict efforts to resist temptations 
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(hypothesis 4.1), although this effect will be mediated by the elicitation of mixed emotions 
(hypothesis 4.2), which in turn will positively predict efforts to resist temptations (hypothesis 
4.3). Finally, it is anticipated that efforts to resist temptations will negatively predict the 
experience of vitality (hypothesis 5.1), but that this effect will be compensated for 
(moderated by) the experience of mixed emotions (hypothesis 5.2).  
5.3. Study 5 
5.3.1. Method 
Participants. Seventy three undergraduate and postgraduate students (58 female, 
Mage = 20.5 years; SD = 3.6 years), participated in the study in exchange for course credits or 
£10 in cash. For reasons related to the accessibility of the sample, participants were recruited 
from a list of student volunteers and an online research participation system facilitated by the 
Department of Psychology. Participants completed the experiencing sampling protocol using 
a web-link sent to their mobiles phones. Participants were informed that the study aimed to 
understand how people manage their desires and personal goals, and how these influence 
their emotions and daily activities. No participants dropped out of the study before 
completing the experiencing sampling. The study received ethical approval from the DESC, 
prior to beginning the data collection process. 
Measures. Participants completed a set of questionnaires during an orientation 
meeting. These questionnaires were aimed to provide a baseline level for some relevant 
variables for the present study. In particular, participants completed the following validated 
scales, as baseline measures: 
The psychological well-being scale (PWB; Ryff, 1989). This scale measures the 
extent to which individuals perceive their lives to be meaningful, worthwhile, in balance with 
their needs, and as having positive relations with other people. The PWB operationalizes 
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psychological well-being along six dimensions: autonomy (e.g., “Being happy with myself is 
more important to me than having others approve of me”), environmental mastery (e.g., “In 
general, I feel I am in charge of the situation in which I live”), personal growth (e.g., “In my 
view, people of every age are able to continue growing and developing”), positive relations 
with others (e.g., “I feel like I get a lot out of my friendships”), purpose in life (e.g., “I have a 
sense of direction and purpose in life”), and self-acceptance (e.g., “In general, I feel 
confident and positive about myself”). Each dimension was assessed using 9-items. All of the 
items were measured on a 6-point Likert-format scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to 
strongly agree (6). Overall, the subscales had good internal reliability indices (autonomy: M 
= 3.92 ; SD = 0.70; α = 0.77; environmental mastery: M = 4.20; SD = 0.75; α = 0.83; personal 
growth: M = 4.89; SD = 0.58; α = 0.77; positive relations: M = 4.56; SD = 0.79; α = 0.82; 
purpose in life: M = 4.59; SD = 0.73; α = 0.79; self-acceptance: M = 4.19; SD = 0.90; α = 
0.86), as did the psychological well-being construct including all of the items (M = 4.39; SD 
= 0.55; α = 0.93). 
The brief self-control scale (SC; Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). This scale 
measures individuals’ tendency to exert control over their own behaviour when facing a 
broad range of self-control dilemmas (e.g., impulse control, control over thoughts). 
Participants evaluated the extent to which each of the 13-items reflected how they typically 
are (e.g., “I wish I had more self-discipline”; M = 3.12; SD = 0.53; α = 0.82). All of the items 
were measured on a 5-point Likert-format scale ranging from not at all (1) to very much (5). 
During the experiencing sampling period, participants completed a number of scales 
on each occasion: 
The conflicting goals scale. This scale was similar to the one used in Study 3, which 
was based on Emmons and King (1988). The scale comprised three items which evaluated 
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the extent to which recent activity/activities (or desire/s) over the last 30-minutes had been in 
conflict with an important goal (e.g., “[this/these desire/s (activity/ies)] had harmful effects 
over a goal you've been trying to achieve”; M = 2.22; SD = 1.08). The longitudinal reliability 
of this scale (using the coefficient omega; Shrout & Lane, 2012) was very good (ω = 0.83). 
All of the items were measured on a 5-point Likert-format scale ranging from not at all (1) to 
very much (5). 
The subjective measure of mixed emotions2. On each occasion they were signalled, 
participants completed the same version of the subjective measure of mixed emotions used in 
Study 2. This measure included four items designed to measure the extent to which 
participants experienced mixed emotions over the last 30-minutes (e.g., “…contrasting 
emotions (positive and negative emotions)”; M = 2.59; SD = 0.98). The longitudinal 
reliability was very good (ω = 0.81). All of the items were measured on a 5-point Likert-
format scale ranging from not at all (1) to very much (5). 
Additionally, participants completed 4 items from the psychological well-being scale 
(Ryff, 1989) corresponding to the dimension of life-purpose (e.g., “active in carrying out the 
plans I set for myself”). This scale was included to evaluate the extent to which participants 
experienced life-purpose on each particular occasion (M = 3.99; SD = 1.02). The longitudinal 
reliability of this dimension was good (ω = 0.71). All of the items were measured on a 6-
point Likert-format scale ranging from not at all (1) to extremely (6). 
Participants also completed two items from the Maslach Burnout Inventory (Maslach 
& Jackson, 1981) measuring emotional exhaustion (e.g., “I’m feeling emotionally drained”), 
                                                     
2 See Appendix-1 for a detailed explanation of the advantages of using the subjective measure of mixed 
emotions compared to using within-person correlations (the most common measure of mixed emotions in 
intensive longitudinal methods). 
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plus two items from the vitality scale (e.g., “I’m feeling alive and vital”; Ryan & Frederick, 
1997). The items measuring emotional exhaustion were reversed to create a single dimension 
of vitality. This scale measures the degree to which the participants felt each of the items at 
the moment that they were completing each questionnaire (M = 3.54; SD = 0.91) using a 
Likert-format scale ranging from not at all (1) to extremely (6). The longitudinal reliability of 
this dimension was good (ω = 0.75). 
Finally, participants completed a short measure of state positive and negative affect 
(Larsen & Diener, 1985). Participants were requested to report the extent to which they were 
experiencing four positive affect adjectives (PA; i.e., happy, joyful, pleased, enjoyment; M = 
2.76; SD = 1.15) and five negative affect adjectives (NA; i.e., depressed, unhappy, frustrated, 
angry, and worried; M = 1.77; SD = .89) at the very moment that they were completing the 
scale. Each dimension showed good longitudinal reliability (PA: ω = 0.87; NA: ω = 0.79). 
All of the items were measured on a 6-point Likert-format scale ranging from not at all (1) to 
extremely (6). 
Procedure.  Participants attended an orientation meeting where they were informed 
about the aims of the study. At the beginning of the meeting participants firstly read and 
signed the informed consent form. The informed consent specified the general purpose of the 
study, the procedures that participants would follow during the study, and the need for their 
mobile numbers. It was explained that all personal information (including their mobile 
number) would be saved in a separate file to their data. All participants agreed to participate 
in the study and completed the set of baseline questionnaires previously described. 
Participants also received oral and written instructions about the specific details of the 
study in the orientation meeting, including the procedures that they would need to follow 
during the study, and what to do in case of problems or queries. Importantly, participants 
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received a unique identification number, which they were asked to memorise or keep in a safe 
place because they would need to provide it every time they completed a questionnaire. 
Furthermore, the meaning of desires and goals was explained (see Appendix-2) to prevent 
potential misunderstandings derived from idiosyncratic interpretations of these concepts for 
each participant. These explanations were accompanied by some examples to ensure 
understanding of the concepts. Participants were asked to start the experience sampling 
period on the first Monday following the day that the meeting took place. 
Experience sampling protocol. Participants used their own mobile phones during the 
experience sampling period of ten consecutive days. Every day, they received four text 
messages during a time interval of ten waking hours. This is consistent with recent 
experience sampling studies investigating goal conflict in the context of self-control 
(Hofmann et al., 2012) and provided enough data to prevent type-II error. Following the 
recommendations of Hektner et al. (2007), this time interval was divided into four blocks. 
Thus, using an online application, messages were set to be delivered at a random time 
between 10:00 and 12:29, another text at a random time between 12:30 and 14:59, another 
text at a random time between 15:00 and 17:29, and finally a text at a random time between 
17:30 and 20:00, with the added criterion that there had to be at least one-hour in-between 
texts. Each text message contained a web-link which took participants to an online 
questionnaire.  
When participants accessed the online questionnaire, they were asked to enter their 
unique identification number. Participants were then asked to indicate whether they had 
experienced a desire over the last 30 minutes. A desire was defined as an immediate need or 
impulse that emerges suddenly in the mind and is not related to current activities. If 
participants indicated having experienced a desire they next defined the content and strength 
of this desire. They were provided with a list including 10 desire domains, following the 
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recommendations of Hofmann et al. (2012): eating, taking substances – such as coffee, sexual 
desire, use of media – such as Facebook, spending, social contact, leisure, 
hygiene/maintenance – such as sports, study/work, and sleep. Participants could choose up to 
three desires on every occasion (using a Yes/No format) and then had to rate the strength of 
the chosen desires on a scale ranging from not at all (1) to irresistible (5). If they indicated 
that they had experienced no desires over the last 30-minutes, they evaluated the degree of 
importance of the activities that they had performed over the last 30-minutes using three 
items (e.g., “…something that benefits you or others in the long run”), in a scale ranging 
from not at all (1) to very much (6). This was done to equate the length of the questionnaire 
regardless participants reported or not a desire. 
Participants then completed the conflicting goals scale. If they had reported a desire, 
the scale was phrased to ask about conflict between their immediate desires and a relevant 
goal; whereas if they did not report a desire the scale was phrased to ask about conflict 
between their current activities. Next, participants completed the subjective measure of mixed 
emotions. At this point, those participants who had reported experiencing a desire over the 
last 30 minutes indicated the extent to which they tried to resist this/these desire/s, using a 
single item (“How much have you tried to resist this/these desire/s?”) on a scale ranging 
from not at all (1) to very much (6).  
If participants reported a degree of goal conflict greater than 1 in the goal conflict 
scale, they indicated the type of goal or goals (if more than one) that were in conflict with the 
desire/s (or activity/activities, if no desire was reported). They chose up to three goals (in a 
Yes/No format) from a list of goal categories, following the recommendations of Hofmann et 
al. (2012): health – such as healthy eating, abstinence/restraint – such as not drinking, 
achievement – such as academic achievements, social – such as moral integrity, time use – 
such as reducing procrastination, relaxation – such as reducing stress, and energizing – such 
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as trying to wake yourself up. After they chose the relevant goal/s from the list, participants 
rated the importance of the chosen goal/s using a scale ranging from not at all important (1) 
to very important (5). Finally, participants completed the vitality scale, the items extracted 
from the psychological well-being scale, and the state affect measure. On average, 
participants took 7 minutes to complete each experience sampling questionnaire. 
Response details. If a participant left a questionnaire unanswered until the next text 
was sent, the response was marked as missing. Similarly, if the participant started the 
questionnaire (entered his/her unique number) but did not complete any question until the 
next text was sent, the response was marked as missing, too. Responses were coded as valid 
if the participant completed the majority of the questionnaire within the corresponding time 
block and when the next questionnaire was separated from the current one by at least one 
hour. However, to ensure that a sufficient number of questionnaires were completed per 
participant, the participant was invited to extend his/her participation for up to one day if s/he 
completed less than 30% of the questionnaires throughout the study. In order to obtain a 
satisfactory response rate throughout the study, the participants received text messages every 
day after the last block ended (between 20:00 and 21:00 hours) to remind them to keep 
completing the questionnaires.  
On average, participants completed 90% of the questionnaires embedded in the text 
messages sent every day. The remaining 10% of the questionnaires were either not responded 
to at all or remained uncompleted. Response rates for individual participants varied between 
60% and 100% of the total number of questionnaires expected for each day. Overall, 
participants provided a total of 2,619 observations. 
When participants finished their final experience sampling day, they were thanked for 
participating in the study and a personalised report was sent a few days later in appreciation 
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for their collaboration in the study. The personalised report included statistics and charts 
about their responses throughout the study, as well as some general advice on implementation 
intentions (i.e., a self-regulatory strategy in the form of an if-then plans; Gollwitzer & 
Sheeran, 2006). 
5.3.2. Data analysis  
As in the previous chapter, the data analysis segment is presented in a separate sub-
section to aid comprehension of the results. This sub-section briefly outlines the principles of 
multilevel modelling and then explains the stages conducted to analyse the data from Study 5. 
It is important to consider in evaluating the hypotheses of the present chapter that 
most of the predictors included in the analyses are time-varying, that is, the variables 
included in the respective models were measured on the same occasions as the outcome(s) 
variables, and repeatedly so over time. As such, the correct interpretation of the predictions 
from the aforementioned hypotheses is that the dependent variable is predicted to be higher 
(or lower) than usual when people report more (or less) on a given independent variable. An 
exception to this reading is hypothesis 3.2 in which experiencing more mixed emotions in 
general (not on a specific occasion, but at mean level of the person) is proposed to interact 
with occasions when people experience conflicting goals to predict greater psychological 
well-being. Evidence for this effect would be shown by a cross-level interaction in which a 
between-person effect (individual differences in mixed emotions) interacts with a time-
varying independent variable (conflicting goals) to predict a time-varying outcome 
(psychological well-being).  
Longitudinal designs are characterised by two or more hierarchical levels of analysis. 
When data are organized in one or more hierarchical levels it is said that the lower level is 
nested within the higher level. For example, employees nested within organizations or 
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citizens nested within countries. In particular, experience sampling methods are described by 
repeated measures nested within individuals. Each individual provides multiple responses 
over time, and as such, the individual represents the higher level in the data structure (level-2) 
whereas time is the lower level in the data structure (level-1). 
Multilevel modelling (MLM) techniques provide a useful tool to explore hypotheses 
concerning fluctuations of responses from individuals over time. Thus, MLM was preferred 
over alternative techniques (e.g., repeated measures ANOVA) for two reasons. Firstly, 
alternative techniques assume that the total variance and covariances are constant across 
occasions. This implies that a variable will fluctuate at the same rate for all of the individuals 
in the sample, which is highly unlikely in a repeated measures design (Hox, 2010). Secondly, 
ANOVA techniques estimate the results based on least square estimation, which needs 
complete data; therefore, participants who miss a signal would be entirely dropped from the 
analysis because this estimation uses listwise deletion (Hox, 2010).  
Multilevel modelling addresses these limitations. Firstly, MLM distinguishes between 
variations in a dependent variable that is between-person (BP) from variation that is within-
person (WP) over time (Hox, 2010). Consider the linear model shown in equation 5.1. In this 
equation the outcome y for person i at time j is estimated based on the average intercept plus 
the predictor x for the same person and occasion, adding two residuals. Thus, the variance is 
partitioned by adding one residual term to account for the differences between the conditional 
mean of the predictor(s) and the individual’s mean across time; this is normally called a 
random intercept (Hox, 2010). Partitioning the variance of a dependent variable results in 
standard errors for the fixed effects that are less biased, and as a consequence, type-I error is 
reduced. The second residual shown in equation 5.1 shows that the slope of the corresponding 
fixed effect can be also treated as random (      ). Incorporating random intercepts and 
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slopes distinguishes between variances at Level-2 (between-person variance) and at Level-1 
(within-person variance) reducing conflation of fixed effects estimated at each level. 
   	 	   	 	      	 	   	 	      	 	    (5.1) 
 In the present chapter, MLM was used to conduct the analyses across three different 
stages. In the first stage, MLM was used to estimate the impact of the type of goals and 
desires on the experience of conflicting goals. These models incorporate an autoregressive 
covariance structure with a lag-1. This is simply a statistical computation that estimates a 
constant variance across occasions, and predicts that the correlation of residuals over time is 
determined by the distance from the immediate following occasion. This is called an 
autocorrelation and is normally estimated using one time point of distance (i.e., lag-1). 
 The second stage corresponds with the testing of a cross-level interaction for 
Hypothesis 3. This required some variable transformations. Following Curran and Bauer’ 
recommendations (2011), a set of between-person centred variables were created by 
averaging the raw scores of each individual for each relevant variable. This created variables 
that had the same score across occasions but a different value across individuals. Then, a set 
of within-person variables were created by subtracting the individual’s average score for each 
variable from the raw scores. This created variables that had a unique value for each time 
point which was orthogonal to the corresponding between-person centred variable. Thus, to 
test the influence of individual differences in mixed emotions on the association between goal 
conflict and life-purpose, the between-person variable of mixed emotions was used to predict 
variations in the slope of the effect of the within-person variable of goal conflict on life-
purpose. This interaction was also tested by plotting the corresponding cross-level interaction 
following the guidelines of Bauer and Curran (2005), and Preacher, Curran, and Bauer (2006) 
for probing multi-level interaction.   
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Finally, Hypotheses 4 and 5 were tested using Multilevel Structural Equation 
Modelling (MSEM; Preacher, Zhang, & Zyphur, 2011; Preacher, Zyphur & Zhang, 2010). 
MSEM was preferred because it allows unbiased estimation of indirect effects, preventing 
conflation resulting from using hierarchical data where both level-1 and level-2 effects are 
present. In this model, separate level-2 and level-1 models of the hypothesised model were 
estimated as latent variables to account for measurement errors, preventing conflation 
between level-2 and level-1 components of the main effects. Separating and estimating direct 
and indirect effects for each level, reduces biases that result when alternative approaches are 
used (i.e., MLM using raw data or centred versions of the variables). This decreases the 
probability of committing type-II errors and provides more accurate confidence intervals. 
These analyses were conducted using Mplus 7.3 (Muthén & Muthén, 2012). Further details 
are provided in the corresponding results sub-section. 
5.3.3. Results 
The results are separated into five sub-sections. The first sub-section provides general 
descriptive statistics concerning the frequency and strength of desires and goals across 
individuals and across time. Additionally, the first sub-section of results estimates the main 
effect of the presence of each type of desire on goal conflict, as well as the effect of each type 
of goal, partitioned by presence and absence of desires, on goal conflict. Finally, this section 
estimates the conditional effect of goals and desires on goal conflict. The second sub-section 
examines the set of hypotheses derived from the main Hypothesis 3. In particular, it 
evaluates whether conflicting goals negatively predict life purpose (hypothesis 3.1), and 
whether this association is moderated by individual differences in mixed emotions 
(hypothesis 3.2). This sub-section incorporates several control variables (PA, NA, and PWB) 
to determine the strength of hypothesis 3.2 when other predictors are included in the model. 
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The third sub-section is dedicated to evaluating Hypothesis 4. This sub-section firstly 
assesses the effects of goal conflict on efforts to resist temptations (hypothesis 4.1), and then 
assesses the mediating effect of mixed emotions in the association between goal conflict and 
efforts to resist temptations (hypothesis 4.2). This sub-section also assesses the impact of 
mixed emotions on efforts to resist temptations (hypothesis 4.3). General levels of self-
control (SC scale), and PA and NA were used as control variables in the mediational model. 
The fourth sub-section examined Hypothesis 5. In detail, this sub-section firstly tests the 
effects of efforts to resist temptations on vitality (hypothesis 5.1) and then whether mixed 
emotions moderate this association (hypothesis 5.2). 
Finally, the last sub-section provides some ancillary analyses that parallel the analyses 
conducted in Study 4 concerning the curvilinear effect of mixed emotions on eudaimonic 
well-being at the between-person level of analysis. 
The nature of goal conflict. Participants reported experiencing a desire on 65% of 
the occasions (N = 1698). As shown in Figure 11, the most common desires were “eating” 
and “leisure”, whereas in term of the strength to the desires, the desires of “media (e.g., 
facebook)”, “study or work”, “social contact”, “sleep”, “leisure” and “eating” were usually 
experienced at a moderate to high intensity (on a scale from 1 to 5), whereas “sexual desire”, 
“spending”, “substances”, and “hygiene or maintenance (e.g., sports)” were experienced at 
low to moderate intensity (in a scale from 1 to 5). Also interesting was the number of 
mentions received for each type of desire, represented by the size of each bubble. Bigger 
bubbles indicate that more people mentioned the corresponding desire on more than one 
occasion. Thus, the most widespread desires across participants were the desire of “eating”, 
followed by the desire of “leisure” and “media”, whereas “sexual desire” and “substances” 









Figure 11. Frequency of mentions of desires and their strength across participants and occasions. 
 
Another aspect examined across individuals and occasions was the type of goals 
activated during the presence or absence of desires. Figure 12 shows that when desires were 
not present, people mentioned a large variety of goals, as deduced from the absolute number 
of mentions of each goal. In contrast, the presence of desires was clearly most common when 
achievement-related goals and time use-related goals were active. Goal importance was 








Figure 12. Types of goals, their frequency of mentions and goal importance across participants and 
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One conclusion that can be drawn from the descriptive plots is that the strength of 
desires and the importance of goals are similar across types of desires and types of goals, 
respectively. In order to statistically evaluate the effect of the importance of the goals and the 
strength of the desires on goal conflict, goal conflict was regressed on the strength of each 
desire and the importance of each type of goal; these independent variables were non-centred. 
The model also incorporated the variable of time (centred) to control for potential linear 
effects of time on goal conflict. The model specified random intercepts and fixed slopes for 
each individual, the first-order autoregressive covariance structure was included, and 
maximum likelihood was the estimator. 
Results did not reveal an effect of the importance of goals on the intensity of goal 
conflict (p > 0.10). However, on occasions where the strength of certain desires was higher, 
people tended to experience more intense goal conflict. In particular, the strength of desire to 
use media, β = 0.08, t(2,550)  = 4.97, p < 0.01 [95%CI: 0.05 / 0.11]; spend, β = 0.05, t(2,527)  
= 2.66, p < 0.01 [95%CI: 0.01 / 0.09]; engage in leisure activities, β = 0.09, t(2,442)  = 7.56, 
p < 0.01 [95%CI: 0.06 / 0.11]; and sleep, β = 0.10, t(2,459)  = 7.92, p < 0.01 [95%CI: 0.07 / 
0.12], were significantly associated with higher levels of goal conflict on a given occasion. 
The previous multilevel model was repeated but this time including the presence of 
each type of desire and type of goals (categorical variables as predictors) when desires were 
present or absent, resulting in 3-new multilevel models. Table 12 (column A) shows that 
conflicting goals were more intense on occasions where the desire to use media,  β = 0.25, 
t(2,540)  = 4.79, p < 0.01 [95%CI: 0.15 / 0.35]; spend, β = 0.20, t(2,499)  = 2.67, p < 0.01 
[95%CI: 0.05 / 0.34]; engage in leisure activities, β = 0.34, t(2,451)  = 7.91, p < 0.01 [95%CI: 
0.25 / 0.42]; and sleep, β = 0.37, t(2,481)  = 7.70, p < 0.01 [95%CI: 0.27 / 0.46], were active. 
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Table 12. The effect of type of desires and type of goals (including when desires were active and not) 
on goal conflict. 
      
Model Parameters 
Column A  Column B (present)  Column C (absent) 
Estimate SE p <  Estimate SE p <  Estimate SE p < 
            
Fixed effects            
Intercept 2.02 0.07 0.01  1.95 0.05 0.01  2.13 0.07 0.01 
            
Time effect -0.01 0.02 0.59  0.01 0.02 0.72  -0.03 0.02 0.10 
            
Desire of eating 0.03 0.04 0.46         
            
Substances desire -0.11 0.07 0.11         
            
Sexual desire 0.12 0.09 0.21         
            
Desire of media 0.25 0.05 0.01         
            
Desire of spending 0.20 0.07 0.01         
            
Desire of social contact 0.08 0.05 0.12         
            
Desire of leisure 0.34 0.04 0.01         
            
Desire of hygiene 0.04 0.07 0.56         
            
Desire of study or work 0.03 0.05 0.54         
            
Desire of sleep 0.37 0.05 0.01         
            
Health goals     0.31 0.07 0.01  -0.48 0.20 0.05 
            
Abstinence goals     0.56 0.09 0.01  -0.37 0.20 0.06 
            
Achievement goals     0.92 0.05 0.01  0.27 0.15 0.07 
            
Social goals     0.18 0.08 0.05  -0.17 0.17 0.33 
            
Time use goals     0.50 0.05 0.01  -0.02 0.16 0.92 
            
Relaxation goals     0.33 0.07 0.01  -0.15 0.16 0.39 
            
Energizing goals     0.22 0.08 0.01  0.17 0.17 0.33 
            
Percent of desires     -0.52 0.16 0.01     
            
Percent of goals         2.68 0.86 0.01 
            
ICC 0.30    0.23    0.32   
            
Deviance -2∆LL(∆df) 171.2 (11)  0.01  883.3 (9)  0.01  199.4 (8)  0.01 
            
R2 0.06    0.29    0.09   
 





In relation to the effect of type of goals on goal conflict when desires were mentioned 
(Table 12, column B), results shows that conflicting goals were more intense on occasions 
where a desire was present and people were pursuing any goal. This indicates that the 
confluence of a desire and a goal produced conditions in which people were likely to 
experience greater levels of goal conflict. The corresponding estimates for each effect (Table 
12, column B) indicate that strongest effects were observed on occasions where one or more 
desires were present and abstinence-related goals, β = 0.56, t(2,526)  = 6.22, p < 0.01 
[95%CI: 0.38 / 0.73], achievement-related goals, β = 0.92, t(2,569)  = 19.01, p < 0.01 
[95%CI: 0.83 / 1.01], and time use-related goals, β = 0.50, t(2,556)  = 9.66, p < 0.01 [95%CI: 
0.40/ 0.60], were mentioned. 
Planned comparisons (not shown in Table 12) including conditional terms between 
type of desires and type of goals found that goal conflict was higher on occasions where 
individuals had the desire to spend money and the goal of abstinence was active, β = 0.48, 
t(2,483)  = 2.44, p < 0.05 [95%CI: 0.09 / 0.84]. Similarly, goal conflict was higher on 
occasions where individual had the desire to engage in leisure activities and achievement-
related goals were active, β = 0.31, t(2,495)  = 3.29, p < 0.01 [95%CI: 0.13 / 0.50].  
The last model estimated the impact of the number of desires present on a given 
occasion on the intensity of goal conflict. To do this a new variable was created based on the 
average score across all types of desires. As the presence and absence of desires was coded 
using 1 and 0, respectively, this variable reflected the percentage of active desires on each 
occasion. Results showed that the activation of more desires on a given occasion predicted 
less goal conflict, β = -0.52, t(2,545)  = -3.34, p < 0.01 [95%CI: -0.83 / -0.21]. Therefore, the 
more desires that people experienced at a given moment, the less conflict they reported.   
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A similar variable was created to estimate the impact of the amount of goals present 
on a given occasion on goal conflict when desires were absent. In contrast to the previous 
finding, the percentage of active goals significantly predicted greater goal conflict, β = 2.68, 
t(2,429)  = 3.12, p < 0.01 [95%CI: 0.99/ 4.36]. This finding provided evidence that the 
simultaneous pursuit of multiple goals led people to experience greater goal conflict. 
However, when examining the effect of single goals on goal conflict on occasions 
where desires were not present, the results were markedly different (Table 12, column C). 
The pursuit of health-related goals predicted significantly less goal conflict, β = -0.48, 
t(2,454)  = -2.44, p < 0.05 [95%CI: -0.86 / -0.09], while the pursuit of the most other goals 
resulted in a negative trend, indicating that goal conflict was not produced by pursuing single 
goals. To sum up, goal conflict was most likely to be experienced when one or more desires 
were activated in conjunction with relevant goals or multiple goals were activated on a given 
occasion. 
The moderating role of individual differences in mixed emotions. In order to 
determine whether individual differences in mixed emotions moderate the relationship 
between goal conflict and eudaimonic well-being, it was first necessary to evaluate whether 
goal conflict predicted eudaimonic well-being. Figure 13 shows the regression fitted lines for 
each participant for the association between goal conflict and the life-purpose dimension of 
psychological well-being. Visual inspection suggests a negative trend, such that greater levels 
of goal conflict were associated with lower levels of life-purpose. 
In order to statistically determine whether individual differences in mixed emotions 
moderated the association between goal conflict and life-purpose, a multilevel model was 
firstly specified incorporating the raw data on goal conflict as a predictor of life-purpose 
(Model-1). The model also incorporated time to control for potential linear effects of time on 
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life-purpose. Random intercepts and random slopes were specified for each individual. Serial 
autocorrelations between residuals were accounted for using the first-order autoregressive 









Figure 13. Life-purpose as a function of goal conflict. Raw data and fitted regression lines for each 
participant over time.  The number above each square represents the actual ID number given to each 
participant at the beginning of the study. 
 
As shown in Table 13, goal conflict negatively predicted life-purpose across 
occasions, β2 = -0.27, t(67)  = -8.80, p < 0.01 [95%CI: -0.33 / -0.21]. This provides support 
for hypothesis 3.1 which stated that conflicting goals will negatively predict life-purpose, and 
confirmed the interpretation of Figure 13. Importantly, there was significant variance in the 
slopes of goal conflict, σ2 = 0.04, Wald-z = 3.79, p < 0.01, which suggest that variables at the 
between-level may account for this variation. The proportion of variance was small, R2 = 
0.08, although the deviance showed that Model-1 fitted the data significantly better than the 
model without predictors. The inclusion of gender and age did not modify the main effect of 
goal conflict on life-purpose. 
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Prior to estimating a new model, an empty model including raw scores of mixed 
emotions as a dependent variable was analysed to determine the amount of between-subject 
variance in the sample, as a proxy of the presence of significant individual differences in 
mixed emotions. The results from this model revealed that a significant amount of variance 
was due to individual differences in mixed emotions, σ2 = 0.26, Wald-z = 5.46, p < 0.01 
[95%CI: 0.18 / 0.37]. Thus, it is possible that some amount of the variability in mixed 
emotions was explained by significant differences across individuals. With the confidence of 
these results, in a second step, a new model was estimated adding a between-person centred 
version of mixed emotions and an interaction term combining goal conflict and the between-
person centred mixed emotions variable (Model-2). The estimator was again maximum 
likelihood. 
The additional interactive term incorporates a new parameter at level-2, which 
estimates the slope of goal conflict on life-purpose from variations in between-subject scores 
of mixed emotions. As shown in Table 13, individual differences in mixed emotions did not 
predict fluctuations in life-purpose. However, a significant cross-level interaction was found 
between goal conflict (level-1) and between-person mixed emotion scores (level-2). The 
effect of fluctuations in the levels of goal conflict on life-purpose depended on individual 
differences in mixed emotions, β2* β3 = 0.11, t(2,239)  = 3.23, p < 0.01 [95%CI: 0.04 / 0.18]. 
Thus, in accordance with hypothesis 3.2, the negative effect of experiencing goal conflict on 
life-purpose was attenuated by between-subject variations in mixed emotions. Although the 
increase in the proportion of variance explained was marginal, ∆R2 = 0.01, the model fitted 
the data well. The inclusion of gender and age did not modify the conditional effect of goal 




Table 13. The effect of conflicting goals on life-purpose moderated by individual differences in mixed 
emotions. 
      
Model Parameters 
Model-1  Model-2  Model-3 
Estimate SE p <  Estimate SE p <  Estimate SE p < 
            
Fixed effects            
Intercept (β0) 4.59 0.08 0.01  4.56 0.07 0.01  2.75 0.55 0.01 
            
Time effect (β1) -0.01 0.01 0.52  -0.01 0.02 0.66  0.01 0.01 0.40 
            
Goal conflict (β2) -0.27 0.03 0.01  -0.26 0.02 0.01  -0.46 0.13 0.01 
            
Mixed emotions-between 
(β3)  
   
 
-0.27 0.20 0.10 
 
-0.18 0.13 0.17 
            
Goal conflict*Mixed 
emotions-PMC (β2* β3) 
   
 
0.11 0.03 0.01 
 
0.09 0.03 0.01 
            
PA-within (β4)         0.29 0.04 0.01 
            
NA-within (β5)         -0.15 0.07 0.05 
            
PWB (β6)         0.42 0.12 0.01 
            
Goal conflict*PA-within 
(β2*β4) 
   
 
   
 
-0.01 0.02 0.50 
            
Goal conflict*NA-within 
(β2*β5) 
   
 
   
 
0.02 0.02 0.36 
            
Goal conflict*PWB 
(β2*β6) 
   
 
   
 
0.06 0.03 0.04 
            
Variances            
Residual variance 0.61 0.02 0.01  0.60 0.02 0.01  0.55 0.02 0.01 
            
Random intercept 
variance 
0.29 0.05 0.01 
 
0.26 0.05 0.01 
 
0.18 0.03 0.01 
            
ICC 0.32    0.30    0.25   
            
Deviance -2∆LL(∆df) 200.4 (2)  0.01  202.2 (4)  0.01  466.6 (10)  0.01 
            
R2 0.08    0.09    0.17   
 
Note: N = 73, 10 days, 4 observations per day, 2,619 observations. SE: standard error; between: between-person 




A graphical representation of this moderation is shown in Figure 14 which depicts the 
multilevel regression fitted lines for changes in life-purpose as a function of fluctuations in 
goal conflict and different values of individual differences in mixed emotions (90% percentile 
and 10% percentile). Figure 14 revealed that, when people did not experience goal conflict 
(represented by 1 in Figure 14, using the unadjusted scale) or they experienced low levels of 
goal conflict, they usually experienced higher levels of life-purpose, and individual 
differences in mixed emotions had no impact. However, at times when people reported 
moderate to high levels of goal conflict (3, 4, and 5 in Figure 14, using the unadjusted scale), 
they tended to report lower levels of life-purpose, but only when their average level of the 
experience of mixed emotions was low, because the negative impact of goal conflict on life-









Figure 14. Multilevel model of a two-way interaction between goal conflict (level-1) and mixed 





As an illustrative comparison, when people reported a very intense goal conflict (5 on 
the scale) and did not experience mixed emotions (i.e., scored on the bottom 10% of the 
sample for mixed emotions), the negative impact of goal conflict led people to report life-
purpose scores as low as “2.5” (on a scale ranging from 1 to 6); whereas at the same levels of 
goal conflict, people who did experience mixed emotions (scored on the top 90% of the 
sample for mixed emotions), scored about “4” on life-purpose using the same scale. 
In the final step (Model-3), the following control variables were added to the previous 
Model-2: within-person levels of positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA), and between-
person levels of psychological well-being (PWB). The corresponding interaction between 
these variables and goal conflict were also included. As shown in Table 13, the main effect of 
goal conflict on life-purpose as well as the interaction between goal conflict and between-
person mixed emotions scores remained statistically significant. Thus, individual differences 
in mixed emotions moderated the association between goal conflict and life-purpose, over 
and above average levels of psychological well-being and state-PA and state-NA. 
In addition, it was found that higher PA predicted greater life-purpose, β4 = 0.29, 
t(2,494)  = 6.69, p < 0.01 [95%CI: 0.21/ 0.38], which confirmed the known benefits of 
experiencing positive emotions in everyday life for psychological well-being. Similarly, 
individual differences in psychological well-being (PWB) significantly predicted within-day 
experiences of life-purpose, β5 = 0.42, t(158)  = 3.40, p < 0.05 [95%CI: 0.18 / 0.66], 
providing evidence of the convergence between everyday experiences of life-purpose and 
general PWB scores. The model explained R2 = 0.17 of the variations in life-purpose, and 
fitted the data well. Another interaction was found between goal conflict and PWB, such that 
people who scored higher on the psychological well-being scale had greater life-purpose 
when experiencing goal conflict.  
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The mediational role of mixed emotions in regulatory efforts to resist 
temptations. To assess whether fluctuations in mixed emotions experience mediated the 
relationship between goal conflict and efforts to resist temptations, a multilevel structural 
equation model (MSEM) using maximum likelihood was specified including goal conflict 
and mixed emotions as predictors of efforts to resist temptations.  
Figure 15 provides a graphical representation of this mediation. In this figure the 
between components are separated from the within components by creating random 
intercepts and slopes for each association (i.e., GC → RT; GC → ME; ME → RT) using the 
observed scores of each variable. The model also involves the estimation of separate residual 
variances for each component at both levels (expressed as “θ” in Figure 15). Not shown in 
the figure, for the sake of simplicity, are the multiple Level-2 covariances among the slopes 
and fixed effects. Thus, the estimation of the lower-level mediation parameters is calculated 
as follows: the path regressing efforts to resist temptations on goal conflict equals the 
estimate of the mean of the corresponding slope (GC → RT); the path regressing mixed 
emotions on goal conflict equals the estimate of the mean of the corresponding slope (GC → 
ME); the path regressing efforts to resist temptations on mixed emotions equals the estimate 
of the mean of the corresponding slope (ME → RT); the indirect effect equals the 
multiplicative term between the path aw and bw plus the covariance between the slopes of ab 














Figure 15. Illustration of 1-1-1 mediation model based on Preacher et al. (2010). GC: goal conflict, 
ME: mixed emotions; RT: efforts to resist temptations.  
 
Findings using this mediational model firstly demonstrated that occasions where 
desires conflicted with relevant goals positively and significantly predicted greater efforts to 
resist temptations during the same event, βcw = 0.33, SE = 0.05, p < 0.01 [95%CI: 0.26 / 
0.41]. This finding supported hypothesis 4.1, according to which goal conflict will positively 
predict efforts to resist temptations. More importantly, the effect of goal conflict on efforts to 
resist temptation was mediated by the elicitation of mixed emotions during the same event. 
The indirect effect of goal conflict on efforts to resist temptation via mixed emotions was 
significant, βc’w = 0.03, SE = 0.01, p < 0.01 [95%CI: 0.01 / 0.05], with an 8% mediated 
effect, indicating that the elicitation of mixed emotions was a proximal predictor of self-
control efforts, supporting hypothesis 4.2. The results also demonstrated that stronger 
experiences of mixed emotions were significantly and positively associated with greater 
efforts to resist temptations, βbw = 0.13, SE = 0.04, p < 0.01 [95%CI: 0.07 / 0.20]. This 































efforts to resist temptations. The fit of the mediation model was good, with a deviance 
significantly better than the empty model, -2∆LL = 112.7 (2), p < 0.01. 
The findings also showed that occasions where greater goal conflict was reported 
were positively and significantly associated with greater levels of mixed emotions, βaw = 
0.16, SE = 0.03, p < .01 [95%CI: 0.12 / 0.20], offering longitudinal support for Hypothesis 1. 
This is also described in Figure 16, which shows the fitted regression lines for each 
participant for the association between goal conflict and mixed emotions. Visual inspection 
of Figure 16 confirms that higher goal conflict was followed by the presence of greater 
mixed emotions. Additional multilevel analyses using mixed emotions as the dependent 
variable demonstrated that the percentage of active goals predicted greater levels of mixed 
emotions on a given occasion, β = 0.82, SE = 0.14, p < 0.01 [95%CI: 0.54 / 1.09]; whereas 
the percentage of active desires did not predict levels of mixed emotions (p = 0.52). These 
demonstrate the strong association between conflicting goals and mixed emotions. 
In order to examine the influence of additional variables in the previous model, efforts 
to resist temptations were regressed on the baseline measure of trait self-control (SC). As 
shown in Table 14 (column labelled as “RT as DV”), the results revealed a non-significant 
effect of trait self-control on efforts to resist temptations (p = 0.51). This model also 
incorporated within-person centred versions of positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA) 
at level-1 to examine the influence of occasions where people experienced greater PA or NA 















Figure 16. Experience of mixed emotions as a function of goal conflict. Raw data and fitted 
regression lines for each participant over time.  The number above each square represents the actual 
ID number given to each participant at the beginning of the study. 
 
Results demonstrated that PA did not predict greater efforts to resist temptations on a 
given occasion (p = 0.47), whereas occasions where people experienced higher levels of NA 
positively and significantly predicted greater efforts to resist temptations, β = 0.09, SE = 
0.04, p < 0.05 [95%CI: 0.01 / 0.16]. Importantly, the indirect effect of the mediational model 
remained significant, βc’w = 0.02, SE = 0.01, p < 0.05 [95%CI: 0.01 / 0.04], as well as the 
effect of mixed emotions on efforts to resist temptations, βbw = 0.11, SE = 0.04, p < 0.01 
[95%CI: 0.05 / 0.18]. As shown in Table 14, the fit of the mediational model including the 
three additional variables was good and the entire model explained R2 = 0.19 of the variance 
at level-1. In order to facilitate the visualisation of the entire model (i.e., including the 
mediation and controlling variables), a summary is shown in Figure 17, incorporating all of 
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Figure 17. Mediational model including trait self-control (SC) at Level-2 and PA and NA at level-1 as 
competing predictors. Squares indicate an observed variable whereas circles indicate latent constructs. 
Subscript “j” indicates a variable measured at level-2, whereas subscript “ij” indicates a variable 
measured at level-1. Dotted lines indicate no-significant effects.   
 
The influence of the everyday experience of mixed emotions on vitality. The final 
set of analyses tested the effect of occasions where people made efforts to resist temptation 
on vitality, and whether this association was moderated by mixed emotions. The previous 
mediational model was used as the primary model upon which new parameters were 
estimated. This provided two advantages. Firstly, this approach added consistency and 
robustness to the previous hypotheses. If efforts to resist temptations have an effect on 
relevant variables, then this effect should occur alongside the mediational model just tested. 















this chapter, providing a more comprehensive model of the functioning of mixed emotions 
and eudaimonic well-being. 
Hence, the previous mediational model incorporated vitality as a dependent variable 
regressed on efforts to resist temptations. Likewise, vitality was also regressed on mixed 
emotions. Mixed emotions were entered into the model as a within-person centred variable. 
This was necessary to create a new level-1 predictor which was orthogonal to the latent level-
2 parameter defined in the mediational model. Although the level-2 parameter was not 
hypothesised in the mediational model, this procedure reduced conflation between the level-1 
and level-2 estimates of mixed emotions. Additionally, a conditional effect was created 
including an interaction between efforts to resist temptation at level-1 and mixed emotions at 
level-1. This additional term estimated the moderating effect of mixed emotions on the 
association between efforts to resist temptation and vitality. Vitality was also regressed on 
PWB and trait self-control at level-2, and finally, vitality was regressed on PA and NA 
measured at level-1 using their within-person centred versions. The rest of the parameters 
tested in the mediational model were the same.  
The second column of Table 14 shows the same mediational model tested in the 
previous sub-section, but including vitality as the dependent variable. The results revealed 
that mixed emotions still mediated the relationship between goal conflict and efforts to resist 
temptations at level-1. Furthermore, occasions where people made greater efforts to resist 
temptations were associated with significantly less vitality, β = -0.08, SE = 0.03, p < 0.01 
[95%CI: -0.12 / -0.04]. This finding supported hypothesis 5.1 which anticipated that efforts 
to resist temptations would negatively predict vitality. Likewise, mixed emotions predicted 
significantly less vitality. However, if occasions where people made greater efforts to resist 
temptations were accompanied by higher levels of mixed emotions, then people reported 
higher levels of vitality, β = 0.07, SE = 0.02, p < 0.01 [95%CI: 0.03 / 0.11]. This result 
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provides support for hypothesis 5.2, which anticipated that efforts to resist temptations will 
interact with the experience of mixed emotions to enhance vitality.  
The inclusion of variables at level-2 (namely, PWB and trait-SC) did not change the 
interaction effect of mixed emotions and efforts to resist temptations on vitality, although 
people who scored higher on the PWB scale had higher levels of vitality across occasions. 
Similarly, occasions where people experienced higher PA positively predicted vitality, 
whereas occasions where people experienced higher NA negatively predicted vitality. The 
inclusion of age and gender did not showed a significant effect on vitality. Finally, it is 
interesting to note that the amount of variance explained was higher after the inclusion of 
PWB and PA in the model, demonstrating the strong interrelations between vitality and other 
well-being related constructs. A graphical representation including the main effects and 











Figure 18. Full-model testing Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 5. Squares indicate an observed variable 
whereas circles indicate latent constructs. Mixed emotions experience appears twice in the scheme to 
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Table 14. Full-model including the mediating effect of mixed emotions in the relationship between 
conflicting goals and efforts to resist temptations, and the moderating effect of mixed emotions on the 
relationship between efforts to resist temptations and vitality with covariates. 
      
Model Parameters 
RT as DV 
 
Vitality as DV 
 Vitality as DV plus 
covariates 
Estimate SE p <  Estimate SE p <  Estimate SE p < 
            
Level-1            
Intercept 0.01 0.61 0.99  1.82 0.74 0.02  1.82 0.74 0.02 
            
GC → RT 0.34 0.05 0.01  0.31 0.05 0.01  0.31 0.05 0.01 
            
GC → ME 0.16 0.03 0.01  0.15 0.03 0.01  0.14 0.03 0.01 
            
ME → RT 0.11 0.04 0.01  0.12 0.04 0.01  0.12 0.04 0.01 
            
Indirect effect 0.02 0.01 0.02  0.03 0.01 0.02  0.03 0.01 0.01 
            
RT     -0.08 0.03 0.01  -0.04 0.02 0.05 
            
Mixed emotions-within      -0.22 0.03 0.01  -0.09 0.04 0.02 
            
RT*Mixed emotions-within      0.07 0.02 0.01  0.04 0.02 0.03 
            
PA-within -0.03 0.04 0.47      0.38 0.05 0.01 
            
NA-within 0.09 0.04 0.05      -0.25 0.06 0.01 
            
Level-2            
GC → RT 0.34 0.05 0.01  0.34 0.05 0.01  0.39 0.05 0.01 
    
 
   
 
   
GC → ME 0.64 0.18 0.01  0.67 0.19 0.01  0.68 0.19 0.01 
    
 
   
 
   
ME → RT 0.37 0.25 0.13  0.41 0.23 0.09  0.45 0.22 0.06 
            
Indirect effect 0.24 0.15 0.11  0.27 0.14 0.06  0.31 0.14 0.04 
            
Trait Self-control  -0.06 0.09 0.51      -0.24 0.12 0.06 
            
PWB         0.61 0.18 0.01 
            
Deviance -2∆LL(∆df) 172.9 (9)  0.01  NC    NC   
            
R2 at Level-1 0.19    0.05    0.34   
 
Note: N = 73, 10 days, 4 observations per day, 2,619 observations. DV: dependent variable; SE: standard error; 
GC: goal conflict; ME: mixed emotions; RT: efforts to resist temptations; within: within-person centred variable; 
NC: the model did not converge to estimate the likelihood estimator. 
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5.3.4. Ancillary analysis 
In order to provide parallel evidence of the curvilinear effect of mixed emotions on 
eudaimonic well-being as shown in chapter 4, mixed emotions at the between-person level of 
analysis were used as a predictor of the global measure of psychological well-being (PWB). 
This is similar to the analysis conducted in Study 4 where a global measure of eudaimonic 
well-being was predicted by mixed emotions elicited following a manipulation procedure. 
 Hierarchical regressions based on 10,000 bootstrapped samples were used to test the 
effect of between-person centred mixed emotions on PWB at step 1. Next, the squared term 
of between-person centred mixed emotions was entered at step 2, in order to test the 
curvilinear effect of mixed emotions on PWB. 
Consistent with Study 4, the squared term for between-person centred mixed emotions 
explained a significant amount of the variance in PWB, R2 = 0.07, F(2, 71) = 6.74, p <  .01, 
whereas the variability explained by between-person centred mixed emotions was not 
significant. Furthermore, the squared term mixed emotions was significantly associated with 
PWB, β = -0.04, p < 0.01 [95%CI: -.02 / -.06], which indicated a concave curvilinear effect. 
5.4. Discussion 
Study 5 used an experience sampling method to examine the influence of mixed 
emotions on eudaimonic well-being via two proposed mechanisms: the restorative 
mechanism and the balancing mechanism. Additionally, Study 5 also assessed the nature of 
goal conflict, and its relationship with the presence of desires and goals in everyday life. The 
discussion of the findings is organised following the four sub-sections presented in the results 
section. Thus, the first sub-section discusses the nature of goal conflict, giving special 
attention to the theoretical consequences of the evidence concerning the elicitation of goal 
conflict. The second sub-section discusses the restorative mechanism. The third sub-section 
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discusses the mediational role of mixed emotions in the relationship between goal conflict 
and efforts to resist temptations. Finally, the fourth sub-section discusses the implication of 
the conditional relationship between mixed emotions and vitality. The discussion section ends 
by emphasising the limitations and main contributions of Study 5 in understanding the impact 
of mixed emotions on eudaimonic well-being. 
Goals, desires, and goal conflict. The findings of Study 5 firstly demonstrated that 
goal conflict can result from the activation of desires that interfere with current goals. 
Occasions where people reported having a desire and a relevant goal was active, wew 
associated with higher levels of goal conflict. In particular, goal conflict was commonly 
characterised by situations where there was a desire for leisure and achievement-related goals 
were present. Likewise, situations characterised by a desire to spend money when an 
abstinence goal (e.g., saving money) was present, produced greater levels of goal conflict. 
Considering the pervasiveness of achievement-related goals and the desire for leisure in the 
present study, it is legitimate to speculate that (a) these situations qualify as a common self-
control dilemma in everyday life, and (b) people consistently identify these situations as 
conflicting, and as a consequence, they qualify as one of the most common self-control 
dilemmas in the sample studied. 
Powers (1973) pointed out that conflict is likely to occur between systems at the same 
level of the hierarchy. This is to say that a temptation, usually defined as a lower-priority goal 
(e.g., Fishbach, Friendman, & Kruglanski, 2003), should not enter into conflict with a long-
term goal. Therefore, the current evidence showing that the presence of a desire and a 
relevant goal predicted greater goal conflict challenges Power’s original idea. However the 
present study construes desires as a motivational force that differs from formal goals only in 
respect of its urgency and its irrelevance with respect to the current activity (Hofmann & Van 
Dillen, 2012). Desires emerge automatically as a reward-processing system in regard of 
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internal need states (e.g., hunger, thirst, deprivation) (Hofmann & Van Dillen, 2012). A 
desire turns into temptation only when it hampers the realisation of a current, relevant task or 
goal (Hofmann et al., 2012). Hofmann and colleagues  added that desires influence actual 
behaviours either through the conscious pursuit of desire, in which case the feeling of 
wanting is present, or via impulsive, habitual responses, which are presumably unconscious 
(Hofmann, Friese, & Strack, 2009; Hofmann & Van Dillen, 2012).  
The present findings suggest that desires are not necessarily lower in the hierarchy. 
Even the most important goals can emerge in the form of a desire, and they can be as 
intruding as the most basic of the temptations. Consider an academic dinning with her 
partner, while she tries to put out of mind the grant application that she has been working on 
in the last weeks. In this example, a central goal, such as achievement is acting as a trivial 
desire because it emerges in a situation where it is not appropriate. Goals (Austin & 
Vancouver, 1996) and desires (Hofmann & Van Dillen, 2012) are characterised as internal 
desired states with a given motivational force. In accordance with this proposition, Fujita 
(2011) defined a dual-motive conceptualisation of self-control. In this theory, self-control is 
not seen as the effortful inhibition of impulses but rather as the prioritization of long-term 
goals over proximal competing motivations. According to Fujita (2011), the effortful 
inhibition of desires is one among several other mechanisms through which people prioritise 
distal goals over short-term goals. Therefore, a desire could be characterised as an unforeseen 
goal, an unexpected guest at a table that is already full.  
In support of the idea that both the activation of multiple long-term goals, as well as 
goals interacting with proximal goals (desires), produced conflict the present findings 
demonstrated that any goal pursuit predicted greater goal conflict when desires were present. 
Even those goals that may be considered temptations on some occasions, such as relaxation, 
predicted greater goal conflict when a desire was active. Furthermore, higher levels of 
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conflict occurred on occasions where desires were absent but people tried to achieve multiple 
goals simultaneously. The percentage of active goals at a given moment significantly 
predicted greater goal conflict. 
In contrast, the percentage of active desires predicted less goal conflict. Previous 
research has shown that the intensity of desires positively predicts self-indulgence (Hofmann 
et al., 2012). This effect is presumed to occur because conscious desires gain access to 
working memory increasing cognitive load and influencing desire-related behaviours 
(Baumeister, Masicampo, & Vohs, 2011; Hofmann & Van Dillen, 2012). Engaging in 
demanding tasks reduces the likelihood of self-indulgence, whereas low cognitive load leads 
people to display greater attention to tempting stimuli and activate hedonic thoughts (Van 
Dillen, Papies, & Hofman, 2013, Study 2). The present findings suggest that a greater number 
of desires negatively predicted goal conflict. A potential explanation for this finding is that a 
greater number of desires activated at a given moment reduced the likelihood of detecting a 
goal conflict. Desires may reduce the probability of identifying the presence of conflict; 
people may self-indulge without even noticing they were hampering a goal. Another 
possibility could be that in the absence of conscious goal-pursuit, people fill out their minds 
with alluring gratifications, which are not considered goals at this point. 
Overall, these findings suggest that what is crucial to understanding goal conflict is 
the nature of the focal goal. If someone is planning to rest at the weekend, then another goal 
(e.g., finishing a thesis chapter), or a desire (e.g., going running or seeing friends), may 
collide with the plan for rest. In Powers’ (1973) terminology, the goal and the desire are at 
the same level: programs. They involve conscious decisions at several points in a sequence of 
actions. The desire to go running seems to be lower than the planned goal of finishing the 
chapter only because the desire was unexpected and irrelevant regarding the conscious action 
plan. Although previous research has suggested that temptations activate long-term goals 
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(Fedorikhin & Patrick, 2010), the evidence presented here indicates that the goal at the 
forefront of attention may determine the type of desire or alternative goals that can potentially 
create conflict. 
Individual differences in mixed emotions moderated the negative impact of 
goal conflict on life-purpose. The restorative mechanisms imply that goal conflict can 
predict lower levels of life-purpose, but that this effect will be attenuated to the extent that 
people report, on average, greater levels of mixed emotions. Findings confirmed this 
hypothesis (Hypothesis 3). Firstly, it was found that those occasions where higher goal 
conflict was experienced predicted lower levels of life-purpose. In accordance with a large 
amount of literature (see Kelly, Mansell, & Wood, 2015, for a review), conflicting goals were 
found to hinder well-being. However, goal conflict interacted with the propensity to 
experience mixed emotions to predict greater life-purpose. Thus, those people who 
experienced higher levels of mixed emotions did not suffer the negative impact of conflicting 
goals on eudaimonic well-being. Findings also demonstrated that this effect was significant 
over and above the amount of positive or negative affect felt on a given occasion, and also 
controlling for trait levels of psychological well-being. Interestingly, the trait levels of 
psychological well-being significantly predicted variations in life-purpose, indicating that the 
dimension of life-purpose measured appropriately levels of eudaimonic well-being. Finally, it 
was found that PWB interacted with goal conflict to predict greater life-purpose. Higher 
levels of psychological well-being buffered the negative impact of goal conflict on life-
purpose. 
These results are in accordance with the DMA (Reich et al., 2003; Zautra. 2003). The 
DMA asserts that on occasions where people experience higher levels of stress, positive 
affect and negative affect follow a bipolar structure, meaning that there are strong negative 
correlations between these oppositely valenced affects. The bipolarity of affect in times of 
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stress can facilitate quick elaboration and rapid responses. In contrast, on occasions where 
people do not suffer stress, positive and negative affect follow a bivariate structure, leading to 
near zero correlations between positive and negative affect. The independence of PA and NA 
can permit greater emotional flexibility. However, the theory also sustains that individual 
differences in the experience of positive and negative affect in times of stress can ameliorate 
the negative consequences of stress on health-related issues. People who can maintain 
independence of positive and negative affect in times of stress (i.e., reflected by correlations 
near zero) are predicted to be better able to cope with stress (Reich et al., 2003; Zautra. 
2003). 
The interaction between mixed emotions and goal conflict as a predictor of 
eudaimonic well-being is also consistent with other research. For example, Kelly and 
colleagues (2011) demonstrated that feelings of ambivalence predicted depression only when 
experienced in the absence of conflict, whereas feelings of ambivalence interacted with goal 
conflict to predict lower levels of depression. Although the concept of ambivalence is 
different from the concept of mixed emotions considered in the present research project, it is 
informative that the interaction between goal conflict and ambivalence predicted lower levels 
of depression. 
Other studies (e.g., Segerstrom & Nes, 2006) have found that individual differences in 
optimism interact with goal conflict to predict well-being, but in the opposite direction. 
Specifically, optimism has been found to predict greater conflict (Segerstrom 2001; 
Segerstrom & Nes, 2006), and evidence seems to indicate that optimism is also associated 
with better psychological health (Segerstrom & Nes, 2006). However, research investigating 
the interaction between goal conflict and optimism has found that life events involving high 
levels of goal conflict predicted worse immune response when optimism was high, indicating 
poorer well-being because immune response is associated with the propensity to get sick 
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(Segerstrom 2001). In contrast to the evidence concerning individual differences in optimism, 
individual differences in mixed emotions buffered the negative effect of goal conflict on 
well-being, even after controlling for state-positive affect and state-negative affect.  
The experience of mixed emotions was a proximal predictor of efforts to 
resist temptations. The balancing mechanism implies that the relationship between goal 
conflict and efforts to resist temptations is mediated by the experience of mixed emotions 
during the same event. Theoretically, the integration of incompatible strands of information 
allows people to balance the benefits and drawbacks of multiple courses of actions. This, 
presumably, helps to prioritise meaningful goals, which in turn, motivates attempts to resist 
temptations. The pursuit of meaningful goals is an important feature of several eudaimonic 
well-being, which helps to connect the findings of Study 5 with the evidence presented in 
Chapter 4.  
The findings supported the hypotheses. Firstly, it was found that goal conflict 
predicted efforts to resist temptations. This is consistent with recent theory and research 
indicating that the identification of goal conflict is a necessary step to exerting self-control 
(Fishbach et al., 2003; Hofmann et al., 2012; Mysreth & Fishbach, 2009). Conflict is a signal 
that triggers efforts to resist temptations (Carver & Scheier, 1982; Hofmann et al., 2012). 
People “know” that it is time to make efforts to continue pursuing a long-term goal partly 
because they have detected a conflict. Although some authors (e.g., Baumeister, 2002) have 
suggested that goal-conflict leads to self-control failure, the bulk of the evidence seems to 
indicate that the perception of goal conflict is positively associated with efforts to resist 
temptations. 
Counter-active self-control theory (Fishbach & Trope, 2005; Mysreth, Fishbach, & 
Trope, 2009; Trope & Fishbach, 2000) suggests that the simultaneous presence of a long-
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term goal and a temptation assists self-control because continuous asymmetrical valuations of 
the goal and the desire take place. People allocate more importance to the goal and less 
importance to the temptation, reducing the likelihood of succumbing to temptation. 
Occasions where a desire becomes stronger in the face of a long-term goal results in greater 
devaluation of the temptation, augmenting valuation of the long-term goal. 
Contrasting with the aforementioned approach, other theories have given greater 
importance to the affective processes underlying self-control (Hofmann & Fisher, 2012; 
Inzlicht & Legault, 2014; Fishbach & Labroo, 2007). For example, Fishbach and Labroo 
(2007) showed that positive mood facilitates self-control when a self-improvement goal (e.g., 
get better grades) was accessible, but positive mood undermines self-control when a goals 
related to mood management (e.g., feeling better) was accessible. In contrast, other theories 
(Inzlicht & Legault, 2014; Powers, 1973, 2014) postulated that negative affect facilitates self-
control because it signals deficiencies in goal progress and heightens the need for greater 
effort to resist temptations. The findings of the present chapter showed that mixed emotions 
predicted greater efforts to resist temptations. Furthermore, mixed emotions mediated the 
relationship between goal conflict and efforts to resist temptations. This is one of the key 
contributions of this chapter. 
In accordance with theories suggesting that self-control is driven by affective 
(Hofmann & Fisher, 2012; Inzlicht & Legault, 2014; Fishbach & Labroo, 2007), Study 5 
demonstrated that perceptions of goal conflict are not the proximal predictor of efforts to 
resist temptations. Rather, the proximal predictor of efforts to resist temptations was the 
experience of mixed emotions after experiencing goal conflict. These results seem to indicate 
that weighting the informational characteristics of the stimuli is only a preliminary step, and 
that the experience of mixed emotions signals the need to integrate complex, incompatible 
stimuli which ultimately triggers self-control efforts. This approach represents a new 
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approach in the investigation of the affective experiences involved in self-control and 
signifies a relevant, innovative contribution of this research project in the field of self-control. 
Finally, the findings demonstrated that the mediating effect of mixed emotions on the 
relationship between goals conflict and efforts to resist temptations remained significant even 
after including state-positive affect, state-negative affect, and trait-levels of self-control. 
Interestingly, trait self-control was not related to efforts to resist temptations. This differs 
from the accrued evidence relating trait self-control and different self-control behaviours (de 
Ridder, Lensvelt-Mulders, Finkenauer, Stok, & Baumeister, 2012), although it is interesting 
to note that a recent meta-analyses found a large amount of heterogeneity in the effect sizes 
for trait self-control when related to well-being and adjustment life-domains (de Ridder et al., 
2012), which was precisely the goal of the present study.  
Thus, people used mixed emotions as the proximal source for choosing to exert 
regulatory efforts, over and above the levels of positive affect and negative affect experienced 
during the same occasion, and also over and above the average levels of self-control. One 
final finding of note was that occasions where people experienced higher levels of negative 
affect positively predicted efforts to resist temptations, providing, for the first time, support 
for the affect alarm model of self-control (Inzlicht & Legault, 2014), which postulates that 
negative emotions drive self-control efforts.  
Mixed emotions interact with efforts to resist temptations to enhance vitality. It 
was finally hypothesised that mixed emotions not only assist the prioritisation of meaningful 
goals, but also replenish a sense of vitality when making efforts to resist temptations. It was 




Efforts to resist temptations and the experience of mixed emotions led people to 
experience less vitality, when considered independently. Nevertheless, the interaction 
between efforts to resist temptations and mixed emotions seemingly replenished feelings of 
vitality. It is important to emphasise that this finding means that if people felt more mixed 
when exerting self-control efforts they did not experience exhaustion, instead they managed 
to maintain the sense of vitality. Furthermore, these results were observed over and above 
levels of state-positive affect and state-negative affect. Finally, state positive-affect positively 
predicted greater vitality, and trait levels of psychological well-being also predicted greater 
vitality. 
These findings indicate that feelings of vitality appear to be a meaningful component 
of eudaimonic well-being. This is consistent with previous findings which have also shown 
that eudaimonic well-being is closely related to vitality (e.g., Huta & Ryan, 2010; Reis, 
Sheldon, Gable, Roscoe, & Ryan, 2000). Likewise, some meaning-based theories of 
eudaimonic well-being have included the inner sense of vitality as a relevant component of 
eudaimonic well-being (Kashdan et al., 2008; Ryan & Deci, 2001). For example, self-
determination theory posits that fulfilment of the basic needs of autonomy, relatedness and 
competence is essential for psychological growth, self-congruence, and vitality (Ryan & 
Deci, 2001).  
Integrating the different sources of evidence presented in this sub-section, the findings 
are consistent with the notion that mixed emotions promote the integration of complex 
information at a given moment. Processing in parallel both the rewarding and the troubling 
consequences of multiple, incompatible courses of action presumably may help individuals 
prioritise meaningful goals in the face of self-control dilemmas. This is demonstrated by the 
positive relationship between the experience of mixed emotions and efforts to resist 
temptations. Finally, although exerting self-control can be draining, experiencing mixed 
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emotions when attempting to resist temptations appears to be capable of replenishing feelings 
of vitality. 
It is possible to speculate that mixed emotions in combination with self-control efforts 
are perceived as a meaningful response to self-control dilemma, giving individuals a sense of 
progress towards long-term goals, relevant to the self, which ultimately enhances the 
subjective experience of feeling alive. Mixed emotions may help people to realise what is 
meaningful and worthy of their efforts. Regardless of whether people’s choices succeed, the 
composite affective experience has the potential to encourage and reinvigorate people to 
balance the multiple opportunities that life commonly holds.     
 Limitations. The findings of this chapter integrate several pieces of the theoretical 
model proposed in chapter 1, and separately examined in chapters 3 and 4, but some 
limitations need to be mentioned. Firstly, Study 5 did not investigate whether efforts to resist 
temptations actually resulted in improved self-control performance. That is, this chapter did 
not explore whether mixed emotions influence actual restraint or self-indulgence. The 
evidence was limited to efforts to resist temptations. One possibility is that mixed emotions 
do not directly influence self-control success or failure but rather they determine the degree 
of goal-commitment and goal-progress when conflict is detected. This aspect is explored in 
greater detail in chapter 6.  
Secondly, testing a mediational model using an experienced sampling method 
required some assumptions concerning causality. In particular, this chapter tested the effects 
of goal conflict on mixed emotions, which in turn, predicted efforts to resist temptations. 
Three conditions are mentioned in the literature as fundamental to sustain causal inference 
when testing mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Stone-Romero & Roposo, 2008). Firstly, it is 
necessary to have temporal precedence, that is, the cause (X) precedes the mediator (M), and 
209 
 
M precedes the effect (Y) in time. Second, cause and effect need to be related. And finally, 
potential confounders need to be appropriately addressed in the model. Two of the three 
aforementioned assumptions are correctly addressed in the present study, whereas the first 
one was partially satisfied. 
The present study established the associations between X and M, X and Y, and M and 
Y. Likewise, potential confounders were satisfactorily incorporated in the model, and the 
proposed mediation remained intact. Potential confounders, such as positive affect or 
negative affect, did not destabilise the mediation, suggesting that the proposed paths were 
correctly estimated. However, temporal precedence was not supported because all the 
variables in the mediation analysis were measured at the same time. In order to partially 
correct this problem, instructions to complete questions concerning X and M considered 
experiences that occurred within the last 30-minutes, whereas Y was instructed to be 
completed as perceived in the very moment the questions were read. Furthermore, the model 
tested mediation over time, meaning that stability of measures over time was observed 
(MacKinnon & Fairchild, 2009), which adds support for the causal chain suggested. 
Finally, the characteristics of the sample, as well as the limited number of categories 
of goal and desires, constrain the extent to which this findings can be generalised. The sample 
mainly consisted of undergraduate and postgraduate students, whose goals and desires reflect 
the academic nature of their activities. This was clear when observing that the most common 
self-control dilemma was the conflict between achievement-related goals and leisure. 
Furthermore, the limitations of time when completing the questionnaires during the 
experience sampling section of Study 5 limited the number of goals and desires that it was 
possible to survey on each occasion. It is possible that examining a larger set of goals or 
desires may have resulted in different findings concerning the nature of goal conflict. 
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Conclusion. To conclude, chapter 5 has integrated the findings presented in chapter 3 
and 4. Using an intensive longitudinal design, goal conflict predicted mixed emotions as they 
did in chapter 3. Furthermore, two more precise mechanisms explaining the influence of 
mixed emotions on eudaimonic well-being were tested. The proposed restorative mechanism 
demonstrated that individual differences in mixed emotions interact with occasions where 
people perceived greater goal conflict to predict life-purpose. The proposed balancing 
mechanism showed that mixed emotions help people to display greater self-control efforts in 
response to self-control dilemmas, which may explain continuous people’s effort to attain 
meaningful goals, which in turn, enhances eudaimonic well-being. Finally, mixed emotions 
and efforts to resist temptations combined to replenish feelings of vitality, suggesting that 








6. CHAPTER SIX: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
“The essence of neurosis is conflict [and] the essence of life is conflict – from which one might 
(incautiously) conclude that life is essentially neurotic” 
David Carr (2009) 
 
he present chapter organises the main contributions of this research project. It suggests 
future research avenues in the investigation of mixed emotions and well-being, 
directions for research linking mixed emotions to goals, and finally an integrative theory of 
complex emotions. Separate sections are devoted to each of these aspects. The first section 
summarises the main hypotheses and findings of the previous chapters, highlighting the main 
contributions, and also main limitations. The second section explores future implications by 
proposing future research to explore the effects of mixed emotions on health-related 
outcomes. Implications of the findings for clinical populations are also described. The second 
section finishes by describing hypotheses to further investigate the relationship between 
mixed emotions and goal shifting. Finally, the third section outlines an integrative model of 
complex emotions, using the conclusions and evidence from previous chapters. This section 
represents a speculative effort which is a summary of the reflections aroused while 
investigating in a research field where no clear theoretical framework has been developed. 
6.1. Findings and contributions 
This research project examined the conditions that elicit the experience of mixed 
emotions and evaluated the consequences of experiencing mixed emotions on eudaimonic 
well-being. Mixed emotions are affective experiences characterised by the co-activation of 
oppositely valenced emotions, such as feeling happy and sad. A broad model was proposed, 




goals will predict mixed emotions. The second main hypothesis was that (H2) experiencing 
mixed emotions, in the context of goal conflict, would positively predict eudaimonic well-
being. The third main hypothesis postulated that (H3) individual differences in mixed 
emotions would moderate the relationship between goal-conflict and eudaimonic well-being. 
The fourth hypothesis suggested that (H4) mixed emotions would mediate the relationship 
between goal conflict and efforts to resist temptations. Finally, the fifth main hypothesis was 
that (H5) mixed emotions would interact with efforts to resist temptations to enhance feelings 
of vitality. 
Prior to testing the hypotheses, a meta-analysis was conducted to evaluate whether 
mixed emotions are a robust and a non-artifactual affective experience (see chapter 2). The 
meta-analysis (of 63 independent experiments), showed that mixed emotions are consistent 
regardless of the type of emotional adjectives or model of affect used. This finding was 
resilient to publication biases and the meta-analysis applied rigorous methods to control for 
measurement error and also biases resulting from combining studies using different designs 
(between-person, within-person, and mixed). Furthermore, the meta-analysis also found that 
the percentage of women in the sample was associated with higher effect sizes, which 
provides an alternative hypothesis to explain why women tend to feel more frequent negative 
emotions, but report similar levels of subjective well-being (Fujita et al., 1991). It is possible 
that women experience more frequent mixed emotions or they are more aware of complex 
emotional experiences, such as mixed emotions. Finally, the meta-analysis found that 
subjective measures of mixed emotions were associated with higher effect sizes, whereas the 
minimum index was associated with lower effect sizes.  
The five empirical studies demonstrated support for the hypotheses mentioned above. 
Specifically, it was found that (H1) conflicting goals consistently elicited the experience of 
mixed emotions. This was confirmed using experimental (Studies 1 and 2), cross-sectional 
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(Study 3), and intensive longitudinal methods (Study 5). In Study 1 (see chapter 3) the 
experimental condition activated two incompatible goals, whereas in the control condition the 
same goals did not conflict. Results confirmed that the conflicting goals condition elicited 
more mixed emotions compared to the control condition where the same goals were not in 
conflict. Furthermore, Study 2 (see chapter 3) found that recalling recent personal 
experiences involving conflicting goals predicted higher levels of mixed emotions compared 
to other intergoal dynamics (i.e., facilitating goals). Study 3 (see chapter 4) also found that 
greater levels of goal conflict were associated with more mixed emotions. Finally, a 
longitudinal study that measured goal-conflict and mixed emotions over time found the same 
association, supporting the ecological validity of the relationship between goal conflict and 
mixed emotions (see chapter 5). Hence, mixed emotions can be elicited following the 
activation of simultaneous multiple incompatible goals. 
Findings also showed that (H2) the experience of mixed emotions was associated with 
greater eudaimonic well-being, using different measures of eudaimonic well-being and 
different designs (i.e., cross-sectional design – Study 3 - and a quasi-experiment – Study 4). 
Study 3 (see chapter 4) found that people who reported, on average, feeling more mixed 
emotions had greater levels of eudaimonic well-being. Likewise, Study 4 (see chapter 4) 
found that the experience of mixed emotions was greater after watching a video-clip (versus 
before having watched the video-clip) intended to elicit mixed emotions, and in turn, higher 
levels of mixed emotions after the video-clip were associated with greater levels of 
eudaimonic well-being.  
The findings of Study 5 (see chapter 5) supported the hypothesis that (H3) individual 
differences in mixed emotions interact with goal conflict to predict greater levels of life-
purpose. Importantly, this association remained consistent over and above state-positive and 
state-negative affect, as well as controlling for trait levels of psychological well-being. 
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Similarly, it was found that (H4) mixed emotions mediated the relationship between goal 
conflict and efforts to resist temptations, over and above state-positive and state-negative 
affect, even when controlling for trait levels of self-control. Finally, Study 5 found that (H5) 
mixed emotions interacted with efforts to resist temptations to predict greater levels of 
vitality. This interaction effect was tested upon the previous mediational model, and 
including all the previous controlling variables. Importantly, the mediational model tolerated 
these stringent conditions, and all the main effects were retained. 
Overall, it is possible to summarise the aforementioned findings into three main 
contributions of the present research project.  
Mixed emotions and the resolution conflict between goals. Firstly, the emotional 
consequences of experiencing conflicting goals exceeds the common distinction between 
positive and negative affect, and situates the experience of mixed emotions as a critical 
affective variable that assists people in the process of resolution of conflicting goals. Several 
theories have suggested that goal multiplicity is an inevitable consequence of rich complex 
social environments (e.g., Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007; Köpetz et al., 2011; Kruglanski, Shah, 
Fishbach, Friedman, Chun, & Sleeth-Keeper, 2002). Likewise, perceptual control theory 
suggested that goal conflict is a state that individuals are compelled to resolve by integrating 
disparate courses of action at higher levels in the goal hierarchy (Powers, 1973, 2014). 
Therefore, mixed emotions may be a relevant component of the control process that enables 
people to correct error signals by prioritising long-term goals. 
Evidence presented in chapter 3 demonstrated that mixed emotions are consistently 
experienced in situations of goal conflict, which was not the case when single goals (Study 1) 
or other intergoal dynamics were present (i.e., facilitating goals, Study 2). Moreover, 
evidence derived from Study 5 showed that the experience of mixed emotions following goal 
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conflict is not merely a residual component of the control process; rather mixed emotions 
facilitate regulatory efforts in the face of conflicts involving desires and long-term goals. This 
means that the experience of mixed emotions may assist the integration of complex, 
incompatible strands of information. 
Both the ESM (Cacioppo et al., 1999; Cacioppo et al., 2004) and the communicative 
model of emotion (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1996) anticipate that one consequence of 
experiencing mixed emotions is that they enable disparate courses of action to be followed. 
Thus, it is possible to suggest that the process through which mixed emotions facilitate the 
resolution of conflicting goals is via providing behavioural equilibration and sense-making 
processes in the face of goal conflict. Following Piaget’s conceptualizations, Bless and 
Fiedler (2006) have suggested that positive affect is related to assimilative, heuristic 
processing styles; whereas negative affect has been linked to accommodative, analytical 
processing styles. Using the same Piagetian analogy, the current findings suggest that mixed 
emotions are more likely to be associated with equilibration which is the process through 
which complex information is incorporated to restore behavioural control.  
Mixed emotions and eudaimonic well-being. Secondly, the evidence presented 
across multiple studies suggests that mixed emotions may be adaptive and positively 
influence eudaimonic well-being, although this effect may be more complex than suggested 
by a simple linear association. Evidence presented in chapter 4 showed that higher levels of 
mixed emotions were related to greater levels of eudaimonic well-being and the search for 
meaning in life; and that the experience of mixed emotions was different from emotional 
conflict (Study 3). Furthermore, artificially eliciting mixed emotions in a sample of students 
about to graduate was also associated with greater eudaimonic well-being. In particular, 
moderate levels of mixed emotions predicted greater eudaimonic well-being; as evidenced by 
a curvilinear association between mixed emotions and eudaimonic well-being. However, no 
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association was found between individual differences in mixed emotions and life-purpose in 
Study 5. Instead, individual differences in mixed emotions moderated the association 
between goal conflict and life-purpose. 
One explanation of this discrepancy could be that eudaimonic well-being was 
assessed differently in chapters 4 and 5. In Study 5 (chapter 5), life-purpose was measured 
repeatedly over time (within-person level), whereas in Study 3 and Study 4 (chapter 4), 
eudaimonic well-being was measured on one occasion (between-person level). Global levels 
of mixed emotions and eudaimonic well-being might be closely related, but when examining 
the association between fluctuations in one of these variables with stable dispositions of the 
other, the effects might be absent. 
It is noteworthy that the experience of mixed emotions at between-person level had a 
curvilinear effect on eudaimonic well-being. A concave, curvilinear effect on eudaimonic 
well-being was found both in Study 4 and the ancillary analysis presented in Study 5. This 
suggests that mixed emotions can directly benefit eudaimonic well-being but only when 
people experience a moderate amount of mixed emotions. Too little or too much mixed 
emotion may have detrimental effects on eudaimonic well-being. This may not be the case 
when examining the effect of mixed emotions on eudaimonic well-being over time, where the 
interaction between goal conflict and mixed emotions is critical to produce beneficial effects 
on eudaimonic well-being. 
Theoretically, mixed emotions may not only facilitate the resolution of conflicting 
goals but also promote balance among multiple possibilities by prioritising meaningful goals. 
Perceptual control theory asserts that the resolution of goal conflict can be achieved by the 
integration of goals at higher levels in the hierarchy (Powers, 1973). Powers (1973) 
characterised high level goals as principles and values. Interestingly, several theories of 
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eudaimonic well-being claim that eudaimonic well-being is characterised by engagement in 
activities that fulfil meaningful goals (e.g., Ryan & Deci, 2001; Ryan et al., 2008, Waterman, 
1990) and promote balance between relevant facets of individual experience (e.g., Ryff, 
1989, 1995; Ryff & Singer, 1998), which is easily translated as goals in the form of principles 
(e.g., finding purpose in life, maintaining healthy relationships). 
Hence, if mixed emotions are primarily elicited following goal conflict, then the effect 
of mixed emotions on eudaimonic well-being should not be interpreted without considering 
the specific situational characteristics under which mixed emotions were elicited. When 
mixed emotions are elicited in the presence of conflicting goals, it is possible to anticipate 
that people will perceive greater levels of eudaimonic well-being. Evidence presented in 
Study 5 (chapter 5) showed that both at the between-person level and at the within-person 
level, mixed emotions interacted with goal conflict features (including efforts to resist 
temptation as a common consequence of goal conflict) to predict greater levels of life-
purpose and vitality, two common constructs in the literature on eudaimonic well-being (e.g., 
Ryan & Deci, 2001; Ryan et al., 2008; Ryff, 1989, 1995; Ryff & Singer, 1998). 
The relevance of the subjective experience of mixed emotions. Finally, the present 
findings suggest that the subjective measure of mixed emotions (developed for the purpose of 
this research project) is a reliable and valid measure of mixed emotions. In contrast to 
common measures of emotions, the subjective measure of mixed emotions relies on the 
assumption that mixed emotions are an integral emotional experience (as explained in chapter 
2). This is identifiable by people as a genuine emotional experience characterised by the co-
activation or the rapid succession of two emotions usually understood as opposite in valence.  
Study 2 (chapter 3) and Study 4 (chapter 4) found that the subjective measure of 
mixed emotions was strongly and positively correlated with the minimum index, one of the 
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most common measures of mixed emotions, indicating that these two measures of mixed 
emotions assessed a similar construct. The research also produced further evidence about the 
minimum index. Importantly, the minimum index used in Study 4 was not based on average 
scores of positive and negative affect. The minimum index used in Study 4 reflected the 
emotions that the literature has mentioned to be coupled when experiencing a limited-time 
experience (i.e., poignancy, a combination of happiness or enthusiasm and sadness). 
Furthermore, Study 3 and Study 4 (chapter 4) revealed that the minimum index was 
positively and significantly related to the corresponding positive and negative emotion, 
suggesting that the minimum index does not just reflect the amount of negative emotions, as 
could be thought considering that it is estimated using the intensity of the weaker affect. 
That said, the subjective measure of mixed emotions and the minimum index (and 
probably most of the self-report measures of affect) may suffer from memory biases 
(Kihlstrom, Eich, Sandbrand, & Tobias, 1999). That is, people may confuse the actual 
emotional experience when asked to report their emotions after a certain period of time. For 
example, in Study 5 (chapter 5) participants reported their experience of mixed emotions 
within the last 30-minutes. This information may be distorted compared to actual feelings in 
the very moment that an event happened. 
The research also found evidence of differences between the measures of mixed 
emotion. The evidence presented in Appendix-1 suggests that within-person correlations, the 
most common measure of mixed emotions in intensive longitudinal designs (e.g., Brose et al., 
2014; Coifman et al., 2007; Grühn et al., 2013; Hershfield et al., 2013; Ong & Bergeman, 
2004), were negatively related to the minimum index and the subjective measure of mixed 
emotions, whereas the minimum index and the subjective measure of mixed emotions were 
positively related. This may imply that future studies should prioritise use of the minimum 
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index or subjective measures of mixed emotions over within-person correlations as an 
indicator of mixed emotions. 
By demonstrating the utility of using the subjective measure of mixed emotions, the 
assumption of mixed emotions as an integral experience is better grounded. The assumption 
of the integral experience of mixed emotions, postulated in chapter 2, suggests that mixed 
emotions are not merely the aggregation of independent emotions. When feeling mixed, 
people genuinely identify specific affective features that exceed the feelings associated with 
single emotions. Some authors (e.g. Greenspan, 2003; Russell, 2003) have suggested that 
mixed emotions are emotional episodes concerning two independent events that people 
confuse as mixed emotions. In contrast to these approaches, the evidence reviewed here has 
shown that people listening to single pieces of music in which there is a conflict between 
tempo and mode (e.g., the piece of music used in the video-clip of Study 4; Hunter et al., 
2008) experienced higher levels of mixed emotions compared to people who listened to 
pieces of music where only a fast tempo or major mode was present. These findings suggest 
that one indivisible event was capable of reliably eliciting mixed emotions. Likewise, when 
people reported feeling mixed emotions across the multiple studies conducted in the present 
research project, they reported a unitary emotional experience that emerged as a result of 
conflicting features in the environment, which, despite the lack of a lexicon to classify it, was 
characterised as a combination of opposite emotions. 
Limitations. Despite the contributions of the present research project, several 
limitations remain. Each chapter describes the limitations of the different studies conducted, 
but it would be valuable to recheck some of them. Firstly, the sample of participants that took 
part in each study mainly consisted of university students. In a recent study, Henrich and 
colleagues (2010) showed that the majority of studies conducted in Psychology have used 
undergraduate students, which are mostly characterised by being well-educated, living in 
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industrialised and democratic countries. They are also richer than average, and have likely 
grown up in Western cultures. They concluded that samples with this background are one of 
the least representative populations to be surveyed. Thus, the generalisability of the present 
findings is an important issue that future studies will need to address by replicating findings 
in other groups of the population (e.g., workers, middle age people, samples from developing 
countries). 
Secondly, all of the studies used self-report measures. Although recent research has 
demonstrated that mixed emotions may also be described by using physiological measures 
(e.g., Henderson & Norris, 2013; Kreibig et al., 2013), demonstrating that, for example, the 
mixed emotion of amusement-fear activates patterns of facial muscles that cannot be simply 
described as components of each emotion separately (Kreibig et al., 2013), it is possible that 
self-report measures of mixed emotions may be subject to biases derived from memory, 
desirability or acquiescence (Kihlstrom, Eich, Sandbrand, & Tobias, 1999). Future studies 
should evaluate the correspondence between self-report measures of mixed emotions and data 
obtained from physiological responses. However, this enterprise may be difficult due to the 
lack of coherence between different emotional responses (e.g., self-report, autonomic 
responses, facial expressions; Hollenstein & Lanteigne, 2014). 
Finally, it was difficult to infer causality with respect to several of the hypotheses 
tested, due to only a portion of the studies included were experimental designs with a control 
group. In particular, some of the evidence presented in Study 5 involving causal relationships 
(e.g., mediation) may produce different findings in the lab. For example, the association 
between efforts to resist temptations and vitality could be in the opposite direction, such as 
that people displayed greater efforts to resist temptations as a result of feeling more vitality. 
Alternative hypotheses derived from the data presented in the studies of this research project 
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will need closer examination using experimental designs in order to determine the 
directionality of the hypothesised association found in several of the studies. 
6.2. Implications of mixed emotions for health-related outcomes and goal 
theory 
To facilitate the presentation of the different implications of mixed emotions for well-
being and goals, this section is separated into three brief sub-sections. The first sub-section 
outlines some potential implications of mixed emotions for promoting health-related 
outcomes, such as smoking cessation. The second sub-section considers some implications of 
mixed emotions for clinical interventions. Finally, the third sub-section outlines future 
research connecting mixed emotions and goal shifting by integrating the goal dynamics 
theory (Fishbach, Zhang, & Koo, 2009).  
Mixed emotions and health-related outcomes. The findings of Studies 3, 4 and 5 
suggest that mixed emotions can boost eudaimonic well-being, especially when experienced 
alongside conflicting goals. These findings suggest that mixed emotions may help people to 
resolve personal dilemmas and achieve a purposeful life. One common conflict that people 
face is trying to avoid certain behaviours that are considered pleasant in the short term, but 
pernicious for health in the long term, such as smoking. Future research should investigate 
whether mixed emotions may positively impact relevant health-related outcomes, such as 
smoking cessation.  
A recent theoretical contribution (Frijda, Ridderinkhof, & Rietveld, 2014) suggested 
that impulsive actions can be controlled by the confluence of multiple emotions because each 
emotion contributes with different action readiness states (motivational forces) which in turn 
regulate ongoing actions, delaying the display of non-deliberative actions. Consistent, with 
this approach, Study 5 (chapter 5) showed that mixed emotions promote greater efforts to 
222 
 
resist temptations. Therefore, it is feasible to suggest that mixed emotions may play a role in 
controlling impulses, such as smoking. For example, it could be possible that mixed emotions 
assist the control of impulsive behaviours by delaying the decision making process. As mixed 
emotions are thought to involve greater levels of behavioural flexibility (Cacioppo et al., 
2004; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1996), people who experience mixed emotions when 
confronted by smoke-related stimuli may delay nicotine desires, thereby gaining time to 
reconsider health-related goals.  
A preliminary step towards this direction emerges from a recent study conducted by 
Veilleux and colleagues (2013). They exposed a group of smokers to a series of pictures. The 
pictures contained pleasant, unpleasant, smoke-related, or neutral cues. Participants reported 
their perceived cigarette craving after the presentation of each picture, completed a self-
reported measure of affect, and undertook a task designed to measure impulsiveness after the 
trials. Participants reported significantly more craving during the exposure to smoke-related 
cues compared to pleasant, unpleasant or neutral cues. Furthermore, smoke-related cues 
elicited greater levels of mixed emotions compared to pleasant, unpleasant or neutral cues, 
and the experience of mixed emotions was associated with increased craving, controlling for 
baseline craving and nicotine dependence. They also found that craving was associated with 
greater levels of impulsivity, although this study did not test the relationship between mixed 
emotions and impulsivity. 
In the previous study, the sample was composed of smokers who were not trying to 
quit smoking. Therefore, the association between craving and mixed emotions may be 
indicative of certain amount of conflict between the desire to smoke when seeing smoke-
related cues and social desirability (e.g., smokers participating in a lab study consisting of 
seeing some smoke-related pictures may infer that smoking is not socially desirable), not a 
conflict between the desire to smoke and the goal of trying to quit smoking. Future research 
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should explore whether greater levels of mixed emotions among people who are trying to quit 
smoking are related to greater success in quitting smoking. In the lab, it could be possible to 
investigate whether the elicitation of mixed emotions produces larger response times to 
smoke-related pictures compared to other emotional or neutral cues. 
Stahl et al. (2014) showed that impulsive actions are characterised by five correlated, 
although independent behavioural components. Control of stimulus interference, which is 
related to selective attention to goal-related stimuli; proactive interference, which is related to 
attending to goal-related cognitions; response interference, which is related to deciding goal-
related choices and executing actions that are consistent with the desired goal; motivational 
impulsivity, similar to delay of gratification; and decisional impulsivity, which is related to 
gathering information relevant to the goal before making a decision. Future research may 
benefit from these findings to determine which of these aspects of impulsive behaviours are 
affected by the experience of mixed emotions in order to determine whether mixed emotions 
can help people to reduce unhealthy behaviours. Consistent with the idea that mixed emotions 
promote greater behavioural flexibility, it is possible that mixed emotions may be particularly 
beneficial for selecting goal-related choices (response interference) or delaying immediate 
gratification in order to prioritise long-term goals (motivational impulsivity). 
The utility of mixed emotions in treating mental health problems. Mixed 
emotions are primarily elicited by the presence of conflicting goals and conflicting goals 
were found to be negatively related to eudaimonic well-being. Powers (1973) suggests that 
goal conflict represents the most serious kind of malfunction for individuals, even amongst 
people who are not affected by a mental health problem. In a recent review of the literature 
concerning goal conflict (at different levels) and well-being, Kelly and colleagues (2015) 
found that high-level conflict (defined as self-discrepancy), mid-level conflict (defined as 
ambivalence), and low-level conflict (defined by goal conflict in plans or projects), was 
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generally associated with poor well-being outcomes (e.g., lower levels of subjective well-
being and psychological well-being, higher levels of psychological symptoms). Importantly, 
the results of Study 3 in the present research showed that mixed emotions are different from 
ambivalence over emotional expression (i.e., emotional conflict), a measure that is commonly 
associated with mid-level conflict (Kelly et al., 2015), and mixed emotions interacted with 
goal conflict to boost eudaimonic well-being. 
Future research investigating the role of mixed emotions in mental health problems 
may benefit from these findings. For example, inspired by perceptual control theory (Powers, 
1973), Method of Levels (Carey, 2006) is a psychotherapeutic approach that has shown that 
the reorganisation of personal conflicts, by mobilizing client’s awareness of higher level 
goals (e.g., acceptance, integrity, autonomy), is an effective intervention to reduce 
individuals’ distress (Carey & Mullan, 2008). Given the evidence linking goal conflict and 
mixed emotions, it is possible that the expression or verbalisation of mixed emotions during 
therapy may be a useful tool for the therapist. Specifically, mixed emotions may help the 
therapist to identify signs of conflicts that clients are unaware or that may deserve further 
attention via the therapist. It is useful to note that competency measures for psychotherapies 
(e.g., Cognitive Therapy Scale- revised; Blackburn et al., 2001) tend to encourage the 
therapist to elicit a range of single emotions. However, little mention is made of eliciting 
mixed emotions; therefore, the manuals might integrate examples of questions that elicit 
mixed emotions. 
Additionally, understanding mixed emotions may also be useful from the patient’s 
point of view. For example, focusing on the mixed feelings that arise with respect to a 
conflict may facilitate an awareness of personal issues, and could be a more direct signal of 
the presence of conflict. However, it is important to consider that, according to the evidence 
presented in Study 4 and 5, mixed emotions are better for individual well-being when 
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experienced at a moderate level. Therefore, the therapist may need to guide the process in 
order to maintain moderate levels of mixed emotions. For example, PCT (Powers, 1973) 
suggests that when conflict is not integrated at higher levels in the hierarchy of goals, the 
overall sense of control is destabilise. Similarly, mixed emotions may need to be experienced 
at moderate levels to produce positive outcomes for individual’s well-being and to maintain 
the sense of control. 
Finally, mixed emotions may help to explain the course of serious disorders, such as 
bipolar disorder. For example, Carolan and Power (2011) found that the emotional profile 
during mania was characterised by the presence of anger and happiness. Although Carolan 
and Power (2011) did not estimate the presence of mixed emotions as studied in previous 
chapters (e.g., using the minimum index), two hypothetical implications can be suggested. 
Firstly, it is possible that the experience of mixed emotions when no conflict is present may 
be pernicious for individual well-being. Thus, mixed emotions may be an additional 
component of a disturbed affect system, and as such, may assist the diagnostic process. For 
example, future studies could evaluate whether mixed emotions are particular to bipolar 
disorder or present in other forms of depression. The differential diagnosis could benefit from 
clarifying the role of mixed emotions across multiple types of depression.  
Secondly, and perhaps more consistent with the evidence presented so far, mixed 
emotions during mania might be a sign of patient’s resilience. It is possible to suggest that 
mixed emotions of happiness and anger, reflect the attempts of the affect system to regulate 
itself, trying to regain balance over emotional expression, and to restore a normal baseline 
level. Future studies should investigate whether mixed emotions during mania actually reflect 
remission or attempts to restore balance to his/her affect system.  
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Mixed emotions and goal shifting. The findings of Study 5 revealed that mixed 
emotions have a direct effect on efforts to resist temptations. However, efforts to resist 
temptations do not necessarily entail goal attainment. Rather, efforts to resist temptations are 
an indirect indicator of success. For example, Sheldon and Elliot (1998) demonstrated that 
goals that are perceived as more personal and autonomously determined led people to display 
greater efforts, which in turn, were associated with higher levels of goal attainment. 
However, an alternative hypothesis could be that mixed emotions are not related to goal 
attainment, but that the critical goal-related process affected by mixed emotions is goal 
shifting. As suggested in chapter 5, mixed emotions tend to increase behavioural flexibility, 
which in turn may modulates the probability that people will shift from one goal into another, 
instead of influencing the attainment of one single, focal goal. 
Future studies should investigate the mechanisms through which mixed emotions 
influence goal shifting. For example, goal dynamics theory (Fishbach & Dhar, 2005; 
Fishbach, Dhar, & Zhang, 2006; Fishbach et al., 2009), suggests that the simultaneous pursuit 
of multiple goals produces characteristic dynamics of self-regulation. One dynamic is 
highlighting in which people prioritise goals that provide long-term benefits. When 
highlighting, people express commitment towards certain goals. A second dynamic of self-
regulation is balancing. When balancing people alternate between different goals in 
successive choices. Thus, for example, on one occasion a student might choose to revise for 
an exam, whereas on the following occasion progress towards one of the goals permits the 
pursuit of alternative goals, such as resting or visiting friends. 
Thus, mixed emotions may influence goal shifting by affecting the degree to which 
people highlight or balance when pursuing multiple, incompatible goals. However, goal 
dynamics theory has been mainly tested in self-control dilemmas, where one relevant goal is 
threatened by an immediate temptation, which is seen as a second order impulse (e.g., 
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Fishbach & Dhar, 2005; Fishbach et al., 2006). Actually, this theory views goal commitment 
and goal progress as opposite motivational tendencies (Fishbach et al., 2009). Goal pursuit is 
enhanced by higher levels of goal commitment and lower levels of goal progress. However, 
this does not consider situations where multiple long-term goals interact or long- and short-
term goals interact. One interesting finding in Study 5 was that the activation of multiple, 
incompatible goals resulted in greater levels of goal conflict, which means that several 
relevant goals may be active at a given moment. Different theories also suggest that self-
control may involve goal dynamics where the crucial distinction is whether the active goals 
provide long or short-term benefits, which implies that desires are not impulses of second 
order necessarily (Fujita, 2011; Hofmann et al., 2012; Hofmann & Van Dillen, 2012).  
An interesting potential integration of the findings of Study 5 and goal dynamics 
theory could be that goal shifting is a function of the level of conflict and the timescale of the 
active goals (or desires) which in turn may produce different patterns of highlighting and 
balancing. On occasions where long-term goals are active (or a combination of long and 
short-term goals), the dynamic of highlighting will be more suitable at lower levels of 
conflict, whereas at higher levels of conflict people will necessarily need to start balancing, 
evaluating relative progress towards multiple goals. In terms of mixed emotions this implies 
that when people experience reduced experience of mixed emotions they might tend to 
commit to single goals, and the probability of goal shifting will reduce. In contrast, as the 
experience of mixed emotions increases, the need to make progress on simultaneous goals 
will increase goal shifting and efforts will be redistributed among several goals.  
However, opposite results should be obtained when considering the activation of 
short-term goals. The activation of multiple short-term goals will be associated with lower 
levels of goal conflict, and reduced experience of mixed emotions consequently. Multiple 
short-term goals will produce high level of goal shifting, which in turn will be associated with 
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balancing. On the other hand, as the levels of conflict and mixed emotions increase, people 
will progressively start to abandon the balancing dynamic and reduce goal shifting, which in 
turn will increase levels of goal commitment, giving rise to the dynamic of highlighting. 
Figure 19 shows a representation of the expected effects. For example, if a PhD 
student has the goal to finish a thesis chapter next Monday but the desire to spend more time 
with his family arises, it is possible that at first he will prioritise the thesis chapter and 
commit himself to finishing on time. However, as the level of conflict increases, and the urge 
to go home becomes stronger, mixed emotions will lead to the redistribution of efforts and an 
attempt to find a middle point between finishing the chapter and spending time with his 
family. Perhaps, working at night when his family is sleeping will be his solution.  
In contrast, if the same PhD student wants some ice-cream, and also wants to watch a 
movie and chat with his mother, he will probably find a way to progress each of these short-
term goals, even juggling the three of them at the same time. However, if his mother starts 
asking multiple questions, while the movie is reaching its climax, he will start to perceive a 
certain amount of conflict and mixed emotions. He doesn’t want to interrupt his mother, but 
the movie is really good. As a consequence, at a certain point, he will need to prioritise the 
movie, the chat with the mother, or even the ice-cream which has been melting while trying 
















Figure 19. Goal shift as a function of the degree of goal conflict/mixed emotions and the timescale of 
the active goals (or desires). Note that the model anticipates that goal shifting reaches an asymptote at 
high and low levels of balancing or highlighting. This intends to reflect that the probability of goal 
disengagement is still present, and the degree of goal shifting is limited. 
 
6.3. Mixed emotions within an integrated theory of emotional complexity 
The phenomenon of mixed emotions reveals a striking feature of emotional 
experience, which is that emotions are complex and vary in ways far beyond the typical 
distinction between positive and negative affect. People report experiencing a vast number of 
emotional experiences, including simple positive and negative affect (e.g., Russell, 2003; 
Russell & Carroll, 1999), “blue-ribbon” emotional episodes (e.g., Panksepp, 2005), and 
mixtures of emotions of varying kinds, ranging from blends of emotion (e.g., Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1987; Vansteelandt et al., 2005) to mixed emotions (e.g., Larsen & McGraw, 















Considering the evidence presented across the multiple studies conducted in the 
present research project, the question arises of how is it possible to report two disparate 
emotions such as happiness and sadness at the same time. This implies that people not only 
recognise some feelings as a combination of different affects, but also that people access 
different sources of affective experience, and that they categorise this experience as a genuine 
feeling. Research has shown that self-reports of affective experience do not merely represent 
thoughts about emotions, but emotional words account for the subjective emotional 
experience itself (Barrett, 2004). Moreover, evidence indicates that language also contributes 
to the perception of emotions  (Gendron, Lindquist, Barsalou, & Barrett, 2012; Lindquist, 
Barrett, Bliss-Moreau, & Russell, 2006). 
Therefore, in order to report two different affects as occurring at the same time, it is 
necessary to characterise both affective experiences as equally meaningful entities within a 
particular situation. This means that people are, firstly, capable of distinguishing two opposite 
affects as separate experiences; and secondly, that these two particular emotions (among a 
large set of different emotional words) are the best to represent their particular state. In this 
sense, it is possible to argue that mixed emotions are a complex emotional experience.   
Kang and Shaver (2004) defined emotional complexity as a personality construct 
related to a large range of emotional experiences and a propensity to make thin distinctions 
within emotional categories. In addition, Lindquist and Barrett (2008) understand emotional 
complexity as a broad construct containing diverse emotional phenomena, such as emotional 
granularity or dialecticism. Emotional complexity corresponds to a complex network of 
emotional concepts that allows individuals to experience refined emotional experiences 
which cannot be described in broad terms. Rather, emotional complexity demands either 
making subtle distinctions within emotional concepts (e.g., emotional granularity; Barrett, 
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2004), or constructing more precise concepts using manifold emotional experiences (e.g., 
mixed emotions). 
However, current definitions of emotional complexity lack a theoretical framework 
that integrates multiple affective phenomena. It was evident through the present investigation 
of mixed emotions that future developments need a more comprehensive theory that 
organises the multiple phenomena related to emotional complexity and makes sense of the 
relationship between multiple aspects of emotional complexity. Hence, the Iceberg Model of 
Emotional Complexity (IMEC) is proposed as a modest and preliminary contribution to 
address this issue and to establish basic principles to study emotional complexity in future 
research. The IMEC takes its name from the shape of the model once all the components are 
integrated (see Figure 20). The model can be decomposed into six major tenets, which are 
briefly described below in the form of principles. 
Principle 1: The emotional lexicon corresponds to the overidentified model of 
affect, which is inaccessible. English, as any other language, has a very large number of 
terms that refer to emotions. Researchers usually simplify the structure of affect in order to 
explain the largest amount of variability using the smallest number of affective descriptors. 
Shaver et al. (1987, Study 1) investigated the hierarchical structure of affect using cluster 
analysis. They determined that the lowest level corresponds to the emotional lexicon that 
characterises the language of a community of native speakers (213 emotional adjectives 
surveyed). In the immediate upper level two smaller sets of discrete emotions were described. 
These correspond to the list of basic emotional adjectives found by theorists of basic 
emotions. The hierarchical structure described by Shaver and colleagues (1987) also 
distinguishes two broad characterisations of emotions as positive affect and negative affect at 





Figure 20. Iceberg model of emotional complexity (IMEC). The upper part of the model was taken 
from the hierarchical structure found by Shaver et al. (1987), including the emotional lexicon.  
 
The IMEC states that the characterisation of emotional experiences using a limited 
number of emotional adjectives provides a useful and accurate representation of emotional 
experiences across the most common situations where emotions are felt. A model is always a 
simplified version of reality. A model of affect is not a replica of emotions as experienced by 
individuals; this is only possible to obtain through investigating the emotional lexicon. As the 
number of variables largely surpasses the parameters that researchers are trying to estimate 
(e.g., fluctuations of emotions over time), the emotional lexicon is always an overidentified 
model, impossible to investigate due to practical reasons (e.g., it is unfeasible to conduct 
research considering a very large amount of emotional adjectives) and statistical reasons 
(e.g., the probability of committing type-II error is large). 
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Principle 2: The emotional lexicon can produce a number of emotional experiences 
beyond common characterisations of affect. Factorising the emotional lexicon to obtain 
simpler structures of affect is a deductive process in which multiple emotional adjectives are 
seen as representing a smaller set of emotional exemplars. This approach, however, ignores 
that the emotional lexicon can produce a vast number of other emotional experiences beyond 
classification defined by simplified versions of the affect structure. For example, Larsen and 
Diener (1992) argued that, despite the strengths of the circumplex model of affect in 
organising a vast number of emotional adjectives, it has limited utility for generating 
hypotheses concerning emotional experiences of similar valence and arousal (e.g., anger and 
fear). 
The IMEC proposes that a number of emotional experiences exist beyond common 
descriptors of affect produced by dimensional or discrete approaches. These descriptions of 
emotion are derived from the same emotional lexicon that descriptive models employ to 
characterise the structure of affect. The generation of multiple other emotional experiences is 
driven by an inductive process, in which simple characteristics governing relationships 
between multiple emotions (many of them described by the models located in the “surface”) 
create more complex emotional experiences. 
 There are four characteristics that are used to “create” emotional complexity: valence 
of affect, intensity of affect, appraisals, and alignment with goals (e.g., action 
readiness).Valence has been identified as a fundamental feature of the affective experience 
(e.g., Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009; Russell, 1980). Almost any word of the affective lexicon 
can be described in terms of the level of pleasantness or unpleasantness. Although authors 
disagree on whether valence is better organised as a bipolar dimension (e.g., the circumplex 
model of affect; Russell & Carroll, 1999) or as a bivariate space (e.g., the evaluative space 
model; Cacioppo et al., 2004), it is clear that interrelations between emotional words of 
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different or similar valence signify markedly different subjective experiences. Whereas 
valence or hedonic tone is described in terms of pleasantness and unpleasantness, intensity 
has been described as a complex emotional feature containing different parameters such as 
the level of arousal or activation, the drasticness of action tendency, and influence upon long-
term behaviour (Sonnemans & Frijda, 1994). 
Appraisals mean that the evaluation of the surrounding circumstances of an affective 
experience play a relevant role in the elicitation and differentiation of emotions (Arnold, 
1960; Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). This is not to say that appraisals correspond to high 
evaluative process exclusively, appraisals can be defined as perceptions of external events 
which are not related to high cognitive processing (Moors, 2013). As stated by Ellsworth and 
Scherer (2003), the “appraisals process is a link between the organism and the situation that 
produces the emotion” (pg. 574). Appraisals show that emotions are adaptive responses that 
motivate individuals to act in particular ways (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Frijda, 2004). 
Emotions also align individual behaviours with specific goals that promote adaptive 
responses. Frijda (2004) argued that the relationship between emotion and motivation relies 
on the energizing properties of emotions on behaviours, and the intentional properties that 
align behaviour and desired end states, giving the affect system an increasing range of 
flexibility and variability to respond to complex environments. The complex experiences that 
arise from these characteristics are organised through two parameters: time and situations. 
Principle 3: There are two levels of emotional complexity, the first level of 
emotional complexity is defined by different fluctuation in emotions over time. Emotions 
fluctuate over time and over situations, and continuous changes in affective experience 
constitute the essence of how emotions colour people’s daily life. This means that emotions 
are dynamic (Kuppens, Oravecz, & Tuerlinckx, 2010; Mauro, 1992; Mesquita & Boiger, 
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2014; Scherer, 2004, 2009). Emotions are not merely the aggregation of isolated and static 
states, but a collection of changing processes (Mauro, 1992). This implies that emotions do 
not only shift from one into another, but more importantly, emotions mutually influence each 
other over the course of an event, altering the intensity of subsequent affects, modifying the 
hedonic valence of ongoing experiences, coupling multiple emotional experiences as a 
consequence of similar appraisals, or changing the behaviours to be deployed at a given 
moment.  
Changes in emotion can result in diverse processes defined by the individuals’ 
fluctuations in emotion (Davidson, 1998; Kuppens et al., 2010). Davidson (1998) described 
four individual differences in affective dynamics characterised by specific features of time. 
One temporal dynamic is defined by the threshold for eliciting particular emotions. Some 
people will have an emotional response to a stimulus of low intensity, whereas others will 
need a more intense stimulus for the elicitation of the same emotion. Another dynamic is 
defined by the amplitude of the emotional response. The time to rise to peak is a temporal 
dynamic of affect characterised by more or less quick responses to emotional stimuli. Finally, 
the last dynamic is recovery time, which is related to the amount of time that an individual 
takes to recover to a baseline level of affect. 
More recently, several other emotional dynamics have been defined. Emotional inertia 
is a recent concept defined by the degree to which emotional responses are resistant to change 
(Kuppens, Allen, & Sheeber, 2010; Kuppens, Sheeber, Yap, Whittle, Simmons, & Allen, 
2012). Emotional inertia has been seen as an unresponsive dynamic of affect, where 
individuals are insensitive to variations in the environment (Kuppens et al., 2010). Emotional 
variability or instability could be described as the opposite face of emotional inertia. 
Emotional variability is defined by the intraindividual variability of emotions over time 
(Grühn, Lumley, Diehl, Labouvie-Dief, 2013; Röcke, & Smith, 2009). 
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Emotional inertia and variability seem to be a function of goal alignment. Emotional 
unresponsiveness from one moment to the next may indicate that people are fixed on the 
emotional consequences of certain events (e.g., unattained goals and subsequent frustration), 
whereas high levels of variability may indicate that emotional experiences are highly reactive 
to changes in the environment (e.g., volatile emotional expression without having reference 
values or goals associated). Interestingly, high levels of inertia and variability, irrespective of 
valence, have been shown to be negatively related to well-being and health-related outcomes 
(e.g., Houben, Van der Noorgate, & Kuppens, 2015; Grouber et al., 2013; Koval, Pe, Meers, 
& Kuppens, 2013; Kuppens et al., 2012). 
Finally, the dynamics of emotions can be also characterised in terms of augmentation 
and blunting; that is, current emotions can increase or decrease the experience of subsequent 
emotions (Pe & Kuppens, 2012). Interestingly, valence and appraisals seem to guide patterns 
of augmentation and blunting. Emotions tend to increase the occurrence of subsequent 
emotions of the same valence, whereas emotions of opposite valence showed blunting from 
one moment to the next (Pe & Kuppens, 2012). Furthermore, evidence has shown that the 
extent to which appraisals involved in a sequence of emotions over time are similar, can 
make augmentation or blunting stronger (Pe & Kuppens, 2012). 
In sum, it is possible to describe a number of complex emotional experiences mostly 
characterised by the parameter of time. This level of emotional complexity describes patterns 
of fluctuation of emotions over time, and constitutes a level of complexity that is generally 
defined by the interrelations among multiple single emotional experiences. 
Principle 4: A second level of emotional complexity is defined by complex situations 
that increase the levels of self-organisation in emotional processes. The IMEC proposes 
that, when time is constrained and the emotion-related event is increasingly complex in terms 
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of its organisation of information, a new set of complex emotions will emerge. At higher 
levels of emotional complexity, the emotional lexicon is increasingly integrated, facilitating 
the emergence of sui-generis patterns of affect characterised by self-organization dynamics. 
Self-organization may result in new verbalisations of emotions, uncommon in the emotional 
lexicon (e.g., mixed feelings), or the combination of multiple emotional adjectives into one 
single experience (e.g., awe; Keltner & Haidt, 2003). 
As the level of emotional complexity increases, self-organization processes may not 
resemble the common use of the emotional lexicon, although people identify these 
experiences as genuine feelings. For example, it is remarkable that the English language, 
among others (e.g., Spanish, Portuguese), does not have specific emotional adjectives to 
describe mixed emotions. Likewise, awe has been defined as a mixture of surprise, pleasure, 
elevation, and astonishment (Darwin, 1872; Keltner & Haidt, 2003). From the point of view 
of the IMEC, this is because some emotional complex phenomena result from increasing self-
organization processes in emotional experiences. 
Self-organization is the process through which a control system reduces a state of 
chaos (i.e., disorganization) via successive negative feedback loops among multiple control 
systems (Guastello, 2002). This is to say that mutual interactions between multiple control 
systems facilitate the emergence of more complex emotions which, in turn, permit the affect 
system to keep flexible and ensure behavioural viability within certain boundaries. For 
example, understanding mixed emotions as an emergent phenomenon explains the positive 
correlations between positive and negative emotion shown in Study 4, evidencing a 
discontinuity from the typical negative correlations observed between positive and negative 
emotions. Thus, mixed emotions are represented by a spontaneous reorganization of the rules 
governing the emotional lexicon, which allow positive associations between emotions of 
opposite valence when goals conflict. 
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This is closely related to Powers’ (1973) idea of the reorganization of goal conflict at 
higher levels in the hierarchy of goals. The IMEC adds that complex emotional experiences 
may be considered an integration process which helps individuals to resolve conflict or 
reduce uncertainty by mobilizing meaning-making. As suggested by Parkinson (2009) 
emotions are a fundamental component in the creation of meaning. The IMEC additionally 
asserts that complex emotional experiences may reduce discrepancies perceived in the 
environment by assisting the process of creating meaning in life. This may help to explain 
why mixed emotions are associated with eudaimonic well-being, and particularly, with 
aspects of eudaimonic well-being related to meaning-making (e.g., life purpose). 
Park (2010) defined meaning-making as the process through which individuals 
attempt to reduce the discrepancy between perceived goals, beliefs or expectations. Park 
(2010) further suggests that searching for meaning may result in greater acceptance, 
perceptions of growth, and changes in identity, global beliefs or goals. Study 3 actually found 
that mixed emotions are closely related to searching for meaning in life, but negatively 
related to having meaning in life. In short, mixed emotions and other complex emotional 
experiences may mobilize individuals to engage to reduce discrepancies, but the actual 











Table 15. Comparison between different concepts of emotional complexity with mixed emotions. 
  Comparison with Mixed emotions 
    
Concept Definition Similarities Differences 
    
    
Emotional 
granularity 
Individual difference associated with 
the ability to make finer distinctions 
and well-differentiated reports of 
emotional experience, demonstrated by 
weak correlations between emotional 
states of the same valence (Barrett, 
2004). 
- Both are described as 
complex emotional 
experiences 
- Complexity is accounted 
for precision rather than 
variety of affective 
experience 
- Assumes a bipolar 
structure of affective 
experience. 
    
Emodiversity 
The degree to which people can 
experience a diverse and abundant set 
of emotional experiences over a period 
of time. Emodiversity is a measure of 
richness of emotional complexity and 
the proportionality of experiences 
pertaining to a broad number of 
emotions (Quoidbach et al., 2014). 
- Emotional complexity 
is constituted by the 
degree of diversity of 
emotions that people 
can experience 
- Emotions are able to 
freely interact with 
each other. 
- The concept of 
emodiversity does not 
incorporate co-activation 
patterns of affect. 
    
Meta-
emotions 
A focal emotion is used as an object for 
a secondary emotion, such as one 
emotion promptings a secondary 
emotion (Mitmansgruber et al., 2008; 
Norman & Furnes, in press). 
- Different emotions 
can be experienced in a 
very short period of 
time 
- Complexity is about 
diverse emotional 
experiences. 
- One primary emotion is 
used as an object to 
experience a secondary 
emotion 
- Meta-emotions are the 
result of meta-cognitive 
functions. 
    
Emotional 
refinement 
“Emotional states characterised by 
detachment, restraint, second-order 
experiences, and self-reflexive 
awareness” (Frijda & Sundararajan, 
2007, pg. 232). 
- May incorporate 
mixed feelings because 




- Incorporates a series of 
different appraisals into 
one unique feeling. 





In terms of the multiple complex emotional experiences found in the literature that 
may fit with principle 4, Table 15 provides a description of several (but not all) the emotional 
complexity phenomena that can be described at this level of analysis. They are compared 
with the concept of mixed emotions and displayed in increasing order of self-organization, as 
previously defined. Emotional granularity can be described as the less self-organized 
phenomenon because the emotional lexicon is conserved. At the middle level of self-
organization is the phenomenon of mixed emotions because the emotional lexicon is shaped 
in new ways that challenge general characteristics concerning the interrelations between 
emotions. Finally, emotional refinement and transcendence are described as the clearest 
examples of self-organization because they combine multiple emotional words and rules to 
create sui-generis emotional experience.  
Principle 5: It is possible to find individual differences in emotional complexity 
that result from three key components observed in the emergent affective phenomena. 
Despite the multiple complex emotional phenomena that can be identified as a result of 
fluctuations over time and chaotic external demands, the IMEC asserts that a common 
single dimension of emotional complexity could be found. 
The model argues that three key dimensions underlie the concept of emotional 
complexity. The first dimension is accuracy which is defined by the degree to which 
people distinguish between emotional experiences. The dimension of accuracy is similar 
to the traditional conceptualization of complexity in terms of the ability to make thin 
distinctions between different emotional experiences (Barrett, 2004; Khan & Shaver, 
2004). The second dimension is versatility which is defined by the degree to which 
people experience a wide variety of emotional experiences, incorporating multiple 
combinations available in the emotional lexicon, beyond common distinctions and 
interrelations of different emotional experiences. This dimension reflects idiosyncratic 
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variations in emotional experiences, ranging from emodiversity to mixed emotions. 
Finally, the third dimension is deepness and is defined by the degree to which people 
experience high levels of personal involvement when experiencing complex emotions. 
This dimension reflects a fusion between the self and the emotional experience, and is 
commonly found in artistic inspiration, and personal experiences that are characterised 
by elevation, self-transcendence, and epiphanic experiences. Hence, the IMEC suggests 
that greater levels of the aforementioned dimensions better characterise what individuals 
and researchers imply when they try to describe emotional complexity. 
Principle 6: The functionality of emotional complexity is determined by the 
perception of the stimuli. Emotional complexity is not useful or beneficial for itself. As 
demonstrated in Study 5, mixed emotions are beneficial when conflicting goals are 
present. Likewise, the different emotional complexity phenomena described so far serve 
adaptive purposes that foster behavioural flexibility on occasions of increasing uncertainty. 
However, when the context is familiar, experiencing complex emotions may destabilize the 
affect system, which may turn emotional complexity into a pernicious experience for 
individuals’ well-being. On occasions where the stimuli are familiar, the repertoire available 
in the emotional lexicon of a given individual is better characterised by discrete and 
dimensional models of affect, or dynamic models of emotions, resulting in greater 
adaptability. This does not mean that familiarity necessarily equates to successful progress. In 
accordance with PCT (Powers, 1973, 2014) emotions are still thought as resulting from error 
signals. Familiarity implies that the nature of the perceived stimulus is not uncertain. 
Individuals continuously try to restore stability and a sense of familiarity with the 
environment on occasions where conflicting stimuli are perceived (Powers, 1973; Proux & 
Inzlicht, 2012). Several theories actually suggest that people make efforts to regain a sense of 
stability when facing uncertainty (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004; Hirsh, Mar, & Peterson, 
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2011; Proux & Inzlicht, 2012; Van de Bos, 2001). The IMEC suggests that experiencing 
emotional complexity is a common response to stimuli that are perceived as uncertain. 
Uncertainty is one of the most critical adaptive challenges for individuals, and people try to 
maintain levels of uncertainty at manageable levels (Berlyne, 1957; Hirsh et al., 2011). 
Importantly, Berlyne (1957) defined uncertainty as indicating the complexity of a conflict. 
According to Berlyne (1957) conflict is determined by the number of stimuli that are 
perceived in a given moment and the probability that a certain response associated with a 
stimulus will occur during one unit of time. This means that conflict is not an absolute 
measure (i.e., present versus absent), but a relative function of the number of goals that are 
activated at a given moment and the probability that the respective behaviours will occur. 
Thus, higher values of this function, mean that greater levels of uncertainty are perceived. 
This assertion is consistent with evidence found in Study 5, where the number of active goals 
was associated with higher levels of goal conflict. 
The IMEC proposes that increasing levels of uncertainty are responsible for the 
emergence of increasingly complex emotional experiences. Under uncertain circumstances, 
the organism gains flexibility to adapt more efficiently to the environment. As mentioned in 
chapter 5, mixed emotions facilitate the integration of complex information at a given 
moment, providing greater behavioural flexibility to respond to incompatible cues in the 
environment. This is consistent with common conceptualisations of mixed emotions 
(Cacioppo et al., 1999; Cacioppo et al., 2004; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1996; Reich et al., 
2003; Zautra, 2003). The IMEC further suggests that this function is not peculiar to mixed 
emotions, but rather represents the common adaptive purpose of emotional complexity, in 
general. 
Unlike recent approaches that have argued that negative emotions are a typical 
response to higher levels of conflict (Hirsh et al., 2011; Proux & Inzlicht, 2012), Berlyne 
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(1957, 1960, 1963) suggested that conflict may be rewarding, such as in gambling and 
aesthetic behaviour. This is not to say that people are wanting to maintain a state of conflict. 
People continuously look to resolve conflict. However, conflict can instigate exploration and 
curiosity, especially when conflict involves two potentially attractive outcomes (i.e., 
gambling) or when conflict is associated with the expectations aroused by the context (i.e., 
novelty) (Berlyne, 1957, 1960, 1963). Hence, Berlyne’s conceptualization of uncertainty 
leaves enough room to accommodate a large number of phenomena reflecting emotional 
complexity, even those that result from artistic appreciation. 
In sum, the IMEC represents a preliminary attempt to integrate a broad range of 
complex emotional experiences that have been characterised in the literature, not yet 
organised into a common theoretical framework. The principles stated in this sub-section 
represent some elementary aspects that may be useful within a more refined version of this 
theory, which is still to come. The IMEC can consistently integrate disparate 
conceptualizations of emotional complexity into a common framework. The IMEC also 
explains some discontinuities evidenced in several of the previous studies reported (positive 
correlations between positive and negative emotions), and conceptualises the nature of the 
association between mixed emotions and eudaimonic well-being in terms of meaning-making 
mechanisms. Ultimately, the IMEC suggests that emotional complexity is the hallmark of an 
affect system that is flexible enough to permit a vast number of emotional responses, accurate 
in signifying relevant stimuli in the environment, and able to initiate searching for meaning 
from disparate situations such as conflict and spiritual revelation. 
Conclusion. In conclusion mixed emotions are a relevant component of the emotional 
repertoire. Mixed emotions have identifiable sources related to goal conflict, they are 
significantly associated with eudaimonic well-being, and assist the process through which 
people resolve conflicting goals. Mixed emotions are not merely the result of confusion or 
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misunderstanding in emotional reports. Different measures of mixed emotions used across the 
studies conducted in the present research project demonstrate consistent evidence linking 
conflicting goals, mixed emotions, and eudaimonic well-being. Meta-analytic evidence also 
supports the claim that mixed emotions are a measurable and non-artifactual experience. 
Implications of the findings offered in previous chapters point to an inextricable relation 
between conflicting goals and mixed emotions, which implies that mixed emotions have 
functional properties that enable individuals to display increasing levels of behavioural 
flexibility and integrate complex strands of information at a given moment. Functional 
properties of mixed emotions may offer important research avenues to investigate mixed 
emotions in clinical settings, improve health-related outcomes, and to better understand the 
relation between goal multiplicity, mixed emotions, and goal shifting. The lack of theoretical 
developments in the field of emotional complexity also offers the opportunity to integrate the 
findings presented in this research project within a broader conceptualisation of emotional 
complexity. Ultimately, the study of mixed emotions may help to explain why, despite 
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8.1. Appendix-1: Evaluating the correspondence between different 
measures of mixed emotions.  
Intraindividual correlation between oppositely valenced affects is one of the most 
common indices of mixed emotions used when conducting longitudinal studies (e.g., Brose, 
Voelkle, Lövdén, Lindenberger, & Schmiedek, 2014; Grühn, Lumley, Diehl, Labouvie-Dief, 
2013; Hershfield et al., 2013; Ong & Bergeman, 2004; Perunovic, Heller, & Rafaeli, 2007). 
Consecutive affective reports over time permits us to estimate the strength of the correlation 
between two or more sets of affective items (e.g., happy, sad, calm, stressed) within each 
individual. This is known as an intraindividual or within-person correlation. For example, it is 
possible to calculate how strongly correlated happiness and sadness are across all the time 
points reported for each individual.  
Within-person correlations are markedly different from between-person correlations. 
Between-person correlations reflect the strength of the association between two sets of 
affective items across people at a given point in time (Brose et al., 2014). When emotions are 
measured over time, an ad-hoc procedure to estimate the between-person correlation is to 
calculate a simple correlation between, for example, scores of happiness and sadness across 
all individuals and across all measurement points (Zelenski & Larsen, 2000). Within- and 
between-person correlations also differ in their association patterns. Between-person 
correlations among positive and negative affective items are commonly near zero; whereas 
within-person correlations among positive and negative affective items are usually negative, 
ranging from -0.58 to -0.13 (Bleidorn & Peters, 2011; Merz & Roesch, 2011; Rush & Hofer, 
2014; Vansteelandt et al., 2005).  
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Yet, the interpretation of a within- or a between-person correlation of a pair of 
oppositely valenced emotions is similar. A within-person (or between-person) correlation 
near zero between, for example, happiness and sadness means that positive affect (PA; e.g., 
happiness) and negative affect (NA; e.g., sadness) were experienced independently (Grühn et 
al., 2013), suggesting that it is more likely that mixed emotions can occur (or in general, if a 
between-person correlation was estimated; Brose et al., 2014). In other words, more positive 
correlations between positive and negative emotions imply that greater mixed emotions are 
present. In contrast, a within-person (or between-person) correlation closer to minus one 
indicates that PA and NA were experienced on a single, bipolar dimension (Grühn et al., 
2013), and this renders co-activation unlikely. 
Evidence is in general consistent in demonstrating that within-person correlations of 
PA and NA near zero are related to better mental and physical functioning (e.g., Brose et al., 
2014; Coifman et al., 2007; Grühn et al., 2013; Hershfield et al., 2013; Ong & Bergeman, 
2004). Table 16 shows a summary of the five identified studies that have investigated the 
association of a within-person correlation between positive and negative affect with well-
being (broadly defined) using a longitudinal design, in its different forms (e.g., experiencing 
sampling, diary study). It is worth noting that the average within-person correlation was, in 
general, negative excepting Ong and Bergeman’s (2004) study which found a positive within-
person correlation. It is possible that this may be due to the fact that Ong & Bergeman’s study 
collected a sample of older adults only. Previous studies have shown that older adults are 
more prone to experience time as a limited experience and this may result in positive within-
person correlations (Carstensen et al., 2000; Ong & Bergeman, 2004). Another notable aspect 
from Table 16 is that the range of within-person correlations between PA and NA was large. 
Figures extracted from these studies showed that the within-person PA-NA correlation range 
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varied from -0.86 to 0.86, which may be indicative of substantial individual differences in the 
experience of mixed emotions (e.g., Rafaeli et al., 2007; Wilt et al., 2011).  
More importantly, the summary of the studies shown in Table 16 reveals that, in 
general, within-person correlations were positively associated with different well-being-
related variables. For example, Ong and Bergeman (2004) surveyed the emotional state of a 
sample of older adults every day during 30 consecutive days. Then they calculated the 
within-person correlation between the positively valenced emotions and the negatively 
valenced emotions as an indicator of poignancy. Positive and stronger within-person 
correlation reflected greater poignancy, whereas negative within-person correlations reflected 
less degree of poignancy. Results showed that within-person correlations between PA and 
NA were positively related to indicators of resilience and negatively correlated with 
neuroticism. They interpreted these findings as demonstrating that co-activation of positive 
and negative emotions predicts better mental functioning among older adults. 
Another study showed that frequency of mixed emotions episodes were strongly 
associated with better physical health (Hershfield et al., 2013). In this study, 3 waves of data 
were collected with a 5-years interval. Participants were instructed to complete an emotional 
adjective questionnaire 5-times a day for over a week in each wave; they also completed a 
medical health questionnaire. Mixed emotions were estimated as the within-person correlation 
between positive emotions (e.g., happiness, amusement) and negative emotions (e.g., sadness, 
fear). Multilevel models were used to demonstrate that mixed emotions were associated with 
less physical health symptoms, over and above mean levels of positive and negative emotions 




Table 16. Summary of the longitudinal evidence linking within-person correlation of positive and 
negative affect and well-being. 





of the sample 
/ (SD) 







      
Brose et al., 2014 101 25.6 (2.7) -.36 (N.R.) 
- Trait positive affect r = .23* 
- Personal growth r = .24* 
      
Coifman et al., 
2007 
54 49.8 (8.2) -.45 (.54) 
- Resilient bereaved 
compared to 
symptomatic bereaved 
d = .56 
      
Grühn et al., 
2013 
109 55.4 (15.9) N.R. 
- Subjective well-




being (6 dimensions) 
n.s. 
      
Hershfield et al., 
2013 




β = .14** 
      
Ong & 
Bergeman, 2004 
40 75.5 (6.3) .19 (.28) 
- Global resilience r = .45** 
- Daily stress r = -.38* 
- Neuroticism r = -.34* 
      
Note: SD = standard deviation; N.R. = not reported; n.s. = no significant association. * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
 
Coifman and colleagues (2007) interviewed a sample of bereaved people on four 
different occasions starting after 4-months of bereavement. The sample was divided into 
resilient bereaved people and bereaved people experiencing depressive symptoms using a 
standardised clinical interview based on the diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
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disorder. Next, they coded portions of each interview as indicating positive affect or negative 
affect; participants also completed a measure of perceived health and a standardised measure 
of health-related symptoms. Findings revealed that resilient bereaved participants tended to 
experience positive and negative emotions concurrently more frequently during each 
interview compared to the participants with symptoms, based on within-person correlations 
(Coifman et al., 2007). Furthermore, resilient bereaved participants exhibited better self-
perceived health compared to the other group (Coifman et al., 2007).  
The two studies that have investigated the association between within-person 
correlations and eudaimonic well-being, using the psychological well-being questionnaire 
(Brose et al., 2014; Grühn et al., 2013) have produced mixed results. Brose and colleagues 
(2014) hypothesised that individuals who have a PA-NA within-person correlation more 
similar to the PA-NA between-person correlation (near zero) should exhibit better well-being. 
In order to assess this hypothesis, participants firstly completed the psychological well-being 
scale (Ryff, 1989) and a trait measure of PA and NA (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988). Next, they participated in a diary study completing a state-affect version of PANAS 
once a day for approximately 100-days. Results revealed a significant effect of trait-PA on 
the PA-NA within-person correlation. That is, individuals who reported feeling more positive 
emotions in general in their lives also had PA-NA within-person correlations near zero. 
Likewise, people who scored higher on the psychological well-being dimension of personal 
growth had less negative PA-NA within-person correlations. 
In comparison, Grühn and colleagues (2013) carried out an experiencing sampling 
study where participants completed a brief questionnaire five times a day for a total of seven 
consecutive days. They used PANAS (Watson et al., 1988) to evaluate the state-affect at each 
occasion, and they also incorporated the psychological well-being questionnaire (Ryff, 1989) 
and trait-affect PANAS (Watson et al., 1988) as baseline measures. However, the findings in 
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this study did not show an effect of psychological well-being or trait-affect on the PA-NA 
within-person correlations. Actually, an opposite trend was observed with estimates 
exhibiting a negative, though non-significant association between psychological well-being 
and PA-NA within-person correlations, excepting the dimension of relation with others which 
showed a positive trend. A similar negative trend was observed between trait-PA and within-
person correlations of PA-NA. 
Most of the studies reported in Table 16 assume that the within-person correlation 
reflects the co-activation of positively valenced and negatively valenced emotions and some 
have considered this to be a measure of mixed emotions or a similar construct (Hershfield et 
al., 2013; Ong & Bergeman, 2007; Perunovic et al., 2007). However, correlation indices may 
not adequately reflect the experience of mixed emotions. Schimmack (2001) showed that a 
pair of oppositely valenced emotions (e.g., happy-sad) revealed the elicitation of mixed 
emotions using the minimum index, but the contrary could be inferred when calculating the 
correlation between these emotions. In other words, correlation values near zero may not 
necessarily reflect the elicitation of mixed emotions. According to Schimmack (2001) 
correlation indices do not appropriately capture the elicitation of mixed emotions because 
correlations near zero do not accurately inform about the elicitation of mixed emotions as 
compared to using the intensity of the weaker affect (i.e., minimum index).  
To provide additional support for Schimmack’s claim, Figure 21 shows contingency 
tables for the elicitation of different pairs of oppositely valenced emotions based on state-
affect reports of data from Berrios, Totterdell and Niven (2015). This is similar to the 
contingency tables reported by Schimmack (2001). The mixed emotion experience of 
happiness and boredom based on the minimum index was equal to 2.9 (considering a scale 
ranging from 1- not at all - to 5 – very much -). In contrast, the correlation of the same pair of 
emotions was equal to -0.42 (Panel 10A). 
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Panel 10B shows a different pattern. The minimum index between enthusiasm and 
sadness was equal to 2.8 (similar to the minimum index of happiness-boredom), whereas the 
correlation between these emotions was equal to -0.09. The lack of correspondence between 
correlations and the minimum index cast doubts that correlation indices reflect the intensity 
of mixed emotions. If correlations do reflect the activation of mixed emotions, then it is not 

















Figure 21. Contingency tables representing the frequency of observations for different pairs of 




An alternative interpretation may suggest that within-person correlations do not 
correspond with correlation indices estimated from cross-sectional data, which are more 
precisely between-person correlations. Variations over time reduce measurement error and 
take into account fluctuations of emotions in daily life, which is not possible to estimate using 
simple correlations at a single time point. Therefore, a Monte-Carlo simulation was generated 
using data reported by Study 5 in order to determine the degree of correspondence between 
different indices of mixed emotions (i.e., within-person correlations, minimum index, and 
subjective measure of mixed emotions). 
Monte-Carlo simulation refers to a computational algorithm that randomly generates 
artificial data, using a specific data-generating process (Carsey & Harden, 2013). Most types 
of data-generating process (DGP) are a mix of systematic and stochastic components (Carsey 
& Harden, 2013). Systematic components are generally defined by the parameters established 
by the researchers. In the case of the present simulation, this corresponds with the 
formulations to calculate the associations among the within-person correlations index, the 
minimum index, and the subjective measure of mixed emotions. The stochastic component is 
normally an error term defined by a particular distribution (e.g., normal, poison; Carsey & 
Harden, 2013). 
For the present simulation, 10,000 artificial responses were simulated for three mixed 
emotions indices: within-person correlations, minimum index, and the subjective measure of 
mixed emotions. Next, Pearson-correlations were estimated between these indices of mixed 
emotions. The stochastic component fitted the data automatically according to the actual 
distribution of these indices in the sample of Study 5; therefore, the error terms of each 
parameter were estimated separately for each variable. 
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Results showed that the minimum index was positively and moderately strongly 
correlated with the subjective measure of mixed emotions (0.48), whereas the within-person 
correlation index was negatively and weakly correlated with both the minimum index (-0.12) 
and the subjective measure of mixed emotions (-0.12). Again, this casts some doubts about 
the appropriateness of using within-person correlation as an indicator of mixed emotions. 
Certain correspondence should be expected between different measures of mixed emotion, 
but this simulation showed that only two measures of mixed emotions (the minimum index 
and the subjective measure of mixed emotions) seem to be tapping a similar construct. As a 
final separate note, the average within-person correlation between positive affect and 
negative affect for the present simulation (-0.44) is quite similar to the correlation anticipated 
by the circumplex model of affect (-0.47; Russell & Carroll, 1999). This correlation is 
characteristic of the L-shape bivariate response distribution of a bipolar dimension of valence 
in the circumplex model when measurement error is controlled and response format is strictly 
unipolar; therefore, the current data-generating process seems to be unbiased for the within-




8.2. Appendix-2: Concepts explained to participants in Study 5 
Desires. A desire is an impulse that usually emerges suddenly in your mind and is not 
related with your current activities. For example, you can be exercising and suddenly you want 
to eat some chocolate. Desires can be understood as temptations because sometimes they 
interfere with your activities. For example, you are revising for an exam and your desires to 
chat with your friends may interfere with the study. In this example, your desires compete for 
your time and energy to finish the current activity. 
Another feature of desires is that they can be in conflict with an important goal for you. 
For example, you may have been trying to quit smoking but during the day you crave for a 
cigarette. Another example could be that you want to sleep or rest, but you are working. 
Finally, it is important to mention that you can have more than one desire 
simultaneously. For example, you may want to drink a glass of wine and this desire 
accompanies another desire like smoking or chatting with someone. 
Goals. We use the concept of goal as the purpose that drives the activities or actions 
you perform in your everyday life. A goal is an objective that you are typically trying to 
accomplish or attain, for example trying to finish cleaning your room, or trying to complete an 
assignment. 
Goals can be about something that you want to move towards or something that you 
want to avoid or prevent. For example, trying to quit smoking is something you want to prevent 
or avoid. On the other, trying to relax yourself is something you want to approach to (e.g., turn 
on the TV). 
Furthermore, a goal is something that may take time to achieve or requires sustained 
effort, such as when you are preparing an assignment for Uni or when trying to save some 
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money for your holidays. On the other hand, goals can also be easier to achieve, such as when 
you want to chat with your friends; you just need to pick up you’re phone to satisfy this goal. 
Finally, multiple goals can be active during a brief period of time. For example, you 
may have been trying to read but also you may want to eat some chocolate, and you can do 
both simultaneously. In other times it is more difficult to harmonise your goals, such as when 
you want to party and you know you need to dedicate more time to revise; in this later case 
your goals are in conflict. 
 
